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Due to the decrease in the extent of sea ice covering the Arctic Ocean,1 coupled with improved 
technology, the Arctic has witnessed a great increase in human activity, most of which involves 
navigation. Operating in a region full of natural hazards to navigation – such as ice cover, harsh 
weather conditions and continuous darkness during part of the year – but largely devoid of 
supporting infrastructure – such as ports, icebreaker assistance, up-to-date charts, effective 
search and rescue (SAR) or radar coverage – ships plying the Arctic face very real risks to their 
safety, including the safety of life of those onboard.2 At the same time, the presence of an 
increasing number of vessels in the Arctic poses a risk to the fragile polar environment, not 
only through accidents but simply by their operation. Operational discharges from ships 
contribute to a significantly larger share of pollution to the marine environment than accidental 
pollution.3 To provide a remedy for at least some of the risks posed by and facing ships in polar 
waters, a new international legally binding instrument, the International Code for Ships 
Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) was developed by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and entered into force on 1 January 2017. The regulations of the Polar 
Code aim to raise the level of protection of the polar marine environment from vessel-source 
pollution and the safety of ships operating in polar waters to above that already applicable. The 
basic regulations regarding navigation and the rights and duties of flag States and coastal States4 
are laid down in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).5 However, 
the provisions of the LOSC need further specification through the technical work of the IMO, 
especially in polar areas on which the LOSC is largely silent.6 The LOSC as the “Constitution 
for the Oceans,”7 creates a careful balance between the two major principles of the law of the 
sea: freedom of the seas – and its manifestation in the field of shipping, freedom of navigation 
– and coastal State jurisdiction. However, as will be seen below, the balance between these 
principles is not as fixed in the Arctic as elsewhere, leaving the negotiation of new instruments 
                                                     
1 For data on the Arctic ice extent, both currently and historically, see National Snow & Ice Data Center, “Arctic 
Sea Ice News & Analysis,” https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/ (accessed November 27, 2018). 
2 IMO, “International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),” Res. MSC.385(94), November 21, 
2014; and IMO, “International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),” Res. MEPC.264(68), May 
15, 2015 (Polar Code), Introduction, 3.1. 
3 See e.g. Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution: The Law and Politics of International Regulation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 19-22. 
4 To elucidate what flag, coastal and port States are I turn to Robin R. Churchill and A. Vaughan Lowe who give 
a simple but succinct definition of the capacities States can act in according to the law of the sea: 
A flag State is the State whose nationality a particular vessel has. A coastal State is the State in one of 
whose maritime zones a particular vessel lies. A port State is the State in one of whose ports a particular 
vessel lies. 
Robin R. Churchill and A. Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999), 344 (original emphasis). 
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, December 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (LOSC). 
6 The notable exception is Article 234 of the LOSC. For its text, see infra note 36. 
7 Tommy T. B. Koh, “A Constitution for the Oceans,” in The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1983), xxxiii-xxxvii. 
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especially open to State manoeuvring, in an attempt to stamp their interpretation on the 
outcome. The Polar Code could, then, both influence that balance and be influenced by 
interested States. Understandably States with experience and stakes in polar shipping played an 
important role in the debates on the Polar Code, even if it was negotiated in an international 
organisation with global membership. The present thesis takes the negotiation of the Polar Code 
as its research topic and places one significant Arctic actor in that negotiation at its centre: the 
Russian Federation. 
With the longest coastline in the Arctic, the concomitant history and experience in polar 
shipping and an infrastructure supporting Arctic navigation,8 though largely developed during 
Soviet times, together with the continuing socio-economic and strategic-military interests in the 
region, Russia is a central actor in Arctic shipping. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) off Russia’s 
coast is more open and less clogged by ice than routes through the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago. A long list of activities reliant on navigation are present along the Russian coast, 
such as resource exploration and exploitation, surveying of the continental shelf, scientific 
research, resupply of remote communities, transportation of construction material and 
machinery to economic projects and hydrocarbons and hard minerals out of the region, fishing, 
cruise tourism as well as naval activities. Looking at Russia’s behaviour and contribution to the 
Polar Code’s negotiation is, then, important in giving meaning to the Code and its influence on 
Arctic shipping. 
Though the NSR runs along most of the Russian Arctic coast it does not cover the whole of the 
Northeast Passage (NEP). Starting at the Kara Gates and extending to the Bering Strait, the 
NSR is a concept originating in Soviet legislation.9 At the same time, while the possibilities of 
the NSR as a trans-Arctic route between the Pacific and the Atlantic have been thrust to the fore 
internationally and actively promoted by Russia since 2009, 10  notably through the 
pronouncements of President Vladimir Putin,11 Russia has placed great emphasis on turning its 
                                                     
8 This does not, however, mean that the state and level of infrastructure in the Russian Arctic is satisfactory. For 
the challenges facing the Russian icebreaker fleet due to the different natures of operation, see Arild Moe and 
Lawson Brigham, “Organization and Management Challenges of Russia’s Icebreaker Fleet,” Geographical 
Review 107, no. 1 (2016): 1-21. 
9 Most recently, the NSR was defined in Russian Federation, Federal Act on Amendments to Specific Legislative 
Acts of the Russian Federation Related to Governmental Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of 
the Northern Sea Route, N 132-FZ, July 28, 2012 (NSR Federal Act). Clause 3 of this Act reads: 
The water area of the Northern Sea Route shall be considered as the water area adjacent to the Northern 
coast of the Russian Federation, comprising the internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the adjacent zone 
and the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation and confined in the East with the Line of 
Maritime Demarcation with the United States of America and Cape Dezhnev parallel in Bering Strait, with 
the meridian of Cape Mys Zhelania to the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago in the West, with the eastern 
coastline of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the western borders of Matochkin Strait, Kara Strait and 
Yugorski Shar. 
10 E.g. Arild Moe, “The Northern Sea Route: Smooth Sailing Ahead?” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014): 784-
802. 
11 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the Second International Arctic Forum,” Arkhangelsk, September 22, 2011,  
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Arctic into a strategic resource base with the help of the NSR as a national transportation 
corridor.12 This duality between the national and the international13 is also reflected in the 
Soviet/Russian NSR legislation. While Soviet/Russian scholars, reinforced by the Arctic’s 
place in the national identity, did voice claims to sovereignty over Arctic waters,14 Russia is 
one of only two States to rely on the ice-covered waters provision of the LOSC, allowing 
unilateral regulation of Arctic shipping by coastal States under certain conditions.15 Russia’s 
legislation with regard to the NSR is, then, mainly based on international law,16 although 
historic waters claims provide it with a backup option. Moreover, Russia’s recent regulatory 
reforms brought it more in line with international law.17 Increasing alignment with international 
law, however, does not mean that Russian regulations are uncontroversial in relation to the 
international legal framework. This can be seen with regard to prior authorisation of ships 
intending to enter the NSR; Russian icebreaking monopoly which also gives comparative 
                                                     
http://narfu.ru/en/media/news/21110 (accessed September 15, 2017). 
12 Russian Federation, Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 
and for a Further Perspective, September 18, 2008 (Basics of Arctic Policy), 4 (a) and (d). 
13 Russian uncertainties as regards balancing national aims and international cooperation have been pointed out in 
general in Robert Legvold, “The Role of Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy,” in The Multilateral 
Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 
21-45; Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen, “Key Features of Russian Multilateralism,” in The Multilateral 
Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 
1-20; Andrei Zagorski, “Multilateralism in Russian Foreign Policy Approaches,” in The Multilateral Dimension 
in Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 46-57; and 
Robert Legvold, “Encountering Globalization Russian Style,” in Russia’s Encounter with Globalization: Actors, 
Processes and Critical Moments, ed. Julie Wilhelmsen and Elana Wilson Rowe (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 15-39. For this tension between the national and the international with regard to Russia and the 
Arctic, see Elana Wilson Rowe and Helge Blakkisrud, “A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia’s Policy Discourses 
and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North,” Geopolitics 19, no. 1 (2014): 77-83; Andrei Zagorski, 
“Russia’s Arctic Governance Policies,” in The New Arctic Governance, ed. Linda Jakobson and Neil Melvin 
(Solna: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 2016), 107-110; and Alexander Sergunin, “Russian Approaches to an 
Emerging Arctic Ocean Legal Order,” Polar Cooperation Research Centre (PCRC) Working Paper no. 6 (March 
2017): 1-52, http://www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-pcrc/pdf/PCRCWPS/PCRC_06_Sergunin.pdf. 
14  See summaries of such views in Erik Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic: Canadian and Russian 
Perspectives (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 168-175; Jan J. Solski, “New Developments in 
Russian Regulation of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 4, no. 1 (2013): 
98-103; and Jan J. Solski, “Russia,” in Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic 
States and User States, ed. Robert C. Beckman et al. (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017), 188-192. 
15 LOSC, supra note 5, Art. 234. The other State to introduce unilateral regulations for Arctic shipping in its waters 
is Canada. For comparative works on Russian and Canadian unilateral regulations, see infra note 126. 
16 For analyses of the Russian legislation in light of Article 234 of the LOSC, see e.g. R. Douglas Brubaker, “The 
Arctic – Navigational Issues under International Law of the Sea,” Yearbook of Polar Law II (2010): 59-63; Erik 
Franckx, “The “New” Arctic Passages and the “Old” Law of the Sea,” in Jurisdiction over Ships: Post-UNCLOS 
Developments in the Law of the Sea, ed. Henrik Ringbom (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 194-216; Solski, “Russia,” 
supra note 14; and Jacques Hartmann, “Regulating Shipping in the Arctic Ocean: An Analysis of State Practice,” 
Ocean Development & International Law 49, no. 3 (2018): 285-287. 
17 Erik Franckx, “The Shape of Things to Come: The Russian Federation and the Northern Sea Route in 2011,” 
The Yearbook of Polar Law V (2013): 268; and Solski, “Russia,” supra note 14, 197-215. 
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advantages to Russian companies authorised to use their own icebreaker assistance; lack of 
transparency on icebreaker fees; and the increased focus on the purpose of security in exercising 
jurisdiction.18 Adding an extra layer to the existing legal issues regarding shipping along the 
NSR is the new Polar Code. 
Looking at Russia as a major actor in the negotiation of the Polar Code is not only interesting 
and important in and of itself, but also because of the interplay and sometimes clash between 
international and national regulations of Arctic shipping, reflecting the conflict of deeper 
underlying principles. While the principle of freedom of navigation, based on uniform and 
universal international regulations, protects the interests of shipping industry and world trade, 
coastal State jurisdiction places barriers on these global interests, at the same time professing 
greater protection to coastal State interests, including for the protection of the marine 
environment. The Polar Code negotiations may thus be seen as a “playground” for ideas that 
go beyond the concrete regulations. Whether the Polar Code reflects the interests of the 
international community – be they environmental protection interests, global shipping interests 
or indeed both at the same time19 – or is shaped to the particular interests of a few coastal States 
is then of importance. This harks back to a dichotomy that, according to Martti Koskenniemi, 
has been influencing international law: community of States vs autonomy of States.20 To tease 
out this aspect of the negotiations of the Polar Code, I employ a theoretical framework based 
on deliberative democracy, focusing more on the theory’s aspects relating to deliberation than 
democracy.21 Of significance is deliberative theory’s dichotomy between arguing (deliberation) 
and bargaining (negotiation), which result in a consensus-based common good on the one hand, 
and the compromise of give-and-take of self-interest on the other. These concepts are 
underpinned by a further distinction between the impartial reasoning of arguing and strategic 
pronouncements reliant on unequal power relations characteristic of bargaining. The spectrum 
                                                     
18 Solski, “Russia,” supra note 14, 197-213. It has also been reported that Russia is introducing regulations for 
foreign warships, including notification requirement before entry into the NSR and the requirement to take pilots 
onboard, see “Press Review: Moscow Tightens Arctic Passage and Kiev Fears Full Loss of Gas Transit,” TASS, 
March 6, 2019, http://tass.com/pressreview/1047602 (accessed April 11, 2019). For an analysis of the proposed 
draft legislation, see Andrey Todorov, “Where Does the Northern Sea Route Lead to?” Russian International 
Affairs Council, March 18, 2019, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/where-does-the-
northern-sea-route-lead-to/ (accessed June 1, 2019); and Jan Jakub Solski, “Navigational Rights of Warships 
through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – All Bark and No Bite?” The JCLOS Blog, May 31, 2019, 
http://site.uit.no/jclos/files/2019/05/JCLOS-Blog_31.5.2019_Jan-Solski-1.pdf. 
19 Kathrin Keil’s analysis reveals that sustained shipping activity and the protection of the Arctic environment are 
not seen as mutually exclusive by actors involved in Arctic shipping, not even by environmental NGOs, Kathrin 
Keil, “Sustainability Understandings of Arctic Shipping,” in The Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic: 
Reconfiguring Identity, Space, and Time, ed. Ulrik Pram Gad and Jeppe Strandsbjerg (London: Routledge, 2018), 
45-46. 
20  Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, reissue 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 488-497. 
21 There is a democratic element to the decision-making process of the IMO which is professedly based on 
consensus and where a wide array of consultative organisations provide voice to the relevant sections of civil 
society. For further discussion of the IMO and its decision-making process, see section 1.2. 
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between these poles, representing deliberative negotiation is also of note. In a technical United 
Nations (UN) body, such as the IMO, one may assume that actors aim towards outcomes that 
are firmly in the public interest.22 In fact, such a goal is evident in the case of the Polar Code 
whose environmental protection and safety aspects are in the interests of the international 
community. Where Russia’s negotiating strategy can be placed between the poles of 
deliberative theory, how this influenced the negotiation and the outcome of the Polar Code, 
how Russia’s negotiating strategy was impacted by the principles of freedom of navigation and 
coastal State jurisdiction, and what that says about Russia as an actor as well as State 
interactions at the IMO more generally, is the focus of this research.  
This thesis therefore poses two general research questions which will be further expounded. 
Suffice it here to formulate them in the following manner: 
1) How can Russia’s participation in the Polar Code negotiations be interpreted? And, 
secondarily, what does this say about Russia as an actor in international negotiations of 
Arctic shipping regulation? 
2) What does the negotiation of the Polar Code tell us about the role of the two principles of 
the law of the sea in largely technical organisations, such as the IMO? 
In the course of this doctoral thesis, to answer these questions, I will first outline my findings 
as presented in my articles in chapter 2. Placing my research at the nexus of international 
relations (IR) and deliberative democracy, in chapter 3 I give an account of my theoretical 
framework, its concepts and how I adapted these to my research, as well as its challenges. 
Chapter 4 explains how I operationalised the theoretical framework to be able to analyse my 
largely documentary material. These chapters lead finally to the discussion and interpretation 
of my findings and answering of my research questions in chapter 5. 
First, however, I want to give a brief explanation of the international law of the sea, particularly 
with regard to the underlying dynamic provided by the two principles, freedom of navigation 
and coastal State jurisdiction, as well as its application to the Arctic. In addition, I provide an 
introduction to the IMO and the Polar Code, to lay the ground for further discussion. 
1.1 The law of the sea and the Arctic 
This section serves to introduce the reader to the two historically defining and underlying 
principles of the law of the sea, which also made their mark on the negotiation of the Polar 
Code. Related to this, one notably vague provision of the LOSC is also introduced which was 
a bone of contention in the negotiations: Article 234 Ice-covered areas. 
                                                     
22 Consider also Jens Steffek, “The Output Legitimacy of International Organizations and the Global Public 
Interest,” International Theory 7, no. 2 (2015): 281-284. 
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The LOSC, negotiated at the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III) between 1973 and 1982, lays down the rights and duties of States regarding their uses of 
the seas – the Arctic Ocean being no different.23 In doing this, the LOSC both codified and 
further developed the law of the sea which itself is based on the competing principles of freedom 
of the seas and coastal State jurisdiction. One of the fundamental freedoms of the sea is freedom 
of navigation,24 based on the right to unimpeded international trade as advocated by Hugo 
Grotius in Mare Liberum.25 Beyond trade considerations, the interests of naval mobility and, 
thus, global security also support the freedom of navigation principle. At the same time, the 
principle of coastal State jurisdiction is based on coastal security,26 and more recently sovereign 
rights over coastal resources.27 Importantly for the present thesis – both on account of the 
IMO’s remit and due to the scope of Article 234 of the LOSC introduced below – pollution 
prevention has also played a significant role in efforts to expand coastal State jurisdiction.28 As 
Davor Vidas suggests, the driving forces behind the two principles are territorial appropriation 
or dominion on the one hand and “economic profit by functional as opposed to territorial access; 
and […] securing strategic gains of naval powers in distant sea areas” on the other.29 
To settle the question of ever-extending jurisdictional claims, the LOSC strikes a careful 
balance between navigation and pollution prevention.30 For the purpose of the prevention of 
                                                     
23 Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, May 28, 2008,  
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/080525_arctic_ocean_conference-_outcome.pdf (accessed 
May 1, 2019). 
24 The high seas freedoms are listed in LOSC, supra note 5, Art. 87. For a praise of the navigational freedoms as 
enshrined in the LOSC, see John Norton Moore, “Navigational Freedom: The Most Critical Common Heritage,” 
International Law Studies 93 (2017): 251-261. 
25  See e.g. Davor Vidas, “Responsibility for the Seas,” in Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in 
Globalisation: IUU Fishing, Oil Pollution, Bioprospecting, Outer Continental Shelf, ed. Davor Vidas (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 17-21; M. C. W. Pinto, “Hugo Grotius and the Law of the Sea,” in Law of the 
Sea: From Grotius to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Liber Amicorum Judge Hugo Caminos, 
ed. Lilian del Castillo (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 27-28; and Michaela Young, “Then and Now: Reappraising 
Freedom of the Seas in Modern Law of the Sea,” Ocean Development & International Law 47, no. 2 (2016): 172. 
26 With regard to this, see e.g. Bernard Oxman, “The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea,” American 
Journal of International Law 100 (2006): 840-843; and Rüdiger Wolfrum, “The Freedom of Navigation: Modern 
Challenges Seen from a Historical Perspective,” in Law of the Sea, From Grotius to the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea: Liber Amicorum Judge Hugo Caminos, ed. Lilian del Castillo (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 
98-102. 
27 Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution, supra note 3, 201. 
28 Oxman, “Territorial Temptation,” supra note 26, 843-849; Eelco Leemans and Thomas Rammelt, “Mare 
Liberum or Mare Restrictum? Challenges for the Maritime Industry,” in The World Ocean in Globalisation: 
Climate Change, Sustainable Fisheries, Biodiversity, Shipping, Regional Issues, ed. Davor Vidas and Peter Johan 
Schei (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 274-275; and Wolfrum, “Freedom of Navigation,” supra note 
26, 94-98.  
29 Vidas, “Responsibility for the Seas,” supra note 25, 27. 
30 For the negotiation of LOSC in light of the competing maritime and coastal interests in jurisdictional questions, 
see Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution, supra note 3, 192-201. John Norton Moore extols the LOSC for 
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ship-source pollution, the coastal State is afforded rights to regulate ships passing through 
waters off its coast to a decreasing degree the more out to sea the ship is found, depending on 
the maritime zone, and largely restricted to generally accepted international rules and standards 
(GAIRAS).31 Although navigational rights and freedoms are preserved and protected against 
unilateral coastal State regulations in various ocean areas, the establishment of the 
environmental protection framework should be seen as one of the major accomplishments of 
the LOSC, putting an end to the freedom to pollute.32 The balance of the two principles in 
general is also supported by the breakdown of a clear divide between maritime and coastal 
interests, due largely to the flagging out of fleets to open registries from traditional maritime 
powers, the ever wider spread of environmental interests as well as the reliance on international 
trade of even the most zealous coastal States.33  
While the LOSC appears to have largely created a balance between freedom of navigation and 
coastal State jurisdiction, two points have to be made. Firstly, Koskenniemi argues that the 
provisions of the LOSC in general are open to the dichotomy of community vs autonomy and 
lack material rules, referring disagreements instead to competent international organisations – 
the IMO considered as such in the realm of commercial shipping – or State agreements.34 I will 
return to these claims in the final chapter of this thesis.  
Secondly, there is one geographical area where the balance established in the LOSC between 
navigation and pollution prevention tilts distinctly towards the latter: ice-covered areas.35 
Article 234 of the LOSC provides for more extensive coastal State rights to protect the marine 
environment by prescribing and enforcing laws and regulations that are stricter than 
international standards.36 This article, specifically tailored to Arctic conditions, was negotiated 
                                                     
resolving an “ancient,” four-century-old conflict between navigational and resource issues as well as modernise 
it, Moore, “Navigational Freedom,” supra note 24, 257. 
31 The coastal State exercises full sovereignty in its internal waters. This sovereignty extends to the territorial sea 
but is further qualified, LOSC, supra note 5, Art. 2. Here, the coastal State can set unilateral standards on pollution 
discharges but is limited by generally accepted international rules and standards (GAIRAS) with regard to the 
regulation of continuously applicable standards, such as construction, design, equipment and manning (CDEM); 
ibid., Art. 21 (1) (f) and (2). It can only regulate navigation in conformity with GAIRAS in the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) where, in principle, the high seas freedom of navigation applies; ibid., Arts. 56 (1) (b) (iii), 58 (1) and 
211 (5). One further manifestation of the freedom of navigation and its objective of global mobility is the right of 
transit passage through straits used for international navigation, between two parts of the EEZ or the high seas, 
with minimal interference from strait States; ibid., Part III, Section 2. 
32 Catherine Redgwell, “From Permission to Prohibition: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
Protection of the Marine Environment,” in The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, ed. David Freestone, 
Richard Banes and David M. Ong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 180-186; and Donald R. Rothwell 
and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 338 and 342-344. 
33 Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution, supra note 3, 62-73 and 102-104. 
34 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, reissue, supra note 20, 488-497. 
35 See also Aldo Chircop, “Jurisdiction over Ice-Covered Areas and the Polar Code: An Emerging Symbiotic 
Relationship?” The Journal of International Maritime Law 22 (2016): 278-281. 
36 LOSC, supra note 5, Art. 234. The text of this article reads: 
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primarily between Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union, and was the result of the 
clash of the two principles, discussed above, in the Arctic: freedom of navigation and the 
general maritime interests of the two superpowers; and the special Arctic coastal State interests 
of Canada and the Soviet Union.37 The possibility to go above the global level rules and, thus, 
create a new balance between environmental protection and freedom of navigation arguably 
also placated the sovereignty considerations on Canada’s part, at the same time acknowledging 
Soviet interests.38 Moreover, the acceptance of the new regime of straits used for international 
navigation in general was of importance especially to the United States but also for the Soviet 
Union. It has to be noted though that the Arctic was not used for international commercial 
navigation to any extent at the time. 
While Article 234 tilts the balance more towards unilateral national environmental protection, 
much of the language of this article remains vague and open to interpretation: which maritime 
zone(s) does it apply in (only in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or also in the territorial 
sea); what exactly does it mean for navigational rights and freedoms and to what extent do 
rights in Article 234 limit these rights and freedoms; and what type of measures may be 
included under Article 234, a provision aimed at pollution prevention in particular.39 What is 
                                                     
Coastal States have a right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the exclusive economic 
zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for the most 
of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine 
environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws 
and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection of the marine environment based on 
the best available scientific evidence. 
37 For the negotiation history of Article 234, see Donald M. McRae, “Negotiation of Article 234,” in Politics of 
the Northwest Passage, ed. Franklin Griffiths (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 98-114; James 
Kraska, “Governance of Ice-Covered Areas: Rule Construction in the Arctic Ocean,” Ocean Development & 
International Law 45, no. 3 (2014): 260-271; and Armand de Mestral, “Article 234 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Its Origins and Its Future,” in International Law and Politics of the Arctic 
Ocean: Essays in Honor of Donat Pharand, ed. Suzanne Lalonde and Ted L. McDorman (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 
111-124. It must not be forgotten that the United States is an Arctic coastal State as well. 
38 Oxman, “Territorial Temptation,” supra note 26, 849. See also John Kirton and Don Munton, “The Manhattan 
Voyages and Their Aftermath,” in Politics of the Northwest Passage, ed. Franklin Griffiths (Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1987), 67-97. With regard to the Soviet Union and Article 234 of the LOSC, see McRae, 
“Negotiation of Article 234,” supra note 37, 109-110 and endnotes 32 and 36, 285-286. 
39 See e.g. Donald M. McRae and D. J. Goundrey, “Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters: The Extent of 
Article 234,” University of British Columbia Law Review 16 (1982): 197-228; Donat Pharand, “The Arctic Waters 
and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit,” Ocean Development & International Law 38, no. 1-2 (2007): 46-48; 
Kristin Bartenstein, “The “Arctic Exception” in the Law of the Sea Convention: A Contribution to Safer 
Navigation in the Northwest Passage?” Ocean Development & International Law 42, no. 1-2 (2011): 22-52; Erik 
J. Molenaar, “Options for Regional Regulation of Merchant Shipping Outside IMO, with Particular Reference to 
the Arctic Region,” Ocean Development & International Law 45, no. 3 (2014): 276-278; Peter Luttmann, “Ice-
Covered Areas under the Law of the Sea Convention: How Extensive are Canada’s Coastal State Powers in the 
Arctic?” Ocean Yearbook 29 (2015): 86-99; Janusz Symonides, “Problems and Controversies Concerning 
Freedom of Navigation in the Arctic,” in Law of the Sea, From Grotius to the International Tribunal for the Law 
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clear is that the coastal State is given unilateral rights to adopt and enforce laws and regulations 
to prevent vessel-source pollution, that is to say without having to consult the international 
community or conform to GAIRAS.40 With regard to polar waters, the Polar Code, or at least 
its mandatory regulations, arguably form part of GAIRAS.41 While Article 234 does not limit 
coastal State regulatory rights to the GAIRAS, what this means for the relationship between the 
Polar Code and Article 234 in practice has been open to debate.42 Only a few limitations are 
placed on the coastal State in exercising its rights under Article 234, including for the laws and 
regulations enacted under it to be non-discriminatory and pay “due regard” to navigation.43 
Only two States have so far relied on Article 234 to introduce unilateral legislation for shipping 
in their Arctic waters: Canada and Russia.44 However, some of their regulations are contested 
                                                     
of the Sea: Liber Amicorum Judge Hugo Caminos, ed. Lilian del Castillo (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 227-130; 
Roman Dremliuga, “A Note on the Application of Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Convention in Light of 
Climate Change: Views from Russia,” Ocean Development & International Law 48, no. 2 (2017): 128-135; 
Hartmann, “Regulating Shipping,” supra note 16; and Jan Jakub Solski, “Russian Coastal State Jurisdiction over 
Commercial Vessels Navigating the Northern Sea Route” (PhD diss., UiT The Arctic University of Norway, 2018), 
Chapter 4.  
40 In relation to this point, it can be argued that submitting unilateral regulations to the IMO, and through it the 
international community, for recognition is both a show of good faith and a way of satisfying the due regard to 
navigation obligation, see Kristin Bartenstein, “Navigating the Arctic: The Canadian NORDREG, the International 
Polar Code and Regional Cooperation,” German Yearbook of International Law 54 (2011): 108; and Solski, 
“Russia,” supra note 14, 205-206. 
41 Øystein Jensen, “The Polar Code and the Law of the Sea,” in Arctic Governance: Law and Politics, ed. Svein 
Vigeland Rottem and Ida Folkestad Soltvedt (London: I.B.Tauris, 2017), 164-169. For an earlier version of this 
paper, see Øystein Jensen, “The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Finalization, Adoption 
and Law of the Sea Implications,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 7, no. 1 (2016): 71-75. 
42 See e.g. Ole Kristian Fauchald, “Regulatory Framework for Maritime Transport in the Arctic: Will a Polar Code 
Contribute to Resolve Conflicting Interests?” in Marine Transport in the High North, ed. John Grue and Roy H. 
Gabrielsen (Oslo: Novus Forlag, 2011), 82-84; Andrea Scassola, “An International Polar Code of Navigation: 
Consequences and Opportunities for the Arctic,” The Yearbook of Polar Law V (2013): 283-288; Ted L. 
McDorman, “A Note on the Potential Conflicting Rights and Obligations between the IMO’s Polar Code and 
Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Convention,” in International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean: Essays in 
Honor of Donat Pharand, ed. Suzanne Lalonde and Ted L. McDoman (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 141-159; 
Chircop, “Jurisdiction over Ice-Covered Areas,” supra note 35, 283-284; Jensen, “The International Code for 
Ships,” supra note 41, 75-77; and Knut Einar Skodvin, “Arctic Shipping – Still Icy,” in Challenges of the Changing 
Arctic: Continental Shelf, Navigation, and Fisheries, ed. Myron Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Ronán Long 
(Leiden: Brill, 2016), 157. 
43 LOSC, supra note 5, Art. 234. 
44 Denmark’s Arctic strategy also refers to the possibility of doing so, see Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands, Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, August 2011 (Danish Arctic Strategy), 18. 
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by the United States and, to a lesser degree, the European Union (EU),45 while to what extent 
they are in line with Article 234 has also been subject to scrutiny.46 
Besides the enduring notion of the freedom of the seas, the main reason for placing restrictions 
on coastal States with regard to pollution prevention in general, and for including the non-
discrimination and due regard clauses in Article 234 of the LOSC in particular, is the global 
nature of the shipping industry. The possibility of ships sailing to any part of the world’s oceans 
is greatly threatened by a fragmented regulatory scene, resulting in a patchwork of regulations 
difficult for ships to “navigate” and, even worse, incompatible regulations that ships cannot 
possibly comply with at the same time. The fact that the two States with the longest coastlines 
in the Arctic – Russia and Canada – have already enacted national legislation in pursuance of 
Article 234 of the LOSC, means that there is a great need for harmonisation in order to avoid 
further fragmentation. This has become particularly important given the increasing navigational 
activity in the Arctic, cited as a reason for embarking on the development of the Polar Code.47 
Since ships operating in the Arctic may be registered in any State, not just Arctic States, and 
the largest ship registers lie far outside the Arctic,48 regional regulations would not suffice to 
provide adequate protection both for the polar environment and for the shipping industry. Thus, 
regulation of polar shipping was placed in the hands of a global international organisation, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).49 
                                                     
45 See e.g. J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd ed. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012), 490-496; and United States, “Diplomatic Note from the United States to Russia regarding the 
Northern Sea Route,” May 29, 2015, reproduced in Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2015, 
ed. CarrieLyn D. Guymon, 526-528, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/258206.pdf (accessed 
June 1, 2019). 
46 For a recent analysis of State practice see Hartmann, “Regulating Shipping,” supra note 16, 282-287. 
47 Denmark, Norway and the United States, “Work Programme: Mandatory Application of the Polar Guidelines,” 
IMO Doc. MSC 86/23/9, February 24, 2009; and Denmark, Norway and the United States, “Work Programme of 
the Committee and Subsidiary Bodies: Mandatory Application of the Polar Guidelines,” IMO Doc. MEPC 59/20/1, 
April 6, 2009. 
48 A large number of vessels are registered in States offering open registries, so-called flags of convenience. Since 
such States are typically developing States, such as Panama and Liberia, they lack the capacity (and often the will) 
to enforce the international rules and standards applicable to ships flying their flag. Churchill and Lowe, The Law 
of the sea, 3rd ed., supra note 4, 258-259. For a table of the largest flags by deadweight tonnage, see United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport 2018 (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2018), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2018_en.pdf, 35.  
49 See also conclusions in Olav Schram Stokke, “Regime Interplay in Arctic Shipping Governance: Explaining 
Regional Niche Selection,” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 13, no. 1 
(2013): 81; and Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, 2nd print (Arctic Council, April 
2009), 6 (AMSA). 
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1.2 The IMO and the Polar Code 
The IMO is a UN specialised agency responsible for international merchant shipping. 50 
Established as the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), it first 
convened in 1959 and was very much a club for maritime States and the shipping industry.51 
Yet, with the advent of environmental activism and in the wake of major accidents resulting in 
well-publicised cases of pollution, the IMO’s remit was extended to pollution prevention 
through the establishment of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC),52 while 
environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) received consultative status at the IMO 
on a par with representatives of the shipping industry. 53  The IMO is mainly a technical 
organisation,54 with delegates being largely technical experts rather than diplomats in the 
conventional sense,55 and is not competent in deciding or adjudicating on jurisdictional matters. 
In its prescriptive function,56 the IMO has generated a global regulatory regime for international 
shipping, a tiny parcel of which is the new Polar Code.  
Instruments. Due to the global nature of the shipping industry, it is pertinent for the IMO to 
develop rules that are universal and uniform, in the sense that they cover ships of all flags 
equally and consistently. The instruments developed by the IMO pertain to a wide subject area, 
with the purpose of the IMO described as “promot[ing] safe, secure, environmentally sound, 
efficient and sustainable shipping through cooperation.”57 Thus, while the work of the IMO is 
primarily directed at ships and therefore States in their flag State capacity, it also caters for the 
environmental protection interests of coastal States through its regulations on pollution 
                                                     
50  For the IMO’s responsibilities under LOSC in general, see Aldo Chircop, “The International Maritime 
Organization,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, ed. Donald R. Rothwell et al. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 416-438. For an introduction to the IMO’s role regarding polar shipping, see Aldo 
Chircop, “The IMO, Its Role under UNCLOS and Its Polar Shipping Regulation,” in Governance of Arctic 
Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States, ed. Robert C. Beckman et al. (Leiden: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2017), 107-143. For the workings of the then-IMCO, see Harvey B. Silverstein, Superships and 
Nation-States: The Transnational Policies of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978). 
51 The importance of maritime interests at IMCO/IMO is underscored by the fact that IMO instruments’ entry-
into-force is linked not only to the number of ratifying States but also to the percentage of the world fleet they 
represent, providing large flag States with an important role in its decision-making. Contributions to the budget of 
the IMO are also determined based on fleet tonnage. 
52 Chircop, “International Maritime Organization,” supra note 50, 424-425. 
53 Pursuance of environmental protection issues, again, also results from the change in perspective of traditional 
maritime States which have lost a large share of their fleets to flags of convenience. Furthermore, the 
diversification of interests represented at IMO is supported by the increase in number of member States with the 
inclusion of newly independent, but largely developing States with no significant fleet of their own. 
54 Silverstein, Superships and Nation-States, supra note 50; and Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution, supra note 
3, 75-76 and 181-184 
55 See e.g. Silverstein, Superships and Nation-States, supra note 50, 35-45. 
56 For the functions of the IMO, see Chircop, “International Maritime Organization,” supra note 50, 427-436. 




prevention and on ship safety by reducing accidental pollution. Ship safety and environmental 
protection also underpin the dual aims of the Polar Code.58 
Due to the universality and globality of IMO instruments, its conventions and recommendatory 
guidelines and resolutions also apply to ships operating in polar waters.59 Of major interest here 
are three Conventions: the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL),60 the 1974 International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)61 
and the 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).62 The first two make the Polar Code mandatory, while 
the latter is cross-referenced in the Code’s chapter regarding manning63 and has consequently 
been amended.64 Furthermore, the work of the IMO includes recommendatory guidelines, two 
of which led directly to the mandatory Polar Code,65 while others complement the Polar Code.66 
Decision-making procedure.67  A new output is usually initiated in one of the IMO’s five 
Committees by one or more of the IMO’s member States, which at the time of writing numbered 
174, with three associate members.68 In the case of the Polar Code, Denmark, Norway and the 
United States proposed placing a mandatory polar instrument on the agenda of the IMO in 
2009,69 no doubt influenced by the recommendations of the Arctic Council’s  Arctic Marine 
                                                     
58 Polar Code, supra note 2, Introduction 1. 
59 For an overview of the IMO instruments relevant to ships in polar waters, see Heike Deggim, “Ensuring Safe, 
Secure and Reliable Shipping in the Arctic Ocean,” in Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean, ed. Paul Arthur 
Berkman and Alexander N. Vylegzhanin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 241-254. 
60 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 
Relating Thereto, London, November 2, 1973 and February 17, 1978, 1340 UNTS 61, as amended (MARPOL). 
61 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, November 1, 1974, 1184 UNTS 277, as amended 
(SOLAS). 
62 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, London, July 
7, 1978, 1361 UNTS 190, as amended (STCW). 
63 Polar Code, supra note 2, Part I-A, Chapter 12. 
64 IMO, “Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on Its Ninety-Seventh Session,” IMO Doc. MSC 97/22/Add.1, 
December 6, 2016, Annexes 8 and 9. 
65  IMO, “Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters,” IMO Doc. MSC/Circ.1056 and 
MEPC/Circ.399, December 23, 2002 (Arctic Guidelines); and IMO, “Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters,” Assembly Res. A.1024(26), December 2, 2009 (Polar Guidelines).  
66 IMO, “Enhanced Contingency Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships Operating in Areas Remote from SAR 
Facilities,” IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1184, May 31, 2006; IMO, “Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger 
Ships Operating in Remote Areas,” Assembly Res. 999(25), November 29, 2007; and IMO, “Guide for Cold Water 
Survival,” IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1185/Rev.1, November 30, 2012. 
67 For an examination of the IMO’s decision-making process in its Legal Committee that in many respects is also 
applicable to the Committees and Sub-Committees discussed in the present PhD thesis, see Nicholas Gaskell, 
“Decision Making and the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organization,” The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 18, no. 2 (2003): 155-214. 
68  IMO, “Member States, IGOs and NGOs,” http://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx 
(accessed November 13, 2018). 
69 MSC 86/23/9, supra note 47; and MEPC 59/20/1, supra note 47.  
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Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (AMSA).70 After agreeing to the new output, work usually 
begins at the next session of the Committee or one of its supporting Sub-Committees, resulting 
in a somewhat slow process. The Committees and Sub-Committees are open to all member 
States for participation, while consultative organisations are also present.71 The latter represent 
the different sectors of the shipping industry, but also include environmental non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Thus, all possible interests are represented in the discussions, including 
maritime interests and coastal and environmental interests.72 The IMO’s Committees usually 
decide on policy points, while the concrete detailed work is delegated to the Sub-Committees 
which send the outcome back to the Committees for adoption. Sub-Committees usually meet 
yearly, while the Committees twice a year. While the Committees and Sub-Committees are in 
session, further work is carried out in working groups of experts representing interested member 
States and consultative organisations. 73  Between meetings of the Committees and Sub-
Committees, intersessional working groups and electronic correspondence groups may 
continue preparatory work. 
The debates at the IMO are based on proposals and information documents submitted by 
member States as well as consultative organisations. Debate is, however, not free-flowing in 
the sense that, typically, one delegation is only allowed to comment on a proposal once and it 
is rare for them to be allowed by the chair to come back and speak on the same issue again. 
Therefore, it is important for States to prepare reactions to the papers submitted so that their 
intervention covers all relevant points. Although the IMO Convention states that decision-
making at the IMO is by a two-thirds majority vote,74 the IMO places great emphasis on the 
notion that in practice it takes decisions by consensus both with regard to recommendatory and 
mandatory instruments. 75  This would suggest that all States agree to the decisions taken 
although it is often the case that decisions are taken based on the chairman’s perception of the 
                                                     
70 AMSA, 2nd print, supra note 49. 
71 The IMO is led by the Assembly, comprising all members, and, when it is not in session, the Council where 40 
members are elected based on a formula of 10 States having “the largest interest in international seaborne trade,” 
10 “States with the largest interest in providing international shipping services” and 20 States with “special 
interests in maritime transport or navigation” (also ensuring global representation). See Convention on the 
International Maritime Organization, Geneva, March 6, 1948, 289 UNTS 48, as amended (IMO Convention), 
Article 17. The work of the IMO is supported by the Secretariat, located in London. 
72 For a detailed description of these, see Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution, supra note 3, 34-74. 
73 The difficulties faced by developing States in attending and contributing to substantive decision-making in these 
groups even if the subject matter is in their interests has been pointed out by Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution, 
supra note 3, 99-101. 
74 IMO Convention, supra note 71, Article 62. 
75 See e.g. IMO, “Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International 
Maritime Organization,” IMO Doc. LEG/MISC.8, January 30, 2014, where it is pointed out four times in the 
introduction that the IMO “normally” adopts instruments by consensus, ibid., 7-12. The Secretary-General at the 
time, Efthimios E. Mitropoulos of Greece, has addressed this issue at MEPC 60, highlighting the divisive nature 
of voting and the IMO’s practice to strive for consensus, see IMO, “Report of the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee on Its Sixtieth Session,” IMO Doc. MEPC 60/22, April 12, 2010, 32. 
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balance between those member States for and against a proposal, in a quasi-voting fashion.76 
Consultative organisations do not possess a right to vote but are influential in shaping decisions, 
especially through their practical expertise. 
Adoption of instruments. IMO Conventions need ratification for entry into force, where not only 
the number of ratifying States counts but also the share of the gross tonnage of the world fleet 
they represent.77 While this accords greater weight to flags of convenience, once a Convention 
is in force, this dynamic changes. For an amendment to enter into force, no positive approval is 
required by member States under the tacit acceptance procedure. Instead, the amendment enters 
into force on a given date unless objected to by a specified number of States,78 negating the 
difference between member States created by the unequal size of their fleets. Thus, the tacit 
acceptance procedure allows for the continuous and relatively fast updating of these instruments 
to keep them up to date with technical developments. 
1.2.1 The Polar Code 
The Polar Code was adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) at its 94th session in 
November 2014 and by the MEPC at its 68th session in May 2015, the Polar Code finally 
entered into force on 1 January 2017. It is the international community’s latest effort to provide 
uniform and universal standards for ships sailing in polar waters with regards to ship safety and 
pollution prevention. The development of the Code was proposed emphasising the increasing 
potential of negative impacts on the safety of vessels and the marine environment, noting that 
such a development would logically flow from the Polar Guidelines79 and singling out such 
issues as SAR and environmental emergency response as well as crew qualification and 
training.80 By introducing a new mandatory international legal instrument for polar shipping, 
the development of the Code also impacts upon the balance of the principles of freedom of 
navigation and coastal State jurisdiction. It sets a higher level of environmental protection and, 
thus, potentially raises the threshold for coastal State unilateral action, while at the same time 
acts to enable practicable shipping in Arctic waters by providing global level safety regulations 
and a benchmark for insurance purposes.  
                                                     
76 Nicholas Gaskell observes the importance of the chairman in summing up the “prevailing mood” of the 
delegations with regard to a particular proposal, see Gaskell, “Decision Making,” supra note 67, 186-187. 
77 In the case of both SOLAS and MARPOL, as well as MARPOL’s optional Annexes, the combined merchant 
fleets of the parties had to constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping 
for these instruments to enter into force. See SOLAS, supra note 61, Article X (a); and MARPOL, supra note 60, 
Article 15 (1) and (2).  
78 IMO, “Conventions,” http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx (accessed November 13, 
2018). For tacit acceptance in the case of SOLAS, see SOLAS, supra note 61, Article VIII (b) (vi). For tacit 
acceptance in the case of the Annexes of MARPOL, see MARPOL, supra note 60, Article 16 (2) (f) (iii). 
79 Polar Guidelines, supra note 65. 
80  MSC 86/23/9, supra note 47; and MEPC 59/20/1, supra note 47. Interestingly, questions of SAR and 
environmental emergency response did not form the major points of the Polar Code negotiations or text. 
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History and geographical scope. While this thesis deals with the Polar Code debates at the IMO 
from 2009, when an expressly mandatory Code was placed on the IMO’s agenda, the idea of 
harmonised rules and standards for ships in polar waters first appeared in the 1990s. 81 
Developments at that time, however, resulted in recommendatory guidelines,82 at first for 
Arctic ice-covered waters but later extended to polar waters, i.e. also including Antarctic waters 
and not just limited to ice-covered waters. The latter’s coverage was kept for the mandatory 
Polar Code. Thus, the Polar Code applies to ships in the Arctic north of 60°N with the exception 
of the waters around Iceland, the Norwegian Sea and the western part of the Barents Sea, but 
including the waters around Greenland as far south as 58°N,83 while in the Antarctic the Code’s 
application area coincides with the waters in the treaty area of the Antarctic Treaty, up to 
latitude 60°S.84 
Negotiating Committees and Sub-Committees. Due to the dual goal of the Polar Code, two 
Committees were responsible for the work on it: the MSC and the MEPC. However, the Code 
was mostly developed in the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE) and, after 
the IMO’s structure was reorganised at the start of 2014,85 the Sub-Committee on Ship Design 
and Construction (SDC). 86  The meetings of the Committees and Sub-Committees that 
discussed the Polar Code are summarised in Table 1. 
Participants. Due to the large number of delegations and their divergent interests and resources, 
not every delegation was equally active with regards to the Polar Code even though, as 
mentioned above, the Committees and Sub-Committees comprise all IMO member States and 
                                                     
81 For these developments see, Lawson W. Brigham, “The Emerging International Polar Navigation Code: Bi-
Polar Relevance?” in Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Law and Policy for Pollution Prevention, ed. 
Davor Vidas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 244-262. 
82 Arctic Guidelines, supra note 65; and Polar Guidelines, supra note 65. 
83 SOLAS, supra note 61, Chapter XIV, Reg. 1 defines Arctic waters as 
[…] those waters which are located north of a line from the latitude 58°00’.0 N and longitude 042°00’.0 W 
to latitude 64°37’.0 N, longitude 035°27’.0 W and thence by a rhumb line to latitude 67°03’.9 N, longitude 
026°33’.4 W and thence by a rhumb line to the latitude 70°49’.56 N and longitude 008°59’.61 W (Sørkapp, 
Jan Mayen) and by the southern shore of Jan Mayen to 73°31’.6 N and 019°01’.0 E by the Island of 
Bjørnøya, and thence by a great circle line to the latitude 68°38’.29 N and longitude 043°23’.08 E (Cap 
Kanin Nos) and hence by the northern shoe of the Asian Continent eastward to the Bering Strait and thence 
from the Bering Strait westward to latitude 60° N as far as Il’pyrskiy and following the 60th North parallel 
eastward as far as and including Etolin Strait and thence by the northern shore of the North American 
continent as far south as latitude 60° N and thence eastward along parallel of latitude 60° N, to longitude 
056°37’.1 W and thence to the latitude 58°00’.0 N, longitude 042°00’.0 W. 
84 The Antarctic Treaty, Washington, December 1, 1959, 402 UNTS 71, Article VI. 
85 IMO, “Summary of Decisions,” IMO Doc. C 110/D, July 29, 2013, 5. 
86 Other Sub-Committees were also consulted with regard to the content of the Polar Code, including the Sub-
Committees on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR), Fire Protection (FP), Human Element, 
Training and Watchkeeping (HTW), Safety of Navigation (NAV), Navigation, Communications and Search and 
Rescue (NCSR), Stability and Load Lines and on Fishing Vessels Safety (SLF), Ship Systems and Equipment 
(SSE) and Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW). See also Table 1. 
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consultative organisations. In line with expectations and in accordance with their experience 
and interests in the Arctic region, the five Arctic coastal States – Canada, Denmark, Norway, 
Russia and the United States – submitted the highest number of documents to the Polar Code 
negotiations, together with Finland which also has ample experience in navigation in ice-
covered waters in the Baltic. Iceland and Sweden, the two remaining Arctic Council member 
States, come slightly further down on the list, below Germany, Argentina and New Zealand – 
the former a State influential in maritime affairs with a large economy and corresponding cargo-
owning interests; the latter two States with territorial claims and SAR responsibilities in 
Antarctic waters. The remaining States that submitted proposals to the process come 
considerably further behind and include such flags of convenience as Liberia, Marshall Islands 
and Panama, and States associated with maritime and user interests in the Arctic such as China, 
Japan, South Korea87 and the UK – the latter also an Antarctic claimant. The number of 
documents submitted by each State is illustrated in Table 2.  
Year Body Year Body 
2009 MSC 86 
MEPC 59 











2011 DE 55 
NAV 57 
MEPC 62 














2013 FP 56 2015 MEPC 68 
Table 1 - IMO Committees and Sub-Committees which discussed the Polar Code, 2009-201588 
However, these numbers only reveal one aspect of the negotiations. Firstly, consultative 
organisations, especially environmental NGOs were especially active in tabling proposals and 
information papers in order to influence the debates and the outcome, although to what extent 
                                                     
87 As regards the generally cautious and lukewarm approach of China, Japan and South Korea towards Arctic 
shipping in general and with regard to the Polar Code process in particular, see Arild Moe and Olav Schram 
Stokke, “Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance,” Arctic Review 
on Law and Politics 10 (2019): 24-52. 
88 The second session of the HTW Sub-Committee arranged in 2015 is not included in this list in spite of having 
discussed crewing requirements relating to the Polar Code as this was after the adoption of the Polar Code’s safety 
part. Accordingly, the discussions at HTW 2 should be seen as consequential work. 
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their concerns were taken on board is questionable.89 Secondly, it is clear that many of the 
States listed in Table 1 were more active in the debates than the number of submitted documents 
would suggest, and more States took part in the discussions even if they did not submit written 
documents. The few documents in the research material that summarise the proceedings in the 
working groups and correspondence groups show that many distinct States, such as the 
Bahamas, Singapore and South Africa, took part in these groups, while many of the States, such 
as Australia, Chile, China, Japan and South Korea, that submitted only a handful of documents, 
attended most of the working and correspondence group meetings.  
Member State Number of 
documents 
Member State Number of 
documents 
Canada 34 Marshall Islands 4 
Norway 30 China 3 
United States 28 Panama 3 
Finland 15 Vanuatu 3 
Russia 15 Chile 2 
Denmark 12 Liberia 2 
Argentina 11 South Korea 2 
Germany 11 Australia 1 
New Zealand 9 Japan 1 
Iceland 8 Kiribati 1 
Sweden 8 Netherlands 1 
United Kingdom 5 St. Kitts and Nevis 1 
France 4 Tuvalu 1 
Table 2 - Number of documents submitted by member States90 
Topics of negotiation. Major procedural issues debated included how to make the Polar Code 
mandatory, with implications for the applicability of the Code to distinct vessel types as well 
as the placement of environmental measures within the Code; and the relationship between the 
Polar Code and other sources of international law, chiefly the LOSC. The Polar Code being a 
highly technical instrument, discussions on the substance of the Code centred, amongst other 
things, on the different ship categories defined by the Code, the definition of temperature 
                                                     
89 The unaddressed concerns of environmental NGOs were listed in a document submitted to the last MEPC 
meeting before the adoption of the Polar Code, see Friends of the Earth International et al., “Consideration and 
Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Environmental Protection in the Polar Code,” IMO Doc. 
MEPC 68/INF.37, March 6, 2015. Russia has been particularly outspoken against proposals submitted by 
“environmental organisation [which] keep mentioning the increased vulnerability of ecological systems of Arctic 
and Antarctic to the human activity,” IMO, “Report to the Maritime Safety Committee,” IMO Doc. DE 56/25, 
February 28, 2012, Annex 21. 
90 These numbers include documents submitted to all the Committees and Sub-Committees that discussed the Polar 
Code. The numbers for Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom also include those papers submitted by the 
chairperson of working and correspondence groups provided by these States. It also has to be noted that many of 
the documents are counted under two or more States due to these being co-sponsored by several delegations. 
Examples to States which frequently co-sponsored papers together are Finland and Sweden; Argentina and Chile; 
and China and South Korea. Many documents were submitted by consultative organisations and by the Secretariat 
of the IMO, which are not accounted for in this table. 
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measurements, oil discharge requirements and qualifications for crew, including the possibility 
of using ice navigators. 
Preamble 
Introduction 
Part I-A Safety Measures 
Chapter 1 General
Chapter 2 Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM)
Chapter 3 Ship Structure 
Chapter 4 Subdivision and Stability
Chapter 5 Watertight and Weathertight Integrity
Chapter 6 Machinery Installations
Chapter 7 Fire Safety/Protection
Chapter 8 Life Saving Appliances and Arrangements
Chapter 9 Safety of Navigation 
Chapter 10 Communication 
Chapter 11 Voyage Planning 
Chapter 12 Manning and Training
Part I-B Additional Guidance Regarding the Provisions of the Introduction and Part I-A
Part II-A Pollution Prevention Measures
Chapter 1 Prevention of Pollution by Oil
Chapter 2 Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk 
Chapter 3 Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged 
Form 
Chapter 4 Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships
Chapter 5 Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships
Part II-B Additional Guidance to Part II-A
Appendix 1 Form of Certificate for Ships operating in Polar Waters
Appendix 2 Model Table of Contents for the Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM)
Table 3 - The structure of the Polar Code as included in IMO Resolution MEPC.264(68) 
Relationship to Conventions. The Polar Code is not a stand-alone treaty although such an option 
was considered during its negotiation.91 It is instead made mandatory through SOLAS and 
specific MARPOL Annexes.92 This solution meant that the Polar Code could enter into force 
expeditiously through the tacit acceptance procedure, whereas a stand-alone treaty would have 
required ratification and its timely entry into force – if at all – could not have been guaranteed. 
However, the downside of the Polar Code being an add-on to SOLAS and MARPOL is that it 
could only contain regulations that fit with the remit of these Conventions and is applicable to 
those ships these Conventions cover. The Polar Code builds on SOLAS and MARPOL, 
meaning that the provisions of these Conventions remain applicable to ships in general, with 
                                                     
91 IMO, “Reports of Sub-Committees: Outcome of DE 55 – Legal Opinion on Making the Polar Code Mandatory,” 
IMO Doc. MEPC 62/11/4/Add.1, May 6, 2011. 
92 IMO, “Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended,” Res. 
MSC.386(94), November 21, 2014; and IMO, “Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973: Amendments to MARPOL Annexes I, 
II, IV and V (To Make Use of Environment-Related Provisions of the Polar Code Mandatory),” Res. 
MEPC.265(68), May 15, 2015. 
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the Code’s polar-specific requirements adding an extra layer of protection on top of these for 
ships operating in polar waters. 
Structure. Besides its Introduction that is made mandatory through both Conventions, the Code 
is made up of two main parts, each containing a mandatory part and additional recommendatory 
guidance. Thus, Part I of the Code for safety measures includes the mandatory Part I-A and 
recommendatory Part I-B, while Part II on pollution prevention contains the mandatory Part II-
A and recommendatory Part II-B. Part I-A comprises 12 chapters, which regulate certification, 
the new Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM), construction, design, equipment and 
manning (CDEM) standards as well as voyage planning, while Part II-A’s five chapters 
correspond to the Annexes of MARPOL. These contain operational – and in the case of Chapter 
1 also structural – requirements that deal with pollution by oil, noxious liquid substances, 
harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form (left blank intentionally), sewage and 
garbage. Interestingly, there is no blank chapter to correspond with MARPOL Annex VI 
regarding air pollution. Table 3 summarises the structure of, and the subject areas covered by, 
the Polar Code.  
Amendments to SOLAS and MARPOL. To make the Polar Code mandatory through SOLAS 
and the MARPOL Annexes, amendments were necessary to these instruments. Therefore, a 
new chapter was included in SOLAS – Chapter XIV Safety Measures for Ships Operating in 
Polar Waters – with regards to the safety part of the Code. This chapter lays down that Part I of 
the Code applies to SOLAS-certified ships, i.e. cargo ships of, or above, 500 gross tonnage 
(GT) and passenger ships carrying more than 12 passengers (so-called SOLAS ships). 93 
However, there is ambiguity as to whether the Code applies to such ships on non-international 
voyages, i.e. between the ports of the same State, or only on international voyages.94 This 
impacts mainly on the applicability of the Code to vessels sailing to Antarctica due to the lack 
of ports on that continent, but also to vessels sailing solely on domestic voyages between two 
ports of the same States, for example along the NSR. Application of the Polar Code to “ships 
owned or operated by a Contracting Government and used, for the time being, only in 
Government non-commercial service” is expressly excluded although, at the same time, 
member States are encouraged to apply the Code’s measures to these “so far as reasonable and 
practicable.”95 This provision, thus, exempts coast guard and naval vessels from the application 
of the Code,96 but suggests that icebreakers would be covered by it. Finally, Chapter XIV 
                                                     
93 SOLAS, supra note 61, Chapter XIV, Reg. 2.1, together with Chapter I, Reg. 2 and 3. 
94 International voyage is defined in SOLAS as “a voyage from a country to which the present Convention applies 
to a port outside such country, or conversely,” ibid., Chapter I, Reg. 2 (d). With regard to this ambiguity, see 
Jensen, “Polar Code,” supra note 41, 157-158; and J. Ashley Roach, “The Polar Code and Its Adequacy,” in 
Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States, ed. Robert C. 
Beckman et al. (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017), 150. 
95 SOLAS, supra note 61, Chapter XIV, Reg. 2.4. 
96 Jensen, “Polar Code,” supra note 41, 159. 
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contains a savings clause stating that the Code shall not “prejudice rights or obligations of States 
under international law,”97 such as those contained in the LOSC. 
As regards Part II of the Code, each of its chapters is made mandatory through amendments to 
the corresponding MARPOL Annex, including a new chapter in each, defining the Polar Code 
as well as the type of vessels the respective chapter shall apply to. Chapter 1 of Part II-A applies 
to all ships,98 Chapter 2 to all ships certified to carry noxious liquid substances in bulk,99 
Chapter 4 to all ships certified in accordance with MARPOL Annex IV,100 and Chapter 5 to all 
ships to which MARPOL Annex V applies.101 The new amendments to the MARPOL Annexes 
do not contain a similar savings clause to that in SOLAS Chapter XIV – however, a general 
savings clause is already to be found in MARPOL, covering all Annexes.102 
1.2.2 Implications and the future of the Polar Code 
In this section I give a preliminary account of how the Polar Code has been received and what 
new developments are in the work at the IMO. However, this outline does not represent my 
findings but provides some of the groundwork for further discussions in chapter 5.  
The Polar Code is a living instrument in the sense that it can and will be continuously updated 
to stay up to date with technological and other developments. The tacit acceptance procedure 
in SOLAS and MARPOL also means that shortcomings can quickly be rectified. At the same 
time, the IMO is free to adopt instruments complementing and strengthening the Polar Code. 
While environmental NGOs were by and large dissatisfied with the Polar Code’s environmental 
part,103 the shipping industry has given a warmer welcome to the Code as a tool to make polar 
                                                     
97 SOLAS, supra note 61, Chapter XIV, Reg. 2.5. 
98 MARPOL, supra note 60, Annex I, Chapter 11, Reg. 47.1. 
99 Ibid., Annex II, Chapter 10, Reg. 22.1. 
100 Ibid., Annex IV, Chapter 7, Reg. 18.1. MARPOL Annex IV applies to all ships of 400 GT and above, as well 
as under but certified to carry more than 15 persons, ibid., Annex IV, Chapter 1, Reg. 2 (1). Any such ship engaging 
in voyages to ports under the jurisdiction of another State party to MARPOL shall be issued with a certificate, 
ibid., Reg. 5 (1). 
101 Ibid., Annex V, Chapter 3, Reg. 14.1. MARPOL Annex V applies to all ships unless expressly provided 
otherwise, ibid., Annex V, Reg. 2. 
102 Ibid., Article 9 (2) reads:  
Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the codification and development of the law of the sea 
by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea […] nor the present or future claims and legal 
views of any State concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State 
jurisdiction. 
Note that MARPOL was concluded before, but with anticipation of, the LOSC. 
103 See e.g. ASOC, “Polar Code Too Weak to Properly Protect Polar Environments from Increased Shipping 
Activity,” November 21, 2014,  
https://www.asoc.org/storage/documents/news/asoc_in_the_news/Polar_Code_too_weak_to_properly_protect_p
olar_environments_from_increased_shipping_activity___The_Arctic_Journal.pdf (accessed March 20, 2019); 
and WWF, “New Polar Code a Good First Step, But Lacks Meaningful Protections for the Arctic,” December 22, 
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shipping more practicable and create a level playing field.104 However, it has been pointed out 
that while the Polar Code’s requirements are especially important for newcomers given the 
increasing navigational activity in the Arctic, most of its regulations would be familiar to 
experienced ship operators.105 At the same time, according to industry representatives, the 
requirements for the training of crew in general and ice navigators in particular leave room for 
improvement,106 while no specific load lines requirements were developed for polar waters.107  
Certain issues remain outside of the Polar Code’s remit and are thus unregulated because of the 
Code’s nature as an add-on to SOLAS and MARPOL. In the realm of environmental protection, 
the Code had to be restricted to pollution prevention and, even within that, issues such as grey 
water discharge and noise pollution could not be included. With regards to safety measures, 
these had to be limited to SOLAS ships, excluding regulation of a number of different vessel 
types. While the MEPC decided to commence work on measures to reduce risks stemming from 
the carriage as fuel and use of heavy fuel oil (HFO) in the Arctic in 2017, arguably within the 
scope of MARPOL, it is unclear whether the outcome of this work would be included in the 
Polar Code or appear as an amendment to MARPOL.108 A further development consequent to 
the Polar Code’s ban on oil and oily mixture discharges in the Arctic is a proposal for a regional 
approach to establishing port waste reception facilities, which would take the shape of a 
                                                     
2016, http://www.wwf.ca/?23703/New-Polar-Code-a-good-first-step-but-lacks-meaningful-protections-for-the-
Arctic (accessed March 20, 2019). 
104  See e.g. “How Does the Polar Code Affect Oil Shipment?” Petro Industry News, December 31, 2014, 
https://www.petro-online.com/news/fuel-for-thought/13/breaking-news/how-does-the-polar-code-affect-oil-
shipment/32830 (accessed December 5, 2018). For a view that large Russian shipping companies welcomed the 
safety part of the Polar Code, see Andrei Zagorski, “Perspective,” in The Arctic in World Affairs: A North Pacific 
Dialogue on the Arctic in the Wide World: 2015 North Pacific Arctic Conference Proceedings, ed. Oran R. Young, 
Jong Deog Kim and Yoon Hyung Kim (Korea Maritime Institute and East-West Center, 2015), 224. For a summary 
of both optimistic and pessimistic views on the Russian shipping industry’s ability to comply with the Polar Code, 
see Sergunin, “Russian Approaches,” supra note 13, 27-28. For a view that the Polar Code would rather limit the 
amount of ship traffic in the Arctic due to its regulations incurring high costs, see Keil, “Sustainability 
Understandings,” supra n 19, 46. 
105 David (Duke) Snider, “A Mandatory Polar Code - How Does It Affect Shipping?” Canadian Sailings, March 
12, 2017, https://canadiansailings.ca/a-mandatory-polar-code-how-does-it-affect-shipping/ (accessed December 
5, 2018). 
106 E.g. Ian Evans, “Ice Navigator Training Aims to Plug a Hole in the Polar Code,” News Deeply, June 19, 2017, 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/community/2017/06/19/ice-navigator-training-aims-to-plug-a-hole-in-the-
polar-code (accessed June 30, 2017). 
107 Aldo Chircop, “The Load Lines Convention and Arctic Navigation” (paper presented at Arctic Frontiers 
Conference, Tromsø, January 25, 2017). 
108 For recent developments regarding the use and carriage of HFO, see IMO, “Report of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee on Its Seventy-First Session,” IMO Doc. MEPC 71/17, July 24, 2017, 61; and IMO, “Report 
of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Seventy-Second Session,” IMO Doc. MEPC 72/17, May 
3, 2018, 50-51. A ban on use and carriage (both as fuel and cargo) of HFO in Antarctic waters is already included 
in MARPOL, supra note 60, Annex I, Reg. 43. 
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MARPOL amendment if accepted.109 The biggest development with regard to the Polar Code 
is the possible extension of its safety measures to non-SOLAS vessels in the so-called second 
phase of the work on the Polar Code. While it was agreed by MSC 99 that the types of vessels 
to be included in this phase of development would be fishing vessels, yachts above 300 GT that 
are not engaged in trade and cargo ships between 300-500 GT, it is doubtful whether the new 
measures would be mandatory in nature.110  
Finally, the Polar Code, just like any other IMO instrument, is reliant on implementation and 
enforcement by flag States. While no regional port State control arrangement exists in the Arctic 
that could enforce compliance with the Code’s requirements, it has been suggested that existing 
port State control arrangements could cover ships enroute to the Arctic. 111  Further, the 
enforcement rights in Article 234 of the LOSC could be complementary to the Polar Code.112 
These options would still leave the enforcement of the Code open to question in the waters 
around Antarctica. 
In summary, the Polar Code should be seen as a necessary first step in the direction of enhanced 
ship safety and environmental protection in polar waters. The Polar Code is more of a 
beginning, rather than the endpoint of mandatory regulation of polar shipping. I will return to 
this, and to whether the Polar Code is a good agreement, in my conclusion. 
1.3 Scholarly research on the Polar Code and Russia’s NSR 
Forming part of the international regulatory scene within which shipping in the Arctic operates, 
it is perhaps natural that the Polar Code has been subject to analysis mainly in the field of 
                                                     
109 Canada et al., “Any Other Business: Regional Reception Facilities Plan (RRFP) – Outline and Planning Guide 
for the Arctic,” IMO Doc. MEPC 72/16, December 29, 2017. See also Canada et al., “Work Programme of the 
Committee and Subsidiary Bodies: Proposal for a New Output to Amend MARPOL to Allow the Establishment 
of Regional Arrangements in the Arctic,” IMO Doc. MEPC 74/14/2, February 8, 2019. 
110 IMO, “Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on Its Ninety-Ninth Session,” IMO Doc. MSC 99/22, June 5, 
2018, 40-45. One important problem regarding fishing vessels not just in the Arctic, but in general, is the lack of 
international safety regulations for these. The safety of fishing vessels of and over 24 m length and operating on 
the high seas is regulated by the Cape Town Agreement of 2012 on the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
1993 Protocol Relating to the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977, 
Cape Town, October 11, 2012. However, as the Cape Town Agreement has not entered into force and is unlikely 
to do so in the near future, it cannot – yet – provide a basis for mandatory safety measures for fishing vessels 
operating in polar waters. For the status of IMO Conventions, see IMO, “Status of Conventions,” 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (accessed November 15, 
2018). 
111 For a discussion on the potential need for an Arctic memorandum of understanding on port State control, see 
Molenaar, “Options for Regional Regulation,” supra note 39, 284-287. For problems pertaining to ensuring 
compliance with the Polar Code through port State control, see Tore Henriksen, “Norway, Denmark (in respect of 
Greenland) and Iceland,” in Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and 
User States, ed. Robert C. Beckman et al. (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017), 275-276. 
112 Chircop, “Jurisdiction over Ice-Covered Areas,” supra note 35, 284. 
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international law. Some of this work is descriptive of the Polar Code or its draft at the time,113 
as well as the developments leading up to it.114 One particular question covered extensively by 
international law scholars concerns the relationship between the Polar Code and LOSC, 
especially Article 234.115 Here opinion is divided as to whether the Polar Code would restrict 
or limit coastal State legislative rights116 or whether Article 234 and the Polar Code would 
complement each other.117  Furthermore, procedural and substantive principles guiding the 
provisions of the Polar Code have been assessed,118 and I will return to this in chapter 3 on the 
theoretical framework. Another aspect of the Polar Code which has received considerable 
attention is the goal-based approach utilised in its safety part and what this novel approach 
means for the development of law.119 Other issues attracting attention are the way the Polar 
Code is made mandatory,120 and the Code’s shortcomings, particularly with regards to seafarer 
training and non-international voyages.121  
At the same time the Polar Code has largely escaped problematisation from a political science 
or IR perspective, although some dynamics of the negotiations are touched upon. These mainly 
                                                     
113  E.g. Lawson W. Brigham, “The Developing International Maritime Organization Polar Code,” in Arctic 
Yearbook 2014, ed. Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot and Joël Plouffe (Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 
2014), 496-499; Julia Jabour, “Progress Towards the Mandatory Code for Polar Shipping,” Australian Journal of 
Maritime & Ocean Affairs 6, no. 1 (2014): 64-67; and Heike Deggim, “The International Code for Ships Operating 
in Polar Waters (Polar Code),” in Sustainable Shipping in a Changing Arctic, ed. Lawrence P. Hildebrand, Lawson 
W. Brigham and Tafsir M. Johansson (Springer, 2018), 15-35. 
114 E.g. Peter Kikkert, “Promoting National Interests and Fostering Cooperation: Canada and the Development of 
a Polar Code,” Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 43, no. 3 (2012): 319-334; and Brigham, “The Developing 
International Maritime Organization Polar Code,” supra note 113. 
115 E.g. Fauchald, “Regulatory Framework,” supra note 42; Roach and Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd ed., 
supra note 45, 494-495; Scassola, “International Polar Code,” supra note 42, 274-288; Rosemary Rayfuse, 
“Coastal State Jurisdiction and the Polar Code: A Test Case for Arctic Ocean Governance?” in Polar Oceans 
Governance in an Era of Environmental Change, ed. Tim Stephens and David L. VanderZwaag (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2014), 245-248; McDorman, “Potential Conflicting Rights and Obligations,” supra note 42, 141-
159; Chircop, “Jurisdiction over Ice-Covered Areas,” supra note 35, 275-290; Jensen, “International Code for 
Ships,” supra note 41, 75-77; Skodvin, “Arctic Shipping – Still Icy,” supra note 42, 153-158; and Jensen, “Polar 
Code,” supra note 41, 164-172. 
116 E.g. Fauchald, “Regulatory Framework,” supra note 42, 82-83. See also Skodvin, “Arctic Shipping – Still Icy,” 
supra note 42, 157. 
117 E.g. Chircop, “Jurisdiction over Ice-Covered Areas and the Polar Code,” supra note 35, 283-285; Jensen, 
“International Code for Ships,” supra note 41, 75-77; and Jensen, “Polar Code,” supra note 41, 170-172. 
118 Jiayu Bai, “The IMO Polar Code: The Emerging Rules of Arctic Shipping Governance,” The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 30 (2015): 680. 
119 E.g. Tore Henriksen, “The Polar Code: Ships in Cold Water – Arctic Issues,” CMI Yearbook 2014 (2014): 332-
344; Bai, “IMO Polar Code,” supra note 118, 683-686 and 690-692; Jensen, “International Code for Ships,” supra 
note 41, 70-71; and Jensen, “Polar Code,” supra note 41, 163-164.  
120 E.g. J. Ashley Roach, “A Note on Making the Polar Code Mandatory,” in International Law and Politics of the 
Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honor of Donat Pharand, ed. Suzanne Lalonde and Ted L. McDorman (Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2015), 125-140. 
121 E.g. Ibid., 133-135; and Roach, “Polar Code,” supra note 94. 
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relate to those actors, Russia and Canada, who have used rights provided to coastal States in 
Article 234 of the LOSC to introduce unilateral national legislation for shipping in their Arctic 
waters, noting particularly their efforts to mould the Polar Code’s content to reflect their own 
legislation.122 The lack of coordination between the Arctic States during the negotiations in 
general has also been discussed.123 Furthermore, the Polar Code has been discussed in the 
context of overlapping international regimes.124 
With regards to Russia’s regulation of Arctic shipping and the NSR, there has been much 
discussion amongst international legal scholars. Such analyses concentrate on Russia’s 
regulations,125 as well as offering comparison with other relevant actors, where again Canada 
is notable.126 In the realm of political science, the NSR has been discussed in the context of 
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supra note 16. 
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Russia’s Arctic policies,127 its organisational framework and challenges have been analysed,128 
as have the imaginaries influencing its development.129 In addition, the Russian State’s and 
Russian shipping companies’ understanding of sustainability with regard to Arctic shipping has 
recently been subject to analysis.130 
Few academics have combined analyses of the Polar Code and Russia. While Julia Bobrova 
discusses the NSR regime and the Polar Code side-by-side,131 Russia’s interests and concerns 
with regards to the Polar Code have to some extent been addressed by Andrei Zagorski and 
colleagues, but without a closer look at the negotiations or reference to Russia’s concrete 
negotiating position.132 Two areas of concern can be highlighted. First is the possible conflict 
between the desire to continue exercising its national jurisdiction over the NSR and the 
acknowledgement of the need for global mandatory rules, with the possibility of extending 
Russian national rules to the rest of the Arctic Ocean.133 In this regard, Zagorski and colleagues 
concluded in 2012, relatively early in the Polar Code process, that the Polar Code meets the 
interests of Russia as it will not only leave Russia’s rights under Article 234 of the LOSC 
untouched but it might also provide greater international acceptance of Russia’s national 
regime, whilst allowing it to enforce the Code and prevent unregulated traffic and marine 
pollution in the central Arctic Ocean.134 Later, however, Zagorski appears somewhat more 
pessimistic, noting that the enforcement of the Polar Code in the central Arctic Ocean is 
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questionable due to flag State reluctance.135 The second concern Zagorski suggests is that the 
stringent pollution prevention regulations of the Code are expected to restrict Russian 
operations with regard to Arctic resource development, as most of the Russian regulations for 
shipping along the NSR are concerned with safety and not environmental issues.136 At the same 
time, discussing Russia’s implementation of the Polar Code, Alexander Sergunin suggests that 
representatives of the Russian shipping and insurance industry are pessimistic as to the 
industry’s ability to comply with the Code’s requirements within the implementation deadlines, 
suggesting that foreign shipbuilders used the Polar Code, especially its environmental 
protection measures, to gain advantage over their Russian competitors.137 
Examining policy and strategy documents as well as legislation and regulations, whilst 
important, provides only one part of the overall picture. Due to the importance of Russia to any 
international regulation of Arctic shipping, I contend here that one angle that has been missing 
in the research is looking at Russia in negotiations on the Arctic shipping regime. Analysing 
Russia’s participation in the Polar Code process tells us something new about, and adds to our 
understanding of, Russia’s interests, motives as well as manoeuvring room with regards to the 
international use of the NSR. 
1.4 Specifying the research questions 
It will be recalled that I posed two overarching research questions: 1) How can Russia’s 
participation in the Polar Code negotiations be interpreted, and what does this say about Russia 
as an actor in international negotiations of Arctic shipping regulation? 2) What does the 
negotiation of the Polar Code tell us about the role of the two principles of the law of the sea in 
largely technical organisations, such as the IMO? 
Based on the discussion above, with regards to the first general research question we can pose 
the following sub-questions: 
a) What issues did Russia pursue during the negotiations of the Polar Code? 
b) In what manner did Russia pursue its interests? 
c) How has Russia balanced international versus unilateral national regulations for Arctic 
shipping during the negotiation of the Polar Code? 
d) How does Russia’s participation in the Polar Code negotiations compare with other major 
actors – especially Canada, which faces similar international legal challenges to Russia? 
As regards my second general research question, I have introduced two underlying competing 
principles in the field of the law of the sea: freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction. 
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While the LOSC tried to balance these two principles, the vagueness of Article 234 means that 
Arctic shipping is still open for contestation between the two. Although the IMO is a technical 
organisation with no competence in jurisdictional matters of the law of the sea, related questions 
based on the two principles do seep into the work of the IMO,138 leading to the following 
questions: 
a) What kind of decision-making process was utilised at the IMO for the negotiation of the 
Polar Code?  
b) How did the IMO’s decision-making process influence the role the competing principles 
of freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction played in the negotiations? 
c) How do actors holding different deep-seated principles influence the creation and 
interpretation of law of the sea instruments? 
In order to answer these research questions four articles make up the body of the present thesis. 
These will be introduced in the next chapter, before embarking on the further discussions. 
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2 Introduction to the articles 
In Russian Proposals on the Polar Code: Contributing to Common Rules or Furthering State 
Interests?139 I give a general overview of the major issues Russia pursued during the negotiation 
of the Polar Code, analysing where Russia’s interests lay between the “truly” international and 
narrow self-interest. Five issue areas are discussed in the paper and contrasted with what I 
identify as the goal of the IMO, or the common good140 – creation of uniform standards to 
enhance ship safety and polar environmental protection. In spite of expectations, the analysis 
of the material shows a lukewarm Russian contribution to the debates and a lack of cooperation 
on proposals with other actors. Russian interests are reflected throughout its proposals, while 
elements of the IMO’s goal are missing in many of these. Russia tried to further its interests 
first through proposing the primacy of coastal State regulations over the Polar Code and, once 
it was clear that it could not achieve this goal with its references to Article 234 of the LOSC, 
Russia focussed on the protection of its interests in a variety of issue areas. This resulted in a 
more reactive Russian stance and a relative unsuccessfulness in the debates. While Russia 
emphasised that it was a maritime Arctic State with superior knowledge and experience, this 
did not translate into a leadership role but resulted instead in a pragmatic picking-and-choosing 
of issue areas where Russia saw its interests threatened. Thus, Russia’s expressed self-image 
was at odds with the reality of its participation in the negotiations of the Polar Code. 
In Russia and the Polar Marine Environment: The Negotiation of the Environmental Protection 
Measures of the Mandatory Polar Code, 141  Russia’s proposals with regards to the 
environmental protection measures of the Code are scrutinised in order to highlight the way 
Russia promoted these. The choice of issue area here is supported not only by the relatively 
large number of documents in the research material, but also by Russia’s ambiguous history 
vis-à-vis environmental protection both nationally and internationally, as well as the primary 
aim of Article 234 of the LOSC in environmental protection. Looking at the content of its 
proposals in the context of those of other delegations, it is evident that Russia falls behind other 
delegations in regard to environmental protection, often in stark contrast to the stated aim of 
the Polar Code. With regards to the mode of communication Russia espoused, strategic use of 
arguments and efforts at bargaining based on demands were largely unsuccessful in achieving 
the goals set out in its proposals, while engaging in deliberative negotiation142 and, thus, 
explaining its interests yielded some results. This suggests a degree of contempt for engaging 
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in deliberations in an international forum, where Russia’s voice is just one amongst many States 
afforded equal weight in the decision-making process. 
In chronologically my last paper In the Same Boat? A Comparative Analysis of the Approaches 
of Russia and Canada in the Negotiation of the IMO’s Mandatory Polar Code,143 I compare 
Russia’s participation in the Polar Code process with that of Canada, asking if the similar 
challenges they face internationally due to their unilateral national legislation produced 
comparable positions and mutual support. I answer this question through the analysis of two 
clusters of issues – and in the process I further expound on topics of my previous articles: the 
question of safeguarding national regulations and systems of shipping control; and the 
regulation of discharge of oil and oily mixtures in the Arctic. As regards the former, parallel 
efforts were made by Russia and Canada to regulate the relationship between the Code and 
coastal State rights, whilst attempts to model the content of the Code after their respective 
access limitation systems led to positions that pointed in opposite directions. That Canada was 
more active in trying to reconcile the Code with its own regime is explained by the fact that it 
has to accommodate the United States, its closest ally and harshest critic, while Russia appears 
more comfortable with manipulating international norms. At the same time, both Canada and 
Russia were concerned about the economic costs stemming from the Polar Code’s pollution 
prevention measures, although their differing positions reflected the different realities they face, 
with Canada being a traditional coastal State whereas Russia is also a major flag State in the 
Arctic. In its capacity as a coastal State, the latter is more directed towards interests in utilisation 
of the waters off its coast and resource exploitation, while Canada is more driven by 
environmental protection interests, which also serve its sovereignty interests as second-best 
arguments.144 A further conclusion reached in this article is the difference between how Canada 
and Russia used their Arctic shipping experience in the negotiations: Canada played a 
leadership role in the negotiations, while for Russia experience and leadership only appeared 
on the rhetorical level. 
In The Elephant in the Room: Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Polar Code 
as an Incompletely Theorised Agreement, 145  I take the negotiations of the Polar Code’s 
relationship with Article 234 of the LOSC as my research problem and look at the influence of 
the principles of freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction over the negotiations, 
linking these to deeper principles of liberal international world order and global security on the 
one hand, and national sovereignty, identity and security as well as stewardship on the other. 
Showing that the IMO effectively bracketed the issue and did not allow it to side-track, delay 
or hamper the development of the Polar Code, I argue that the way the IMO dealt with this 
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contentious issue in the context of the Polar Code makes the Code an incompletely theorised 
agreement, whereby the underlying principles to a negotiation are not debated or reconciled. 
While arguing that this is a positive outcome, as this technique allowed for the conclusion of 
an agreement which enables safer and more environmentally sound shipping in the Arctic as 
well as provides legitimacy to the process, I also suggest that such an outcome leaves room for 
manoeuvre for States, submitting that States prefer such ambiguity to the outright rejection of 




3 Theoretical framework: deliberation and bargaining 
As already touched upon in the introductory chapter, I rely on a theoretical framework built on 
deliberative democracy to study Russia’s contribution to the IMO’s decision-making process 
on the Polar Code. It was appealing to apply the distinction underlying deliberative 
democracy’s understanding, between arguing (deliberation) and bargaining (negotiation), to 
debates within an international organisation for several reasons. Decision-making through 
deliberation, based on mutual reason-giving and aimed at consensus on the common good, has 
been viewed as advantageous from a legitimacy point of view.146 Firstly, the procedure allows 
for the equal participation of the players and the opportunity for all to have their voices heard 
and considered, well suited to the sovereign equality of nation States. 147  Moreover, the 
inclusiveness of deliberation in international organisations can be further enhanced by the 
participation of not only nation States but also, for example, NGOs – usually in a consultative 
or observer status.148 Secondly, it is thought that deliberation produces better outcomes than 
negotiation through the pooling of knowledge and its aim of consensus on the common good.149 
The inclusive nature of the process together with an outcome of enhanced epistemic quality 
can, thus, unite participants and enhance compliance, something that is often seen as the 
Achilles heel of international regimes. At the same time, bringing bargaining (negotiation) into 
the theoretical framework serves as a counter-point to the ideal-type of arguing 
(deliberation),150 and sits better with classical IR thinking of rational nation States primarily 
concerned with power and interests, even within the setting of international organisations. As 
Kenneth Abbott calls for a richer institutionalism with the inclusion of different IR 
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perspectives,151 bringing bargaining and arguing together also acknowledges that interests and 
values intertwine in real-world processes examined by both IR and international law scholars.152 
The concept of arguing was originally introduced into IR through a debate unfolding in the 
German Zeitschrift for Internationale Beziehungen (ZIB), and was attractive partly due to the 
introduction of normative concerns into IR. Further, arguing was also thought to elucidate what 
happens when States actually sit down to negotiate – or as Lars Lose says, “bridge the gap 
between the motivation to cooperate and the actual achievement of cooperation”153 – and 
account for interesting outcomes that were unexpected and could not be explained purely on 
the basis of power, interest and bargaining. Thomas Risse formulated a separate “logic of 
arguing” in addition to, and above, the two logics previously contrasted in IR, the logic of 
consequentialism (strategic bargaining) and the logic of appropriateness (rule-guided 
behaviour) – understanding the “logic of arguing” as truth-seeking behaviour.154 Others have 
also envisaged arguing as a distinct mode of social interaction,155 researching whether, and 
under what conditions, arguing so defined occurs in international negotiations and whether, and 
under what conditions, arguing affects the outcome of such negotiations.156 Yet empirical 
results have been elusive.157 In particular, what has caused problems was 1) showing that 
persuasion has occurred, and 2) the co-occurrence of instances of arguing and bargaining in the 
same debate.  
In a parallel development in the nexus of IR and international law, Abbott and Duncan Snidal 
suggest that interest actors are more likely to be influenced by the logic of consequences and 
value actors by the logic of appropriateness, and they appropriate different strategies in the 
legalisation process to the two groups of actors: strategic bargaining for interest actors, 
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normative persuasion for value actors.158 However, they also acknowledge that interests and 
values are intertwined and both motivate legalisation processes, while actors in real-world 
situations are not purely interest or value actors, therefore positing that both interests and values 
can be part of the explanation.159 
In light of the above, it has been suggested that arguing and bargaining should be seen as distinct 
modes of communication 160  as well as applied to individual utterances. 161  The 
acknowledgement of the co-occurrence of arguing and bargaining is a significant step towards 
the recognition that at least elements of arguing and bargaining may indeed be complementary 
– an idea also increasingly present in deliberative democracy.162 In this regard, Jens Steffek 
notes the role of incomplete theorisation in diplomatic negotiations, first and foremost over 
treaty texts, emphasising that diplomacy is not aimed at truth-seeking or reasoned consensus as 
conceptualised by Risse and others,163 but rather at settling conflict through the use of legal 
arguments motivated by the need to find treaty wordings acceptable to all parties.164 The 
acknowledgement that arguing and bargaining co-occur allows for the deconstruction of the 
insistence on the part of some international organisations on consensus decision-making, 
aligning with other studies into what lies behind consensus, especially regarding silence and 
tacit consent.165 
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While much of the debate involving arguing in IR has focussed on arguing as a social action, I 
take arguing and bargaining as modes of communication at the level of individual utterances in 
my research. Such an approach follows the suggestions of Katharina Holzinger and Thomas 
Saretzki, also acknowledging that arguing and bargaining can and do co-occur in the same 
negotiating setting.166 This approach allows me to depart from pure forms of outcome such as 
consensus, and focus on forms and outcomes of deliberative negotiations, primarily 
incompletely theorised agreements that I rely heavily on in my research. Further, as Steffek 
argues in rejecting previous research questions looking at whether arguing occurs, its conditions 
and effectiveness, a focus on incompletely theorised agreements – and I argue on non-pure 
deliberation and negotiation – “can reveal a lot about actors’ identities, their normative 
commitments and historically situated worldviews.”167  
In this vein, I focus on Russia to say something more about its interests and motives as regards 
Arctic shipping regulation. My primary concern, as stated in the introduction, is related to the 
problem of the national versus the international in the regulation of shipping in Arctic waters, 
and whether the proposals reflected, explicitly or implicitly, the particular self-interest of single 
nation States, or took as their starting point the common interest of the international community. 
In the following section I will first introduce classical deliberative theory’s dichotomy between 
(pure) arguing and (pure) bargaining and the characteristics of these, without which any further 
discussion would be unintelligible. This is followed by a discussion of more recent 
understanding of the coalescence of elements of deliberation and negotiation and the resulting 
deliberative negotiation. This is further expanded with regards to incompletely theorised 
agreements. Throughout, I relate the theory and its concepts to my research and show how I 
understood and used these.  
3.1 The classical dichotomy of arguing and bargaining 
Deliberative democracy is made up of two elements: deliberation and democracy. The 
democratic element of the theory refers to “collective decision making with the participation of 
all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives.”168 Yet, in the setting of 
international organisations where the key actors are nation States, the inclusion of all 
stakeholders may be problematic. In this respect, the IMO is quite progressive among 
international organisations with the inclusion of consultative organisations in its decision-
making, even if these are primarily there because of their particular expertise and not for any 
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democratic ideal.169 While consultative organisations can contribute to the debate, I am more 
interested here in the process of decision-making rather than in the inclusivity of the process. 
There is, therefore, less emphasis placed on the democratic element of deliberative democracy 
in this research. To indicate this, I will from now on – as I have done in the articles making up 
this thesis – refer to the theory as deliberative theory. 
The deliberative element of the theory, meanwhile, may be defined as “decision making by 
means of arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values of 
rationality and impartiality.”170 This definition needs to be dissected and elaborated further. A 
central element of deliberation is the process of mutual exchange of arguments. In this, the 
mutuality presupposes that the parties not only justify their claims but are also open to 
persuasion by valid claims uttered by others. Thus, although they have a set of preferences and 
interests, these can be adjusted in order to reach commonality. The transformation of 
preferences is indeed the point of deliberation. The main motive behind deliberation, or arguing, 
is reason,171 allowing us to also talk about mutual reason-giving.172 Reason is “impartial, both 
disinterested and dispassionate.”173 These qualities are necessary if parties aim to reach a 
common understanding, common interest, common good. In its classical understanding, 
deliberation excludes self-interest and results in a consensus concerning the common good 
where all parties agree for the same reason.174 The validity of claims raised in deliberation is 
based on propositional truth in the case of factual claims, 175  normative rightness – also 
interpreted as impartiality176 - in the case of normative claims and, in both instances, sincerity 
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– that is, the participants mean what they are saying.177 Arguing thus involves the evaluation of 
claims on these bases and with reference to an external authority for validation, as noted by 
Saretzki who calls this the triadic structure of arguing.178 Such external authority is mutually 
accepted and may include “previously negotiated and agreed-upon treaties, universally held 
norms, scientific evidence.”179 Thus, what matters in deliberation is the power of the better 
argument.180 By contrast, the use of coercive power – including both the threat of sanction and 
the use of force – is seen as antithetical to deliberation.181 Such an understanding of coercive 
power also includes misrepresentation and lying, as “A’s lying leads B to act, without B’s 
willing it, against B’s own interests in ways that B would otherwise not act.”182 Thus, the 
deliberative ideal also requires mutual respect.183  
Formulated this way, arguing is placed squarely in opposition to bargaining. Like arguing, 
bargaining is a mode of communication and decision-making. Instead of involving the 
exchange of arguments, bargaining is an exchange of demands,184 so that parties achieve their 
set of preferences and give as little in exchange as possible. Demands are supported through 
the use of threats and promises185 which are made credible through unequal material resources 
external to the process and, thus, unequal power relations.186 These are instances of coercive 
power use, as is misrepresentation that goes against the mutual justification ideal of 
deliberation. Further, demands and misrepresentations are made to support the achievement of 
the parties’ narrow self-interest, as opposed to the common good. As Jon Elster observes, while 
arguing is intrinsically linked to reason, one of the motives behind bargaining is interest.187 
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Finally, due to the give-and-take of bargaining, the result of this process cannot be consensus 
but can only end in a compromise. 
Elster points to two types of misrepresentation that exploit two of the bases for deliberation’s 
validity claims – truth and rightness – and terms them “strategic uses of argument.”188 In the 
first case, instead of a threat the speaker utters a warning, thus avoiding the question of 
credibility. Instead of stating what they will do, the speaker warns of what will happen, an 
objective fact ostensibly outside the speaker’s control.189 In the second case, the speaker uses 
appeals to impartial arguments instead of their self-interest.190 As Elster states: 
The number of plausible-sounding norms of fairness is so large that most groups will be 
able to find some norm that corresponds, at least roughly, to their self-interest.191 
While Elster lists several reasons for resorting to the use of arguments instead of bargaining 
outright, I find three of them to be of interest here. The first reason for turning to strategic use 
of arguments instead of outright bargaining is the role of social norms and the fear of 
opprobrium if one resorts to bargaining and reference to self-interest.192 The second is that, as 
Elster states, “by citing a general reason one might actually be able to persuade others.”193 
While Elster goes on to say that this applies to persuading neutral parties, I think it is more 
important here to point out that it is possible that some self-interested outcomes might also be 
in the collective interest. Thus, that interest would turn out to be a generalisable interest.194 
Third, a speaker might refer to principles in order to “avoid humiliating an opponent” and allow 
them to save face.195 This statement seems to allude to the mutual respect ideal of deliberation 
and is important in processes of decision-making where parties continually work together, as 
in the case of the IMO. These reasons already allude to why there is a need to adjust the concepts 
of arguing and bargaining for use in research of interactions in institutionalised settings, while 
also foreshadowing deliberative negotiations, which I discuss further in this chapter. 
3.1.1 Arguing and bargaining in the present research 
From my empirical experience of how the IMO works, it is clear that the setting of an 
international organization affects arguing, bargaining and the admissibility of certain utterances 
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during the debate – both in terms of limiting certain utterances and allowing room for others. 
In this section I discuss the limitations and the consequences for applying the theoretical 
framework to the IMO’s discussions, while section 3.2 will return to the incorporation of certain 
utterances of self-interest into arguing. Adhering to standards of engagement and social norms 
in international organisations such as the IMO, actors are inhibited from the most blatantly 
obvious uses of coercive power. The use of threats, promises and exit-options are restricted in 
the debates as they are deemed inappropriate, threatening the continued work of the 
organisation. How is it possible then to identify bargaining and to analytically separate 
instances of arguing and bargaining? The concept of bargaining is more than just the use of 
threats, promises and exit-options. To be able to separate arguing and bargaining distinctly from 
one another, I looked at other characteristics of these concepts as well as adapt these to the 
circumstances of the IMO. I focussed on the dichotomy between reliance on reason towards the 
common good and reliance on self-interest and – to the extent it was possible to identify in the 
material – demands. This was further aided by the dichotomy between claims of validity in 
truth and rightness – with implicit or explicit reference to an external authority – rendering 
reason disinterested and impartial, and claims of credibility based on unequal power relations. 
Focussing on the distinction between the common good and self-interest, it was necessary to 
establish what the common good was that the international community strove for when putting 
the Polar Code on the IMO’s agenda. To identify the common good, several documents were 
consulted including those that proposed a mandatory code for ships operating in polar waters,196 
laying down the goals of the proposed code, as well as various other IMO documents including 
the IMO’s constitutive Convention 197  and Strategic Plan which includes its mission 
statement.198 On the basis of these documents, the common good as pursued in the negotiation 
of the Polar Code can be identified as containing three elements:199  
1) The procedural “umbrella:” the creation of uniform, and universally applied, standards; 
2) The substantive content of such standards for remote polar areas: 
a) enhanced maritime safety (safe ship operation); and  
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b) enhanced protection of the marine environment (primarily by pollution prevention).200 
In this, I concur with Jiayu Bai, who suggests that the Code’s provisions are guided by the 
principles of non-discrimination – corresponding to my uniform and universally applied 
standards – and the substantive principles of safety of life at sea and environmental 
protection.201 I want to underline here that, in my view, all three elements of the common good 
are necessary as they are closely connected. The procedural goal – without the substantive 
content – is just that: it does not say anything without specifying what the standards are 
regulating for. Yet it is an important part of the definition as it emphasises the globality and 
internationality of the Polar Code: it applies to ships of all flags in equal measure in the Arctic 
(or Antarctic) waters, whether under national jurisdiction or beyond. But the content is sorely 
needed, and it is made up of two elements: maritime safety and environmental protection. While 
these have value in themselves, they are also interconnected. Thus ideally both would be served 
by the Polar Code, although in specific provisions it may be only one of these substantive goals 
that are represented – even more so due to the nature of the Polar Code being made mandatory 
through two international Conventions, one covering safety issues, the other pollution 
prevention measures.  
What makes this formulation of the common good really indivisible and – yes – common is 
also that it amalgamates aspects of the interests of the shipping industry – primarily, uniform 
and universally applied global rules as well as safety – with the environmental protection 
interests of developed and coastal States and environmental NGOs. 202  Environmental 
protection measures (including aspects of safety measures) are, moreover, important as these – 
or rather the potential lack of consideration of these – might fuel unilateral national measures 
from coastal States. Such an understanding of the common good in the case of the Polar Code, 
thus, tries to unify and hold in balance the two main principles of the law of the sea, freedom 
of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction. The Polar Code would strive to enable the exercise 
of navigational freedoms in a highly adverse environment, making it more practicable, whilst 
also providing for a uniform global framework. At the same time, coastal State concerns would 
be satisfied by the environmental protection measures of the Polar Code, in addition to the 
indirect effects of its safety measures.  
Having said this, beyond the conflict between the IMO’s goal of uniform and universal 
standards and the unilateral exercise of Article 234 rights,203 there is also an inherent tension 
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between the substantive elements of the common good. Viewing the safety goal as a way of 
reducing accidental pollution results in harmony between the safety and the environmental 
protection goals. However, viewing the safety goal as making polar shipping more practicable 
and thus enabling it leads to a conflict with the goal of providing enhanced environmental 
protection. On the other way round: seeing the environmental protection goal as inhibiting 
shipping also pits the two substantive elements of the common good against each other. There 
was, thus, a need for debate as to how to reconcile or find the balance between these goals that 
are interdependent but conflict at the same time. This is exactly what the years of negotiation 
on the Polar Code had to achieve. 
The stark contrast between the contours of the common good and direct self-interest helped me 
analytically separate arguing and bargaining to enable a discussion and interpretation of single 
actors’ utterances, primarily Russia, in the Polar Code debates. I employed such a sharp 
distinction between instances of arguing and bargaining in Russian Proposals on the Polar 
Code. 
The discussion on the elements of the common good also leads to a theoretical issue. The 
formulation of the common good as something pre-given appears to clash with the 
conceptualisation of the common good in deliberative theory as something emerging through 
deliberation.204 However, the two are not irreconcilable. When debating at the IMO, States are 
working on a set agenda, with an idea as to what the regulations they are debating and creating 
are supposed to aim for. In this sense, the contours of the common good are set prior to the 
debates. However, they emerge through lengthy discussions of their own prior to the 
negotiations process and are, in this sense, not pre-given. These contours need to be filled with 
meaning which emerges from further detailed deliberation.  
Thus, while the common good defined in the case of the Polar Code appears to put the principles 
of freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction in balance, this would have to be done 
through the particular provisions of the Code. Thus, where that balance could be found and 
whether it would tilt in one direction of the other was to be decided through the deliberation of 
the Code’s content. Similarly, how the relationship of the substantive elements is conceived – 
conflicting or interdependent – emerges from debates: the discussions on what the Polar Code 
should aim for resulted in an emphasis on the complementary nature of the two substantive 
goals of the common good, but whether the substance of the Code follows this had to emerge 
in subsequent debates. 
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3.2 Inclusion of self-interest, and deliberative negotiation 
While above I have neatly separated arguing and bargaining from each other, the picture is 
more complicated than that. I have already briefly introduced Elster’s strategic use of impartial 
arguments, whereby a speaker disguises self-interest – a form of misrepresentation and part of 
bargaining. However, more recent theoretical developments introduce self-interest into 
deliberation and the common good. In the following, I explain this development towards 
acknowledging that self-interest can play a role in deliberation and contribute to achieving the 
common good. 
As already suggested, the institutional setting can place constraints on both bargaining and 
arguing. In practice, it can also be the case that institutional norms allow for the expression of 
self-interest while still aiming for a common good: 
[…] it is both permissible and in some institutional instances required that [participants] 
take particular concern for their own interests. Participants need not be fully neutral or 
detached in the deliberative process.205 
Jane Mansbridge and others posit that the expression of self-interest and the conflict of interests 
are not necessarily antithetical to deliberation and indeed, suitably constrained, may be 
complementary to it as “in politics participants make decisions not only for others but also for 
themselves.”206 Thus, by integrating “conflict with commonality,”207 self-interest can play a 
vital function in the furtherance of the common good.  
While the expression of self-interest can be reconciled with deliberation, it is important that 
such expression is not without its constraints. Mansbridge and colleagues suggest two kinds of 
constraints on the expression of self-interest, a universal one of “moral behaviour and human 
rights” and a deliberative one of “mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, fairness and mutual 
justification.”208 In a similar vein, Harald Müller suggests two sets of constraints on the pursuit 
of self-interest specifically in the case of IR, which is particularly instructive. Motivated by 
empirical findings showing instances of arguing and bargaining in the same negotiating setting 
and needing to reconcile this with logics of action, Müller suggests that both arguing and 
bargaining are guided by the logic of appropriateness, i.e. regulated by norms of what behaviour 
is appropriate and legitimate under a set of circumstances. 209  Thus, according to him, 
bargaining can be appropriate if constrained through both a substantial set of constraints which 
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define what self-interest is or is not appropriate, while the procedural set of constraints is 
formulated thus: 
In negotiations, it is appropriate for actors to pursue their self-interest unless it collides 
with a valid norm that prescribes different behaviour.210 
One such norm, I argue, is the imperative to further the common good. Thus, one might merge 
Müller’s two constraints and say that it is appropriate for actors to pursue their self-interest 
unless it clashes with the contours of the common good. Self-interest that does not clash directly 
with the contours of the common good might then be generalisable.211 Thus, even if it is not 
included in the outcome after deliberation on it, utterance based on such self-interest is 
admissible. 
Mansbridge lists four reasons why expression of self-interest is important in deliberation, three 
of which I concentrate on here.212 First, expressions of self-interest inform the search for the 
common good, in the sense of providing information as well as direct input when the common 
good is “only” an aggregation of individual goods.213 This leads to the second reason, which is 
that the participants’ discussion involving self-interest increases the understanding of the 
parties both in terms of self-understanding as well as mutual understanding.214 In the latter case, 
parties gain an understanding of each other’s wants and needs, on the basis of which they can 
identify conflict fault-lines as well as areas of commonality.215 Mutual understanding can also 
facilitate the adoption of the perspective of each other by the parties, satisfying the 
transformative criteria of deliberation. 216  This also signals where other, non-deliberative 
mechanisms are needed to make a decision.217 In practice, for example, deliberations might be 
brought to a close and a binding decision reached by a voting mechanism.218 Finally, such a 
process and the resulting mutual understanding can lead to a heightened sense of solidarity and 
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mutual respect,219 much needed in institutional settings where the parties work together in 
repeated interactions, such as in the case of the IMO. This is in contrast to the spirit of 
community arising from pure consensus decision-making, where expressions of self-interest 
are excluded which, as a result, may mask important differences. However, it should also be 
noted that the masking of differences among the parties can have positive effects for reaching 
a decision, as in incompletely theorised agreements discussed below. 
The inclusion of self-interest into deliberation leads to different forms of what has been termed 
deliberative negotiation, located between pure arguing and pure bargaining. While falling short 
of the classical ideal of deliberation resulting in consensus, deliberative negotiation does aspire 
to the regulative ideals of deliberation, and may be defined by both the observance of mutual 
justification, respect and fairness on the one hand and conflict of interests and the “context of 
relative openness and disclosure about interests, needs, and constraints” on the other.220 Indeed, 
Mansbridge suggests that in practice the need to think in terms of others’ interests may generate 
more respect and joint gain than empathy.221 One situation, mentioned by Mark Warren and 
colleagues, which can facilitate deliberative negotiation is precisely repeated interactions of the 
parties, allowing for increased respect towards, and understanding of, their counterparts.222 
While such repeated interactions may conflict with democratic norms of genuinely contested 
elections and accountability, this need not concern us in an IR setting. More to the point is that 
deliberative negotiations, facilitated by repeated interactions, allow workable outcomes to be 
reached while upholding the ideals of deliberation.  
3.2.1 Considerations of deliberative negotiation in the present research 
The common good as accepted when the Polar Code was placed on the IMO’s agenda is in the 
interests of the international community in general but also the particular self-interest of 
individual States. This is the case even if some States would be more affected by a pollution 
incident or an accident compromising the safety of a ship and those on board than other States. 
Yet States have a multitude of interests – some of them very distinctive. These interests are 
given more or less weight when deliberating on how to fill the contours of the common good 
and, as long as they do not contradict the aims of the Polar Code, they are admissible in the 
debates and would not be considered bargaining positions. 
The problem for the research is separating the two different kinds of self-interest. Here, I return 
to my second dichotomy mentioned in section 3.1.1: that between claims of validity in truth 
and rightness and claims of credibility based on unequal power relations. While this dichotomy 
helps identify arguing and bargaining, it is not without its complications. A lack of support for 
a proposition in a claim of truth or rightness might not be taken to mean that the aim was not 
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towards the common good. While it is expected that positions are argued for at the IMO, this 
might be somewhat relaxed in certain instances, such as when setting out what might be 
included in a new text early on in the negotiations. As an example, in chapter 4, I will briefly 
touch upon a Canadian proposal submitted to the 55th meeting of the DE Sub-Committee, 
document DE 55/12/7.223 This paper includes many suggestions for what should be included in 
the Polar Code without many arguments. While in some instances a lengthier argumentation 
could be desirable to explain the need for a certain provision in the text of the Polar Code, 
submission papers come with space constraints. Once concrete proposals are tabled, there is 
space for more argumentation. However, lack of support for a position in a claim of truth or 
rightness might suggest that a closer look is warranted. After all, instances of arguing are 
intended to change the preferences of others based on the power of a better argument 
substantiated by validity. Put simply: without a claim to validity, it is hard to persuade. State 
delegations at the IMO know that they need to substantiate their points, especially if a proposal 
is controversial. International organisations, such as the IMO, are structured environments 
where the logic of appropriateness dictates that decisions are based on sound reasoning. If there 
are no arguments included in a proposal, does this mean we are facing a self-interested demand? 
Such was the question, for instance, when considering a Russian proposal in document SDC 
1/3/18 trying to overturn an agreed ban on discharges of oil and oily mixtures without much in 
the way of arguments to support the proposal.224 Such an interpretation could be supported 
when considering the document together with a Russian statement that the proposal was to be 
repeated at the Committee level (that is, at a higher level than the Sub-Committee where 
document SDC 1/3/18 was tabled) if not accepted.225 In addition, since overturning an agreed 
decision is resisted at the IMO and tends to be seen as opening a “can of worms,” the Russian 
delegation should conceivably know that significantly more argumentation was needed to 
underline why it was imperative to overturn the discharge ban. 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the above dichotomy stands reliance on unequal power 
relations. That means coercive power that would clash with the deliberative ideal, rather than 
the power of the better argument. The lack of reliance on such power relations when expressing 
self-interest could, therefore, indicate less of a bargaining position and more of a genuine aim 
to contribute to deliberative negotiation and the search for the common good through the 
expression of self-interest. One shortcoming of Russian Proposals on the Polar Code is that I 
do not make explicit the difference between generalisable self-interest compatible with the 
common good and self-interest contradicting the common good, instead treating them with the 
same broad brush. In that article, I concentrate very much on instances of bargaining in the 
Russian position, such as the hidden demand noted above. In later papers, notably in Russia 
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and the Polar Marine Environment and In the Same Boat, I do try to make a point of the 
possibility of developing mutual understanding. Such is the case notably in the later debates on 
the discharge ban on oil and oily waters. Here, Russian papers contain arguments regarding the 
impact of the ban on icebreakers and hydrographic and survey vessels, while the limited scope 
of the proposed grace period appears to show a regard for the interests and values of those 
parties in favour of stringent environmental protection standards. That a limited grace period 
was indeed introduced shows that the expression of suitably constrained self-interest can 
contribute to formulating the meaning of the common good.226 These articles thus provide a 
more nuanced picture than, and an evolution from, what is presented in Russian Proposals on 
the Polar Code. 
Furthermore, as I stated above, the inclusion of self-interest into deliberation may signal when 
non-deliberative mechanisms are needed to arrive at a decision. The purpose of debates at the 
IMO, as in other functional international institutions, is decision-making. When the self-interest 
of parties cannot be reconciled with each other or the common good, or when time in a 
Committee or Sub-Committee meeting is too limited to deliberate all possible positions and 
arguments before arriving at an outcome, there is a need for a mechanism other than 
deliberation – and pure consensus decision-making – to achieve a decision. In such a case, the 
outcome would fall short of ideal deliberation’s consensus. 227  One such non-deliberative 
mechanism is voting. Thus, while in pronouncements the IMO insists on characterising its 
decision-making as consensus, the way in which the Chairman of an IMO Committee or Sub-
Committee “senses” the prevailing mood in the hall as Gaskell describes it228 – or to put it more 
mundanely, establishes whether there is a majority for a proposal without calling for an actual 
vote – should be seen in the light of deliberative negotiation. That is, based on a count of the 
delegations’ statements of support or opposition, the Chairman brings deliberation to a close. 
In this way, it is also possible to establish whether a particular interest is deemed by the parties 
to be capable of filling the common good with meaning. 
3.3 Incompletely theorised agreements 
One form of deliberative negotiation is incompletely theorised agreements, a concept developed 
by Cass Sunstein.229 This process formed the basis for my hypothesis explored in The Elephant 
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in the Room and is elaborated on in detail there.230 Suffice it here to say that such agreements 
involve agreement on particular outcomes and even low-level principles, but not fundamental 
or abstract principles.231 Thus, the parties arrive at an outcome without agreeing to it for the 
same reasons, which is the core difference between incompletely theorised agreements and the 
consensus of classical deliberation.232 The silence that is employed in incompletely theorised 
agreements resulting in not fulfilling “the demands of the criterion of mutual justification ‘all 
the way down’,” 233  further differentiates such agreements from other concepts, which 
emphasise the need for expanded deliberation or full clarification of disagreements.234 Such a 
formulation takes into account the diversity among participants as well as the lack of possibility 
for more abstract theorisation.235 The latter may be subject to criticism, which points to the 
desirability of a genuine agreement based on “fully articulated reasons and larger principles” 
within politics. 236  Yet, the diversity among participants suits multi-member international 
organisations well, while the possibility of abstract theorisation might not be possible – not on 
account of modesty as Sunstein suggests with regard to judiciary237 but – on account of State 
sovereignty as well as the practical needs of achieving an outcome among a large number of 
participants. The use of incompletely theorised agreements as a concept can, thus, be relevant 
with regards to world politics. In fact, Jens Steffek argues that diplomatic practice is 
overwhelmingly characterised by incompletely theorised agreements.238 
While incompletely theorised agreements fall short of deliberative theory’s consensus, Sunstein 
commends them for fulfilling the deliberative ideals of mutual respect, civility and 
reciprocity.239 He also claims that the goal of incompletely theorised agreements is reaching 
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“consensus” on particulars.240 Steffek’s observation illuminates this better while respecting the 
narrow understanding of consensus of classical deliberative theory. He states with regard to 
diplomatic communication that it builds “bridges across the gaps of disagreements rather than 
[…] closing the gaps.”241 According to Steffek, while the outcome is not completely theorised 
and is thus not a consensus, arguments do matter due to the nature of such debates where much 
of the discussion is about finding appropriate (and creative) wording for legal texts.242 Such 
questions do not lend themselves to bargaining,243 even if the resulting outcome is intentional 
textual ambiguity which can be exploited by rival interpretations.244 Sunstein suggests that 
incompletely theorised agreements are built on rules and analogies, providing fixed points on 
which participants can converge instead of on high-level principles.245 Such a legal style of 
reasoning is also evident in settings where international legal instruments are negotiated.246 
While analogies and rules are helpful in further classifying legal arguments, they also provide 
the kind of external authority which actors relate their arguments to, resulting in the triadic 
nature of arguing Saretzki talks about.247 Sunstein’s rules and analogies refer to already agreed 
norms and already decided cases or, as I have shown in the case of the Polar Code,248 previously 
reached decisions on other IMO instruments. The authority of analogies might be somewhat 
more questionable than that of rules, and in need of further argumentation to show their 
relevance to the case debated, bringing in lower-level principles. While Steffek argues that the 
textual ambiguity that may result from incomplete theorisation is indispensable to the 
functioning of international negotiations so that actors can “embark on cooperative 
enterprise”249 – and often reaching and signing an agreement is in itself a major achievement – 
whether incompletely theorised agreements once concluded are successful in achieving their 
purpose may be questionable.250  
3.3.1 Incompletely theorised agreements in the present research 
In this section I want to address three points regarding my use of the concept of incompletely 
theorised agreements in the case of the Polar Code in The Elephant in the Room. First, based 
on the history of the law of the sea and its application to the Arctic, I identified two high-level 
principles – freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction – in the case of the Polar Code 
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where the clash between these two principles was not resolved by the negotiations. Yet, as 
Sunstein suggests, what is “high-level” or “lower-level” is a matter of comparison.251 Following 
on from this, I suggested even higher-level abstractions lying behind my two principles which, 
while clashing in this case, are not irreconcilable. Thus, I did not suggest that Canada and Russia 
reject the liberal international world order which relies on freedom of navigation. Nor was the 
intention to imply that the United States or European States object to environmental 
stewardship. What I claim in The Elephant in the Room is that there is a difference in 
perspective or emphasis: Canada and Russia see the issue of Arctic shipping through a more 
local perspective, while the United States and others through a global lens.252 
Second, to the methods of reaching incompletely theorised agreements suggested by Sunstein 
– rules and analogies – I added second-best arguments in The Elephant in the Room and 
suggested that, without the framing provided by these, arguments evoking rules and analogies 
would not have worked.253 Inasmuch as such second-best arguments obscure the ultimate 
principles at play, they may be seen as misrepresentation, with the implication that incompletely 
theorised agreements utilising second-best arguments are non-deliberative. At the same time, 
such second-best arguments can and often do provide genuine arguments for one or the other 
outcome and, as suggested by Mansbridge and colleagues,  
[t]o the degree that the parties can genuinely offer one another such [mutually acceptable] 
justifications, based not only on the need to find a modus vivendi but on mutual respect for 
the other’s premises, the process of generating incompletely theorized agreements meets 
the deliberative criteria of mutual justification, mutual respect, reciprocity, fairness, 
equality among participants, and the absence of coercive power.254 
I argue that the debates over savings clauses described in The Elephant in the Room, while 
obscuring the ultimate principles, did result in an exchange of genuine arguments that respected 
those deeply-held principles of the participants as well as the deliberative ideals, without 
allowing the debates to descend into disputes directly involving ultimate foundations which is 
what had happened at the IMO just a few years previously. I do not mention the debates at the 
IMO related to Canada’s newly mandatory Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone 
Regulations (NORDREG) in The Elephant in the Room.255 However, the possible effect of 
those debates on the different approaches taken by Russia and Canada when raising the issue 
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of Article 234 of the LOSC in relation to the Polar Code are discussed in In the Same Boat, 
suggesting that Canada had learnt from the NORDREG debates and, thus, showed more respect 
towards the principled positions of others, notably the United States.256 In addition, there might 
be conflicts between the Polar Code and other international legal instruments. Therefore, it is 
natural to regulate the relationship of these – as I have said in The Elephant in the Room, savings 
clauses are not controversial in themselves.257 Thus, I argue that the savings clause debates 
were an exercise in deliberative negotiation, although possibly quite close to non-deliberative 
negotiation. 
Third, while incompletely theorised agreements are characterised by the clash of high-level 
principles and the lack of resolution to this clash, it is also emphasised in the literature that, due 
to the lack of resolution, the parties agree to the outcome for different reasons.258 I omitted to 
explore this facet of incompletely theorised agreements in The Elephant in the Room. It is clear 
that while the only savings clause included in the new text – regulation XIV/2.5 of SOLAS – 
favoured Canada and Russia because it could be used to justify the primacy of their unilateral 
national regulations, the United States, Germany and others could agree to it due to the 
analogies provided as well as the generality of its language and the use of the phrase “rights or 
jurisdiction.” Similarly, the lack of savings clauses in the MARPOL Annexes could be accepted 
by Canada and Russia because of the framing of the issue in the language of transparency, and 
because it was expressed during the debates that the Code is not envisaged to impair rights 
prescribed in LOSC. For others, such an outcome was satisfactory as it did not expressly place 
the LOSC and the controversial Article 234 rights over the Polar Code. However, I also want 
to emphasise the commonality among the parties for accepting the outcome: that the IMO was 
not meant to resolve this issue in the first place as it is not an international legal adjudicator. 
The use of rules, analogies and second-best arguments allowed for the creation of textual 
ambiguity that, as Steffek states, may be interpreted differently by the parties.259 
3.4 Concluding remarks on the theoretical framework 
What remains before concluding my theoretical framework is a final note on IR and arguing 
and bargaining. While I have relied on Müller and his understanding of the logic of 
appropriateness over arguing and bargaining in my explanation of the inclusion of self-interest 
into deliberation, I am less wedded to the idea of the triangle of the logics of arguing, 
                                                     
256 Bognar, “In the Same Boat?” supra note 143. 
257 Bognar, “Elephant in the Room,” supra note 145, 194-195. 
258  E.g. Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized Agreements,” supra note 229, 1742-1745; Sunstein, “Practical 
Reason,” supra note 229, 270-273; Steffek, “Incomplete Agreements,” supra note 156, 236-237; Mansbridge, 
“Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations,” supra note 150, 12-15; and Mansbridge et al., “Place of Self-
Interest,” supra note 172, 70-71. 
259 Steffek, “Incomplete Agreements,” supra note 156, 231. 
 
50 
consequences and appropriateness to understand the debates that take place at the IMO.260 One 
of the problems with these logics of action is that they describe social actions, not modes of 
communication. In Müller’s conceptualisation then, both arguing and bargaining fall under the 
logic of appropriateness, meaning a focus on the structure that constrains or enables what 
utterances fit within the norms of the international institution that is the IMO, rather than on 
actors and their particular utterances. As Saretzki suggests, Müller’s formulation places what 
happens in the communication process into a black box.261 
Yet, I am more concerned with actors than with the IMO itself. 262  Primarily, I want to 
understand actors with regards to how they act in the IMO, and particularly with regards to the 
dichotomies of arguing and bargaining (and deliberative negotiation between the two) and 
common good and self-interest (and generalisable self-interest between the two). Secondarily, 
it was necessary to establish also how the IMO functions, for instance how the common good 
can be understood in the case of the Polar Code. I touch upon the IMO’s debates – for example 
with regards to its avowed consensus decision-making – as a result of looking at the actors and 
their specific utterances and how these can be reconciled into a decision.  
Therefore, I decided to keep the logics of action in the background rather than placing them in 
the foreground of my research. As has been suggested, opposing, dichotomous, mutually 
exclusive schools and perspectives “reduce the complexity of a field.”263 In fact, Abbott and 
Snidal urge for the employment of the logics of appropriateness and consequences together in 
order not to miss “the richness of law in uniting interests and values” in the process of 
legalisation, while highlighting that most actors are motivated by both interests and values.264 
I suggest focussing on concrete questions such as: How do actors treat the norms of the 
organisation they act in? Do they engage to further the common good, even through the 
expression of their own self-interest, or do they disregard this aim and bring self-interest into 
the debates which directly clashes with the contours of the common good? How do they express 
these interests or argue for the common good? And, most importantly for my research, what 
does this say about the actors – rather than about the IMO? Placing the logic of actions in the 
background, I form an understanding of the actors acting within the IMO. 
  
                                                     
260 Risse, “Let’s Argue!” supra note 154, 2-7. As Saretzki suggests in his critique, Müller turns “the triangle around 
once, putting the logic of appropriateness in the upper corner [instead of the logic of arguing] and designating it 
to be ‘superior’,” Saretzki, “From Bargaining to Arguing,” supra note 160, 171. 
261 Saretzki, “From Bargaining to Arguing,” supra note 160, 170-172. 
262 In connection to formulating my second set of research questions, I am particularly thankful to Hans-Kristian 
Hernes for pointing out the obvious difference between the IMO and actors participating in debates at the IMO. 
263 Kjell Goldmann, “Appropriateness and Consequences: The Logic of Neo-Institutionalism,” Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 18, no. 1 (January 2005): 35-52. 
264 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Law, Legalization, and Politics: An Agenda for the Next Generation 
of IL/IR Scholars,” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State 
of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 39. 
 
51 
4 Methodology: approaching the Polar Code 
negotiations 
In this chapter, in explaining and giving a systematic account of how I conducted my research, 
I follow the three stages of the process. First, I describe the collection of my data, together with 
the challenges encountered. This is followed by an account of the selection process with regards 
to my primary material, IMO documents. In the final two sections of this chapter, I show how 
I analysed the selected documents through descriptive argumentation analysis and the use of 
the value-description-prescription (V-D-P) triad. In these two sections, I explain in detail my 
method of working with my material in order to show how I could still talk about arguing, 
bargaining and deliberative negotiation as modes of communication in the absence of available 
minutes from the IMO’s meetings. I thus place an emphasis on connecting my methodology to 
my theoretical framework. My documentary material, combined with a theoretical framework 
built on the concepts of arguing and bargaining, poses particular research challenges connected 
to evaluating claims identified through argumentation analysis, which will be discussed as well.  
4.1 Research material and its challenges 
The research presented in this thesis relies on a number of different source materials, including 
documents obtained from the IMO which forms the basis of my research, as well as 
observations made at the IMO, interviews with participants in the negotiation of the Polar Code, 
audio records of the IMO, national legal and policy documents as well as academic writings. 
4.1.1 IMO documentary material 
In order to be able to analyse the negotiation of the Polar Code and the positions and 
justifications provided for these by the different States, especially Russia, the core material is 
provided by publicly available IMO documents from the negotiation process of the Code. These 
were collected from the IMO’s online documentary database, IMODOCS.265 A further IMO 
document was recovered from the website of the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty (see 
below).266 The documents have the widest possible range in time, authorship and type.  
Timeframe. The documents range, in the main, from the 2009 initiation of the development of 
the mandatory Polar Code to its conclusion in May 2015. The documentary material spans 
sixteen MSC and MEPC Committee sessions and six sessions of the DE and SDC Sub-
Committees.267 Documents collected from other Sub-Committees of the IMO that discussed 
parts of the Polar Code were also included.268 Altogether, 289 IMO documents make up the 
research material. However, it should be noted that debates in the Sub-Committees other than 
DE and SDC, whilst highly technical, were largely limited, shown also by the relatively few 
documents submitted to these bodies. Only a tenth of the documents (29) bear the initials of 
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these Sub-Committees.269 Of these, less than half (12) were authored by member States or 
consultative organisations, the rest being submitted by the IMO Secretariat. In comparison, of 
the remaining 260 documents only 47 were submitted by the Secretariat, these largely covering 
the outcomes of Committee and Sub-Committee meetings. 
As stated, the research material covers the period up to the adoption of the environmental part 
of the Polar Code in May 2015.270 However, having followed subsequent debates regarding 
shipping in polar waters, I do refer to papers which were submitted to the IMO after the Code’s 
adoption to highlight more recent developments of significance. Still, these documents do not 
form the core of the research but are meant for illustration and update.  
Authorship. In order to reconstruct the debates on the Polar Code, no documents were initially 
excluded from the research on account of authorship even if the focus was on Russia. Thus the 
documentary material includes papers from Russia and the Arctic States – some of the major 
actors in the debates – as well as from States that have an important stake in the Antarctic, 
especially SAR responsibilities since the Polar Code affects their interests as well; States with 
maritime interests, such as Germany; flags of convenience; NGOs representing both industry 
and environmental protection interests; as well as papers developed by the IMO’s 
organisational apparatus submitted by the IMO Secretariat or Chairs of working and 
correspondence groups.271 The papers that were not directly relevant to the issue areas taken up 
by Russia threw up a number of questions, some of which have been explored in the articles 
constituting this thesis. Thus, for example, the question of competing principles addressed in 
The Elephant in the Room originates from Canadian proposals, while also resulting in a 
comparison of the way Russia and Canada approached the relationship between the Polar Code 
and Article 234 of the LOSC in In the Same Boat. Furthermore, reading Russia’s proposals 
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against other actors contributed to the approach employed in Russia and the Polar Marine 
Environment. These documents also provided for a quantitative basis to place Russia’s 
contribution to the negotiations in context. 
Document type. The material is made up of proposal documents submitted by the members and 
consultative organisations of the IMO, information papers submitted by the same actors and 
reports of the Committees and Sub-Committees. The latter have proven especially helpful in 
the reconstruction of the major positions and arguments expressed during the debates as well 
as the decisions made. However, one major deficiency of these reports is that they tend to make 
the States and NGOs participating in the debates anonymous in the sense that they are only 
directly identified upon request, usually in relation to a statement or intervention made.  
Furthermore, reports of the working and correspondence groups involved in the detailed 
technical work on the Code have been included in the material. However, only those reports 
that were submitted between sessions of the Committees and Sub-Committees could be 
included. Reports of such groups that were submitted during the sessions and thus took the form 
of working papers are not publicly available through IMODOCS. One such working paper was 
discovered almost by accident by the author, while working on a blogpost relating to shipping 
in Antarctic waters. This working paper DE 55/WP.4 was attached to a Norwegian document 
submitted to the 34th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. Thus, although originally not a 
public document, it was included in the present research having already been put into the public 
domain. 
Concluding this introduction to the documentary material from the IMO, it is to be noted that, 
of the 289 documents gathered, Russia authored fifteen, while nine statements and interventions 
made by Russia are recorded in reports of the Committees and Sub-Committees. In addition, 
two papers authored by Norway and one by Canada record the position taken by Russia.272  
4.1.2 Observation at the IMO 
I had the opportunity to observe the plenary sessions of the 68th meeting of the MEPC between 
11-15 May 2015, where the Polar Code’s pollution prevention part was adopted. Preparation 
for the observation of this meeting was hampered by the lack of public access on IMODOCS 
to documents submitted before the meeting. Furthermore, because this session was so late in 
the Polar Code process, there was scarcely any substantive discussion regarding the Code in 
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2; and Norway, “Ship Design and Construction: Draft Polar Code, Part I-B,” IMO Doc. MSC 93/INF.4, March 4, 
2014, Annex, 6. 
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plenary.273 Most of the work was conducted in the drafting group, to hammer out the precise 
language of the Polar Code text. To this group, observers such as myself were not allowed.  
While this clearly shows the limits of the observation at MEPC 68, my presence at this meeting 
was not futile, even if my observations included discussions unrelated to the Polar Code. 
Observing the meeting gave a profound insight into how the IMO works in practice. Seated in 
the gallery amongst other observers, it was possible to follow the flow of the debates.  
Among the different sequences observed was the way in which decisions, supposedly taken by 
consensus according to literature on the IMO, are at times taken by counting those who have 
spoken for or against an issue.274 Furthermore, the observations also highlighted that many 
more delegations are involved in the debates on a given issue than just those that submitted 
papers or are referenced in the reports of the Committees and Sub-Committees. Even if they 
are simply stating their support or lack thereof, these State can have a bearing on the outcome 
in cases where the margins between the different sides are small. Conversely, some small 
delegations might stay silent on issues of potential interest due to lack of funds and proper 
representation, unless an inspirational person takes the lead, such as the delegation leaders of 
the Cook Islands or the Bahamas. My observations also illustrated the issue of groupings of 
States and interest organisations in the decision-making process, notably groups such as 
members of the EU, or the grouping of shipping industry representatives and flags of 
convenience, often supported by other developing States. Whether these groupings also played 
a part in the negotiation of the Polar Code is hard to say, but one indication of this is a proposal 
co-sponsored by open registries and shipping organisations.275 
Finally, one observation that struck me, with possible implications for Russia, was the language 
in which the debates were held. While the debates observed were conducted in English,276 
                                                     
273 The only substantive proposal submitted to this meeting was China and the Republic of Korea, “Consideration 
and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Proposed Modifications to Regulation 1.2.2 of Chapter 
1 of Draft Polar Code, Part II-A,” IMO Doc. MEPC 68/6/4, March 16, 2015. 
274 Consider again the Chairperson summing up the prevailing mood in the hall and the sense of the discussion, in 
Gaskell, “Decision Making,” supra note 67, 186-187. 
275 Kiribati et al., “Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Reception Facilities 
for Oil and Oily Mixtures,” IMO Doc. SDC 1/3/1, October 11, 2013. The co-sponsors of this documents are the 
following: Kiribati, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO), CLIA, International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), International 
Federation of Shipmasters’ Association (IFSMA), International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA), 
International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), International Ship Managers’ Association 
(INTERMANAGER), International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), International 
Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), The Nautical Institute and 
Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd (SIGTTO). 
276 Further issues relating to the use of the English language, such as practical problems of translation delay, 




interpretation is provided to and from the IMO’s official languages.277 However, the English 
language skills of some of the delegations who were not able to use their own language left 
ample room for improvement. Furthermore, debates which went over the working hours of the 
interpreters had to be conducted in English, causing observable difficulties to those delegations 
used to expressing themselves in their own language. Moreover, interpretation is not provided 
for the working and drafting groups. All these points suggest possible impairments for some 
delegations in communicating and advancing their positions in potentially crucial discussions, 
including Russia in the latter two cases.  
4.1.3 Interviews with participants 
Further insight into the IMO’s decision-making process in general, and the Polar Code 
negotiations in particular, was sought by conducting interviews with participants of the Polar 
Code negotiations, especially with regard to what went on “behind the scenes” in the working 
groups, correspondence groups and chats among the participants in the corridor.  
The first interviewees were those I met during my time at the IMO, as well as the Chair of the 
working group responsible for the development of the Polar Code, Ms Turid Stemre of Norway. 
From there, the snowball method was used to gather further interviewees. However, obtaining 
and conducting interviews was marred with difficulty, with many delegates of national 
delegations unwilling to answer requests for interviews and, in cases where they did, reluctant 
to speak on the record about the details of the negotiations or at all, in spite of the anonymity 
offered in the requests for interview.278 As a consequence, I shifted focus to interviewing 
“fringe” participants: delegates from consultative NGOs and advisors in the national 
delegations. This yielded some results; however, these delegates typically focussed on their 
field of expertise, thus providing only partial insight. Crucially, being peripheral actors in the 
negotiations, they were not directly involved in the more interesting political decisions.  
Due to the obstacles outlined above, besides informal discussions that took place during my 
week at MEPC 68, only seven interviews were conducted during the period 2015-2017. These 
included the working group Chair, four other members of national delegations (Ms Stemre also 
being a Norwegian delegate) and two members of consultative NGOs. The difficulty in 
obtaining interviews demonstrates the sensitive nature of the Polar Code negotiations.  
4.1.4 Supporting material: audio records and national legal and policy 
documents 
Since getting interviews proved difficult, I turned to other material to help with the analysis of 
the IMO documents. Firstly, one of my interviewees provided me with access to audio records 
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278 Notably but understandably, Ms Stemre would only discuss the IMO’s decision-making process, also with 
regard to the Polar Code, in general due to her impartial role in the negotiations as the Chair of the Polar Code 
working group – this, however, helpfully complemented my observations of the workings of the IMO. 
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of debates at the plenary sessions of the IMO’s Committees and Sub-Committees. Essentially 
taking the form of audible minutes, these records provided valuable insight into the discussions, 
which took place at meetings before I started my research and to which, therefore, I could not 
gain admission to observe. The first meeting regarding the Polar Code to be covered by these 
audio records is MSC 91 in 2012. Thus, these records have a shorter temporal scope than the 
negotiations themselves, leaving out among other things four DE meetings (see Table 1). Even 
so, the audio records span approximately 30 hours across nine Committee and Sub-Committee 
meetings.279 
The audio records had their own challenges. Beyond the possibly sensitive nature of the 
negotiations that I have become cognisant of from my interviews, I learnt halfway through my 
research process from my contact that they preferred me not to use the audio records as a direct 
source or refer to them in my study. From then on, therefore, I treated these records as if they 
were off-the-record conversations and did not use them as evidence in my research if I could 
not corroborate them with other sources. 
As another supplementary source, national policy documents, laws and regulations, particularly 
in the case of Russia, were used to pinpoint possible positions during the negotiations and to 
evaluate claims with regards to State interests or the common good. In the case of Russia, these 
included four documents with direct bearing on the Arctic:  
two policy documents regarding Russia’s Arctic: the 2008 Basics of the State Policy of the 
Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective280 
and the 2013 Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and 
National Security up to 2020;281 and  
two new legal instruments updating previous regulations for the NSR: the 2012 Federal Act 
on Amendments to Specific Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Related to 
Governmental Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of the Northern Sea 
Route282 and the 2013 Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route.283  
Other documents and sources were also consulted, such as the 2001 Maritime Doctrine of 
Russian Federation until 2020284 and speeches delivered by Vladimir Putin, first as prime 
minister, then as president, at the biannual International Arctic Forum, The Arctic – Territory 
                                                     
279 These meetings are those of MSC, MEPC, DE and SDC. 
280 Basics of Arctic Policy, supra note 12.  
281 Russian Federation, Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National 
Security up to 2020, February 20, 2013. 
282 NSR Federal Act, supra note 9.  
283 Ministry of Transport of Russia, Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route, January 17, 
2013, No. 7. 
284 Russian Federation, Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation until 2020, July 27, 2001. 
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of Dialogue. 285  These sources were complemented by an extensive range of academic 
literature.286 
With regards to other key actors, the following policy documents were consulted:  
for the United States, the 2009 National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 25 287  and the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic 
Region;288  
for Canada, the 2009 Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future,289 the 2013 
parliamentary report Canada and the Arctic Council: An Agenda for Regional Leadership: 
Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development290 as 
well as Transport Canada’s 2011 pitch for re-election to the IMO Council, Canada: 
Committed to the Goals of the International Maritime Community;291  
for Denmark, the Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020.292  
In the case of Norway, the Norwegian Maritime Authority’s website has the reports of the 
Norwegian IMO delegation for each Committee and Sub-Committee session, providing insight 
into their work including on the Polar Code.293 As regards the shipping industry and the 
                                                     
285 Putin, “Speech at the Second International Arctic Forum”, supra note 11; and Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the 
Plenary Session of the Third International Arctic Forum The Arctic – A Territory of Dialogue,” Official Site of 
the President of Russia, September 25, 2013, http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6032 (accessed March 30, 
2015).  
286 See section 1.3. With regard to the 2001 Maritime Doctrine, see Dariya V. Vasilevskaya, Alexander V. 
Nikolaev and Grigory I. Tsoy, “The Environmental Component of the National Maritime Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Arctic Ocean,” in Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean, ed. Paul Arthur Berkman and 
Alexander N. Vylegzhanin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 93-101. 
287  United States, National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, 
January 9, 2009. 
288 United States, National Strategy for the Arctic Region, Washington, May 10, 2013. 
289 Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status 
Indians (Canada), Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future, Ottawa, 2009. 
290 House of Commons (Canada), Canada and the Arctic Council: An Agenda for Regional Leadership: Report of 
the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, May 2013. 
291 Transport Canada, Canada: Committed to the Goals of the International Maritime Community, TP 14916, May 
2011. 
292 Danish Arctic Strategy, supra note 44. 
293 Norwegian Maritime Authority, “Arkiv – gammel struktur underkomiteer,” Norwegian Maritime Authority, 
https://www.sdir.no/om-direktoratet/presentasjon-av-direktoratet/internasjonalt-arbeid/underkomiteene/arkiv-
gammel-struktur-underkomiteer/?p=1 (accessed December 12, 2018) (in Norwegian); Norwegian Maritime 
Authority, “Arkiv – MEPC-rapporter før 2016,” Norwegian Maritime Authority, https://www.sdir.no/om-
direktoratet/presentasjon-av-direktoratet/internasjonalt-arbeid/imos-miljovernkomite-mepc/mepc-for-2016/ 
(accessed December 12, 2018 ) (in Norwegian); and Norwegian Maritime Authority, “Arkiv – MSC-rapporter før 
2016,” Norwegian Maritime Authority,  
 
58 
expected future user States of Arctic shipping routes, the 2012 and 2014 International Chamber 
of Shipping (ICS) position papers on Arctic shipping are noteworthy,294 while for China’s 
policy towards Arctic shipping scholarly writings were relied upon.295  
4.1.5 Concluding observations on the research material 
In this research I placed IMO documents to the fore and interpreted them with the help of the 
supporting material and secondary literature. This allowed me to focus on what was actually 
written in the Russian IMO proposals, which would have often served as the only reference to 
other delegations when preparing for the debates. This means that a more addressee-oriented 
strategy could be included in the interpretation, less heavily reliant on the opinions and 
recollections of Russian delegates which would have resulted in a more producer-oriented 
strategy.296 At the same time, it remains unclear if any comprehensive document detailing the 
Russian aims and strategy in the Polar Code negotiations existed. 297  The lack of such a 
document suggests that the Russian delegation arrived at the IMO without a clear strategy and 
supports the interpretation that Russia took a reactive stance in the negotiations.298  
Of course, both addressee- and producer-oriented strategies are present in this research at the 
same time. However, more weight was given to the addressee-oriented reading when discussing 
Russia’s proposals in the context of other States’ and consultative organisations’ documents, as 
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sjosikkerhetskomite-msc/arkiv---msc-rapporter-for-2016/ (accessed December 12, 2018) (in Norwegian). 
294 International Chamber of Shipping, Position Paper on Arctic Shipping, December 2012; and International 
Chamber of Shipping, Arctic Shipping Position Paper, 2014. 
295 See e.g. Gang Chen, “China’s Emerging Arctic Strategy,” The Polar Journal 2, no. 2 (2012): 358-371; and 
Nengye Liu, “China’s Role in the Changing Governance of Arctic Shipping,” The Yearbook of Polar Law VI 
(2015): 545-558. A general overview of the interests of Asian user States of the Arctic shipping routes was 
provided at the 2015 CIL-JCLOS Conference Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of 
Arctic States and User States, Singapore, December 9-11, 2015. For relevant book chapters resulting from this 
conference, see Deukhoon (Peter) Han and Sung-Woo Lee, “Rights, Interests, Positions and Practices of Asian 
Flag States, with Special Reference to the Republic of Korea,” in Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights 
and Interests of Arctic States and User States, ed. Robert C. Beckman et al. (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017), 297-
317; and Guifang (Julia) Xue and Yu Long, “Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination for User States,” in 
Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States, ed. Robert C. 
Beckman et al. (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017), 318-356.  
296 For a summary of the addressee-oriented and producer-oriented interpretation strategies, see Göran Bergström 
and Kristina Boréus, “Analyzing Text and Discourse in the Social Sciences,” in Analyzing Text and Discourse: 
Eight Approaches for the Social Sciences, ed. Kristina Boréus and Göran Bergström (London: Sage Publications, 
2017), 12-13. 
297 This may be contrasted with Canada’s approach. Canada arrived to the first DE meeting to discuss the Polar 
Code (DE 53) with a complete draft text of what they wanted to see in the Polar Code, as suggested in Aldo 
Chircop, Peter G. Pamel and Miriam Czarski, “Canada’s Implementation of the Polar Code,” The Journal of 
International Maritime Law 24 (2018): 434. For the Canadian draft, see Canada, “Development of a Mandatory 
Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Proposed Framework for the Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters,” 
IMO Doc. DE 53/18/2, November 20, 2009. 
298 Bognar, “Russian Proposals on the Polar Code,” supra note 139, 125-126. 
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well as when analysing the debates regarding Article 234 of the LOSC and the avoidance of 
underlying principles; whereas the analysis leant towards a more producer-oriented reading 
when scrutinising Russian proposals themselves. In this way, the hope is that a more balanced 
analysis between producer- and addressee-oriented approaches could be found. 
4.2 Digesting the documentary material 
Before embarking on a discussion of how I analysed my material, there is a need to further 
elaborate on how the documentary material was read, how selections were made and what kind 
of documents these are. Since the material comprises 289 documents, it was essential to narrow 
this down for the analysis. At the same time, I did not want to lose the wider context of the 
debates as a whole either.  
The material was read following the chronological order of the Committees and Sub-
Committees. However, among the documents submitted to each Committee or Sub-Committee 
session, I first read the report summarising the proceedings of that given session, providing an 
important overview of which proposals were considered together and signalling points of 
contention and disagreement. Statements or interventions of specific actors included in such 
reports directed the attention towards specific issues and opinions. Following the reports of 
Committees and Sub-Committees, each of the proposals and information papers was read in 
clusters highlighted by the reports, followed by another reading of the report to understand the 
proceedings in light of what was stated in the concrete proposals. In this second reading, I 
concentrated on the summary of viewpoints put forward on a given issue and the decisions 
taken. Furthermore, later reports included draft texts of the Polar Code, allowing me to compare 
these to each other and the proposals, and follow concrete changes.299 This way, it was possible 
to follow the debates in their entirety. 
I decided to focus on the MSC, MEPC, DE and SDC meetings since these provided the principal 
fora for the Polar Code discussions. Furthermore, debates in the other Sub-Committees, which 
were thus excluded from the analysis, were highly technical, posing a limitation to my layman’s 
understanding. Narrowing the focus down to the MSC, MEPC, DE and SDC meetings did not 
result in the exclusion of Russian proposals, since all of Russia’s documents were submitted to 
these Committees and Sub-Committees. However, it resulted in the omission from the analysis 
of one Russian intervention and one statement. The former was made at NAV 59 and concerned 
Russia’s work regarding hydrographic surveying and charting along the NSR.300 Meanwhile, 
the Russian statement to HTW 1 emphasised the importance of practical training of crew on 
ships in polar waters as well as the need for ice navigators onboard such vessels.301 
Further selection was helped by focusing on the fifteen Russian proposals and the remaining 
statements and interventions as the core of the material. To provide the context of the debate 
                                                     
299 Such draft texts could also be found in reports of intersessional working and correspondence groups. 
300 IMO, “Report to the Maritime Safety Committee,” IMO Doc. NAV 59/20, October 1, 2013, 35. 
301 IMO, “Report to the Maritime Safety Committee,” IMO Doc. HTW 1/21, March 7, 2014, Annex 12. 
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for these proposals, relevant proposals were selected based, firstly, on the reports since these 
grouped together those proposals that covered the same or related issues and were thus 
discussed together during the negotiations, allowing for easy identification of which documents 
Russia’s proposals were considered against. 302  Secondly, each proposal and information 
document contains on its opening page a section entitled “Related documents” which connects 
it to papers from previous meetings, thus forming a chain of documents and debates. 
In Russian Proposals on the Polar Code, chronologically the first article I wrote, I endeavoured 
to give an overview of Russia’s contribution during the Polar Code negotiations. The analysis 
here thus included all 15 documents as well as statements and interventions to MSC, MEPC, 
DE and SDC. While this was reduced to six proposals and three statements in Russia and the 
Polar Marine Environment, corresponding to the focus being solely on environmental 
protection measures, other States’ and consultative organisation’s submissions on the same 
subject matters were also included in the analysis.  
At the same time, for The Elephant in the Room, I wanted to look at how, if at all, Article 234 
of the LOSC was discussed, searching my documentary material with the search word “234”. 
Only two Russian documents303 and DE 55/22,304 the report of the DE meeting during which 
the first Russian proposal was discussed, came up. At the same time, from my readings of the 
material I was aware of papers documenting Canadian concerns regarding savings clauses, 
clearly impacting how the relationship of the Polar Code and LOSC, and by extension Article 
234, should be interpreted. The lack of mention of Article 234 in these documents led to the 
idea of exploring the Polar Code as an incompletely theorised agreement, making me also re-
read my material with this in mind to see if any more mentions of this topic could be found, 
leading to further documents: a proposal by Germany305  and an early pronouncement on 
freedom of navigation by Denmark.306 Following the draft texts, as well as relying on secondary 
literature307 and discovering working paper DE 55/WP.4, also helped trace how regulation of 
the relationship of the Polar Code and Article 234 unfolded. 
Finally, having been aware of the differences in approach to the issue of Article 234 during the 
negotiations between Russia and Canada, I wanted to see if there might have been similarities 
                                                     
302 The reports also pinpointed the debates during which the Russian delegation made a statement which otherwise 
is located in an annex attached to the report. 
303 Russian Federation, “Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Procedure of 
Accounting for National Regulations,” IMO Doc. DE 55/12/23, February 1, 2011; and Russian Federation, 
“Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: A Proposal to Appoint Categories 
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305 Germany, “Ship Design and Construction: Comments on the Proposed Draft Amendments to SOLAS to Make 
the Polar Code Mandatory,” IMO Doc. MSC 93/10/2, February 21, 2014, 3. 
306 Denmark, “Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: HAZID Analysis of Ships 
Navigating in Arctic Waters,” IMO Doc. DE 53/18/5, December 18, 2009, 2. 
307 Most notably, McDorman, “Potential Conflicting Rights and Obligations,” supra note 42. 
 
61 
in the approaches of the two with regard to the content of the Polar Code. In order to do this, 
the net was cast wide among the documents of these two States. Accordingly, more issue areas 
were covered in my presentation at the 9th International Congress on Arctic Social Sciences 
(ICASS IX) in the summer of 2017,308 which was eventually revised into In the Same Boat. In 
this revision, the decision was made to concentrate on environmental regulations, as Article 
234 of the LOSC entitles coastal States to regulate for environmental protection purposes, while 
it also appeared that those regulations of the Polar Code were important to both Canada and 
Russia. However, this has meant that certain subject areas fell victim to this narrowed focus, 
notably crewing issues. 
Formally, the documents analysed for this research are similar as they must adhere to the 
guidelines of the IMO. These set out the requirements for documents submitted to the IMO, 
such as that their front page should link these papers to the Strategic Plan of the IMO and 
include a short summary of the objectives of the proposal, as well as that the document should 
conclude with a summary of the proposed action.309 Furthermore, the length of the submissions 
is also closely regulated. This is linked to deadlines for submission before each Committee and 
Sub-Committee meeting, also allowing for the submission of documents commenting on papers 
already received with an extended deadline.310 Proposal papers are on average approximately 
2-4 pages long, discounting annexes. Looking at the Russian proposals, only two of these were 
more than four pages long, while only two did not utilise the extended deadline for commenting 
papers further confirming the reactive nature of Russia’s proposals.311 Finally, while the IMO 
has six official languages, only three of these are used as working languages for documents: 
English, French and Spanish. Therefore, all the Russian proposals were submitted in English. 
As regards the content of the documents, depending on the subject matter, there can be 
differences in the level of technicality of the proposals contained therein. Thus, some Russian 
proposals, for example regarding icebreaking capability, are highly technical, including 
calculation formulae and equivalency tables. These are also, rather unsurprisingly, short on 
argumentation. Of course, the IMO being a technical organisation, such specialised language is 
often unavoidable. At the same time, documents regarding policy points, such as that on the 
                                                     
308 Dorottya Bognar, “A Comparative Analysis of the Positions and Arguments of Russia and Canada in the 
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geographical boundary of the Polar Code’s application, 312  are less technical and more 
argumentative, lending themselves better to analysis. Most of the documents submitted, 
however, fall somewhere between the two. 
4.3 Argumentation analysis 
In order to reconstruct the debates on the Polar Code, and in particular to analyse Russia’s 
positions in these debates based on the IMO documentary material, I utilised a descriptive 
approach to argumentation analysis as a starting point to my analysis. Unlike Holzinger who 
also looks at arguing and bargaining on the level of individual utterances and utilises a 
methodology based on speech acts,313 I did not have the minutes for the debates being analysed. 
I therefore had to find a way to identify equivalents to individual utterances. By using 
argumentation analysis, I could break up my texts into their building blocks, which in turn could 
be evaluated with respect to arguing and bargaining. 
Argumentation in this context should be understood as including both the central claim of the 
text – that is, the standpoint argued for – as well as the claims for and against it. Given that the 
aim of these proposal texts was to persuade the other negotiating parties to support its central 
claim, I did not expect to find many opposing claims within a single proposal text. 
The central statement of the analysed document forms the standpoint argued for, or in other 
words the issue expression.314 Issue expressions may be descriptive, prescriptive or normative, 
where the latter can also be seen as a reformulation of the prescriptive issue expression into an 
evaluation.315 Since most of the documents that form my research material are proposals with 
regard to the form and substance of the Polar Code, the issue expression in most cases is 
prescriptive even if it is not explicitly stated as such. They call for action: including or excluding 
new language in the text or changing existing text.  
To illustrate how locating the issue expressions worked in practice, I take the example of one 
of Russia’s submissions regarding the principle of priority of national regulations over the Polar 
Code’s requirements, DE 55/12/23.316 Although, as stated above, one formal requirement of 
submissions to the IMO is that they conclude with a summary of the proposed action, this is 
often of no help in identifying the issue expression. Under the heading “Action requested of the 
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Sub-Committee,” DE 55/12/23 simply states: “The Sub-Committee is requested to consider this 
document and decide as appropriate.”317 This hardly sums up the central thesis of the document. 
Such practice appears to be quite normal among the delegations: ticking all the boxes without 
having to repeat themselves. In more fortunate cases, the documents’ authors would refer to the 
paragraph where the proposed action is to be found. Instead, we have to look further up in the 
text to search for the issue expression and find that the document states that Russia “supports 
the original wording proposed by Canada and suggests to keep it in the Preamble of the Code 
under development by supplementing the Preamble with [the text of the clause proposed by 
Canada].” 318  Thus, in effect, we are facing the prescriptive issue expression: “Keep the 
principle of priority in the Preamble of Code!”  
Other elements important in building argumentations are arguments and premises. Here, 
arguments are understood as claims “made in support of or against another claim,”319 where the 
latter can be both an issue expression or another argument. Bridging two claims – an issue 
expression and an argument or two arguments – explaining the link between the two, one can 
find a so-called premise (denoted with “φ”) which is taken for granted, presupposed and may 
be implicit. 320  Confusingly, a basic concept of my deliberative theoretical framework is 
arguing, a mode of communication based on the exchange of reasoned arguments. Needless to 
say, the two “arguments” are not the same. Both arguments in deliberation and expressions of 
self-interest in bargaining count as arguments in argumentation analysis, as they are made in 
support of or against an issue expression or another “argument.” To avoid any 
misunderstanding, in my articles I have consistently tried to avoid using the word “argument” 
for anything but arguments in the sense used in deliberative theory.321 Therefore, I often 
resorted – in the absence of any better option – to using the word “justification” in my articles 
when I meant argument in argumentation analysis.  
Arguments may be classified in different ways. They may be divided into descriptive and 
normative arguments322 just as arguments in deliberative theory can be factual and normative, 
with validity claims in truth and rightness. Further, with respect to their relationship to other 
claims, arguments may be pro and contra (counter) arguments.323 In addition, both arguments 
and premises appear at different levels in the argumentation, depending on whether they relate 
to the issue expression or to other arguments.324 This, together with the distinction of pro and 
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contra arguments, gives a clear structure to the argumentation of each document by providing 
a relationship between the arguments. 
As an example, the above document, DE 55/12/23, lists several claims to substantiate its issue 
expression (in order of their appearance in the text):  
it is essential to define the role of the maritime administrations of polar States; 
Russia has adopted national regulations and requirements applying to all ships navigating 
along the NSR within the limits of its EEZ; 
the Code should clearly define principles of applying the requirements within the EEZs of 
polar States. 
The first argument is further supported by a second-order argument emphasising that such 
administrations have the necessary skills and knowledge regarding “ensuring the safety of 
navigation, […] ice conditions depending on the season and […] weather regimes in areas under 
their jurisdiction and adjacent to these areas.”325 If required, this argument could be further 
broken up into three third-level arguments for the three areas listed where the maritime 
administrations possess skill and knowledge respectively. Also, the second argument has a 
second-order argument supporting it including a direct quote of coastal State rights in Article 
234 of the LOSC. The premise here is that, as Russia has been acting within its international 
legal rights, its regulatory regime and by extension its basis in rights enshrined in Article 234 
should be acknowledged in the text of the Polar Code through the inclusion of the principle of 
priority. The LOSC here is an external authority, an international treaty accepted by most States 
involved in the negotiation of the Polar Code.326 Finally, the last argument regarding a clear 
definition for applying the national requirements of polar States in the EEZ is justified by the 
fact that it was already formulated by Canada but later omitted. The arguments listed here are 
all pro arguments.  
Contra arguments were more present when analysing entire debates. Identifying the issue 
expression and arguments in each document allowed me to set these against each other on the 
level of debates. When analysing debates, different models are offered on ordering arguments 
in relation to one another, such as the agent- and substance-oriented models.327 I aimed to merge 
these two models so as to not only gain an overview of where each actor stood on a given issue, 
but also to see on which specific points or arguments these actors clashed. I illustrate this using 
the debate surrounding the above Russian document DE 55/12/23. 
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While DE 55/12/23 was discussed along with several other documents grouped together since 
they related to the framework and structure of the Polar Code, this subject area is too wide to 
be considered one debate, encompassing other subject matters such as goal-based standards and 
how to make the Code mandatory.328 Helpfully, the report of DE 55 highlights that the Russian 
document and a Canadian one, DE 55/12/7 were objected to for the same reasons by several 
delegations, including the United States.329 These contra arguments may be summarised as 
follows: 
There is concern over the legal basis of Russia’s (and Canada’s) regulatory regime. 
There is concern over the practical safety aspects of Russia’s (and Canada’s) regime. 
National regulatory systems should be submitted for adoption by the IMO. 
IMO can address the defects of such regulatory systems. 
The application of Article 234 of the LOSC by Russia (and Canada) is doubtful.330 
It is doubtful that the Code would provide international legal basis for Russia’s (and 
Canada’s) regime. 
The major contention between the United States and Russia then appears to centre on the use 
of Article 234 as the legal basis, and thus the legality, of the Russian regulatory regime, 
weakening Russia’s arguments for keeping the principle of priority in the text of the Polar Code. 
The second-order Russian argument regarding the skill and knowledge of polar States’ 
maritime administrations on navigational safety is also countered, although to a lesser extent, 
by the second American claim.  
That the Canadian document DE 55/12/7 is criticised by the United States and others at the 
same time as Russia’s proposal, appears to suggest that that submission might provide support 
to Russia’s arguments. The DE 55 report, again helpfully, describes that only paragraphs 7 and 
15 of the Canadian document were subject to counter-argument. However, looking at that 
document as a whole, as well as the paragraphs singled out, one can mainly find a list of 
proposals with not much argument supporting any of them. Each proposal may be interpreted 
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as a small issue expression, with paragraph 7 proposing the requirement of all ships to carry a 
permit to operate to authorise their entry in different water areas, while paragraph 15 proposes 
that ships regularly report “where applicable, to coastal States regarding their operations and 
the prevailing conditions.”331 Paragraph 7 states the argument that such a permit to operate 
would “assist coastal States in regulating operations in accordance with their own systems of 
navigational control.”332 Both this first-order argument and the issue expression in paragraph 
15 suggest an implicit premise, namely that coastal States have a right (in Article 234 of the 
LOSC) to establish their own regimes which may include authorising vessel operations and 
prescribing reporting requirements respectively. Thus, while the Canadian document does not 
propose the reestablishment of the principle of priority unlike Russia and covers different 
subject matters from the Russian submission, it similarly takes it for granted that Arctic coastal 
States have the right to adopt their own national regulatory regimes based on Article 234 of the 
LOSC, and in this respect provides some support to Russia’s proposal. 
Table 4 shows the structure of the debate regarding the principle of priority. We can see both 
the different actors’ positions in this debate as would be clear in the actor-oriented model, and 
the intersections of arguments from the substance-oriented model. 
The above example shows, on the one hand, that contra arguments are more likely to be found 
on the level of debates. On the other hand, it also appears to be the case that States would submit 
a paper containing an alternative text to be included in the Polar Code as the issue expression 
rather than outright rejecting and arguing against another State’s proposal. In such cases it was, 
therefore, helpful to build a model of the debate, such as in Table 4, in order to find which 
arguments States clashed or converged on. Again, as mentioned in the chapter on the theoretical 
framework, the lack of argumentation for these alternative texts and, thus, support in validity 
claims would not necessarily mean that we are facing a demand. 
4.3.1 Challenges and relevance of argumentation analysis 
In the example of the debate on the principle of priority above, I introduced proposals and 
arguments mainly from three actors: Russia, the United States and Canada. However, more 
delegations appear to have voiced arguments on the matter as suggested by the mention in the 
report of DE 55 that the United States was supported by several delegations. Which States’ 
delegations these were333 and what precise arguments they stated is unclear from the report. 
This example points towards two distinct problems. Firstly, the reports of the Committees and 
Sub-Committees would often include the major arguments expressed during the debates 
without naming any of the delegations expressing these. Thus one runs the risk of missing 
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important actors from the analysis even if their arguments can be included in the reconstruction 
of the debates. Further, it is also possible that an argument uttered by a key actor is missed 
because the speaker is not identified in the report. 
Claim Actor 
IE: Keep the principle of priority in the Polar Code’s Preamble! R 
P1: It is essential to define the role of the maritime administrations of polar 
States. 
R 
P1P1: Administrations avail of the necessary skills and knowledge 
regarding “ensuring the safety of navigation, […] ice conditions depending 
on the season and […] weather regimes in areas under their jurisdiction 
and adjacent to these areas.” 
R 
C1P1P1: There is concern over the practical safety aspects of 
Russia’s/Canada’s regime.
U 
P2: Russia has adopted national regulations and requirements applying to all 
ships navigating along the NSR within the limits of its EEZ.
R 
P1P2: According to Article 234 of the LOSC, coastal States have the right 
to adopt laws and regulations.334
R 
(φP1P2): As Russia/Canada has been acting within its international legal 
rights, its regulatory regime and by extension its basis in rights enshrined 
in Article 234 should be acknowledged in the text of the Polar Code.335 
R, C336 
C1P1P2: There is concern over the legal basis of Russia’s/Canada’s 
regulatory regime. 
U 
C2P1P2: The application of Article 234 of the LOSC by Russia/Canada 
is doubtful.
U, O 
P3: The Code should clearly define principles of applying the requirements 
within the EEZs of polar States. 
R 
P1P3: The principle of priority was already formulated (by Canada’s 
proposal) but later omitted from submitted documents.
R 
C1: National regulatory systems should be submitted for adoption by the 
IMO. 
U 
P1C1: IMO can address the defects of such regulatory systems. U 
C2: It is doubtful that the Code would provide international legal basis for 
Russia’s/Canada’s regime. 
U, O 
Table 4 - Structure of the debate on the principle of priority at DE 55337 
Secondly, even if the intervention of a specific State is noted in the report it would often be no 
more than a sentence, lacking much in the way of arguments. The case is different for 
statements, as these are attached to reports as annexes rather than included in the main body of 
the reports, allowing for lengthier texts. Statements are then comparable to proposal documents 
                                                     
334 I chose not to include the full text of Article 234 here due to space constraints. 
335 In Russia’s case, such acknowledgement should be through the principle of priority. 
336  Although this was expressed in relation to different issue expression by Canada, the Canadian premise 
nevertheless supports Russia’s argument. 
337 Abbreviations: IE – issue expression; P[number] – pro argument; C[number] – contra argument; φ – premise; 




and may even contain more extended argumentation, justifying States’ positions. Interventions 
contained in the reports, however, are more akin to the paragraphs of the Canadian document 
used in the above example and were treated in a similar manner in the analysis. Nevertheless, 
interventions could still be very much part of the reconstruction of debates and positions of 
States. 
Likewise, proposals with a more technical content pose a challenge for argumentation analysis. 
These are often wanting in arguments – or at least arguments intelligible to laymen such as 
myself. Thus, while these documents did form part of the overall analysis, they were often given 
a more superficial treatment. Nevertheless, they provided some important contributions to the 
analysis. As an example, the Russian submission DE 56/10/14, although devoted to the 
discussion of ice classes and ship categories, includes one sentence regarding limitations placed 
on navigation imposed by national rules introduced on the basis of Article 234 of the LOSC.338 
This sentence, thus, takes it for granted that Arctic coastal States act within their international 
rights when introducing such rules unilaterally, similar to the example discussed above, and as 
such reinforces the Russian stance as regards its perceived rights provided by that article and 
its relationship to the Polar Code. 
Both these problems could, to some degree, be remedied by corroboration with the audio 
records where such records exist. However, from the audio records as well as from my 
observations it is clear that many delegations only speak during the debate to express their 
support for, or opposition to, a proposal without any arguments explaining the grounds for it. 
This is especially the case if the relevant arguments were already stated by delegations that have 
already spoken. Similarly, Russia’s support for a Canadian proposal regarding the inclusion of 
savings clauses into the new MARPOL amendments making the Polar Code’s environmental 
part mandatory339 is noted without further elaboration of the possible Russian arguments for its 
support. That support would be noted in my combined agent- and substance-oriented model in 
the “actor” column. 
4.4 Evaluating arguments 
While identifying the building blocks – issue expressions, arguments and premises – of single 
documents and whole debates as well as reconstructing their structures on that basis is important 
in itself, I used that as a starting point to say something more about these arguments, to evaluate 
them. As Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough argue, arguments can be evaluated from 
a logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspective, meaning a good argument is rationally 
persuasive, dialectically reasonable and effective. 340  While in the dialectical perspective 
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questions are asked of the reasonableness of the proposed action, in the logical perspective what 
is in focus is the tenability/acceptability, relevance and sufficiency of arguments.341 
Yet, in my analysis I am not focussed so much on whether the arguments raised in the debates 
regarding the Polar Code were “good” in the sense of being reasonable, tenable, relevant, 
sufficient or effective. Of course, it is of interest whether the arguments have succeeded in 
changing the preferences of other delegations and influenced the textual outcome. But in order 
to answer my research questions, I set out to evaluate whether claims and justifications put 
forward were based on self-interest or aimed at the interest of the international community, the 
common good. As discussed in chapter 3, further distinction between validity claims and 
credibility claims based on unequal power relations can aid in elucidating instances of arguing 
and bargaining. However, we may differentiate between generalisable State interests and those 
interests that do not further the common good but rather clash with it. In some cases, there may 
be a fine line between the two and it is down to the strength of the argumentation whether a 
State interest is accepted as furthering the common good. If State interests can be reconciled 
with deliberation as suggested with regards to deliberative negotiation, then it has to be the case 
that validity claims based on truth and rightness might be found with regard to these as well. 
This would be a true combination of arguing and bargaining in one text in the vein of Steffek, 
who suggests that diplomatic negotiation is about resolving conflict of interests but through 
arguments, not persuasion.342  
I have already accounted for the definition of the common good in the case of the Polar Code 
in section 3.3 and this need not be repeated here. As for gaining an understanding of State 
interests – both as regards shipping in general and Arctic shipping in particular – I turned to the 
policy and legal documents introduced above in section 4.1.4 as well as secondary academic 
literature, especially with regards to my primary focus, Russia. Identifying both the common 
good and self-interest of specific States helps in classifying the claims – issue expression, 
arguments and premises – of State proposals regarding the Polar Code.  
In order to classify these claims I use a value-description-prescription (V-D-P) triad, where the 
value statement and the descriptive statement – the latter of which may concern both situations 
and means-ends – lead to the prescriptive statement. 343  Descriptive statements are also 
evaluative assessments, at the same time as the circumstances brought up for the 
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argumentation’s sake are affected by the values held by the speakers.344 The value-dimension 
itself may be further broken up into a fundamental level value and an operative level goal 
supported by the fundamental level.345 On this basis one may have chains on multiple levels: a 
higher level V-D-P triad and a more operative level goal-description-prescription (G-D-P) 
triad.346 This distinction is suited to my research which is also concerned with deeper, more 
fundamental principles. As suggested in the previous section, arguments in argumentation 
analysis can be descriptive or normative, which roughly coincides with descriptive and 
value/goal statements in the V-D-P/G-D-P triad. If stated with sincerity, factual descriptive 
statements can be questioned for their truth claims, while value/goal statements’ basis in 
impartial and universal norms – that is rightness – may also be challenged.  
Turning back to the example of the Russian proposal regarding the principle of priority above, 
we can illustrate the workings of the V-D-P/G-D-P triad. Starting with the prescriptive 
statement, this can be found in the issue expression: Keep the principle of priority in the Code! 
Moving backwards from this statement, it is easy to find the statements describing the situation, 
referring to the skills possessed by the maritime administrations of the Arctic States as well as 
the existing legal framework which includes the rights prescribed in Article 234 of the LOSC. 
Besides this, mention is made of the more specific Russian regulations, building on Article 234. 
It is conceivable that the maritime administrations avail themselves of the skills and knowledge 
listed in this text and their factual claim can be challenged and should be possible to defend. 
Qualifying the skills and knowledge possessed by the maritime administrations as “necessary” 
also suggests an evaluative assessment of that description. The reference to the LOSC also 
enhances the validity claim of the argument built on it as an external authority. 
While at first glance the value dimension is not specified, I argue that the claim that it is 
essential to define the role of maritime administration is part of the value dimension, and more 
specifically a goal statement. Similarly, premise φP1P2 that national regulations based on 
Article 234 should be acknowledged in the text of the Code (at the expense of the less valued 
international regulations) is a goal statement. This premise is, of course, based on the particular 
self-interest Russia has in upholding the national nature of the NSR. The acknowledgement of 
maritime administrations’ role and national regulations may then be interpreted as the operative 
level goal, whereas the fundamental level value underlying these is coastal State jurisdiction, 
as opposed to the freedom of navigation and extensive international regulation of Arctic waters. 
Unilateral national regulations are, after all, what creeping coastal State jurisdiction is all about 
and is challenged by the principle of freedom of navigation. This conclusion is supported by 
the fact that although, as mentioned, Article 234 is extensively cited in the document, its second 
sentence referring to the limitations based on the coastal State rights provided by Article 234, 
                                                     
344 Fairclough and Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis, supra note 146, 46-47; and Lindberg, “Qualitative 
Analysis,” supra note 343, 104. 




specifically due regard to navigation, is omitted. Finally, the means-ends description of how to 
acknowledge national regulations and the role of maritime administrations refers to keeping the 
principle of priority, formulated by Canada and later omitted in the text of the Code.  
This proposal does not hide the Russian interest in upholding the primacy of national 
regulations over the Polar Code. As I have said, State interests could be admissible so long as 
they do not clash with the common good. Article 234 of the LOSC does allow for unilateral 
national regulations against vessel-source pollution which arguably fits the environmental 
protection component of the common good. The problem for Russia here is that unilateral 
national regulations directly clash with the uniform and universal standards element of the 
common good, thus its interests on which document DE 55/12/23 is based are not generalisable. 
It is not in the interests of the international community. The reconciliation of the two is 
seemingly impossible. However, as I have shown in The Elephant in the Room and will further 
discuss in the chapter 5, Canada managed just that. 
4.4.1 Challenges of evaluating arguments 
One of the challenges when using the V-D-P/G-D-P triad is that some of these elements may 
be lacking in the texts. These may be found in premises identified through argumentation 
analysis as the one above reinforcing the goal statement. Thus, some of these elements might 
be implicit in the text itself. Others might have to be gleaned from other proposals or from the 
supporting material of policy and legal documents.347 
Another issue requiring careful consideration is misrepresentation. As discussed in the chapter 
on the theoretical framework, self-interest may be disguised as claims to principles, and threats 
may be replaced by warnings in order to make one’s claim more palatable to others. Similar to 
Elster’s formulation of strategic uses of argument, Fairclough and Fairclough talk about 
rationalisation, when the ostensibly offered argument is not what supports the claim for the 
speaker himself – it is only offered to deceive and garner support for the claim.348 Thus, 
sometimes a claim expressed in a document might be expressed overtly in support of what is 
meant to be the common interest, yet the logical V-D-P chain does not add up and the 
interpreted value-dimension links to a self-interest.  
The use of the reference to the LOSC as an external authority in the above example is coupled 
with the self-interest of Russia in maintaining its national regulatory regime, at first glance 
suggesting a strategic use. However, examining the issue more closely, it is clear in this 
proposal that Russia’s position is based on its particular self-interest. Russia is quite clear in its 
argumentation: Article 234 of the LOSC allows unilateral national regulations, Russia has thus 
drawn up its regulatory regime, this regime should be given priority over the Code due to 
LOSC. There is no deception here. Russia does not hide the aim of its proposal as retaining the 
primacy of its national regulations. The problem stems from the ambiguity of the interpretation 
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of Article 234. What Russia does is rely on its interpretation of Article 234, omitting to mention 
the other, inconvenient interpretation based on the due regard obligation. However, it is not to 
be expected that States would undermine their own proposals with the use of contra arguments, 
especially considering the interpretation of Article 234 has never been tested in court. Had 
Russia coupled the acknowledgement of Arctic States’ national regulations with a justification 
based on the (universal) environmental protection element of the common good to support its 
prescriptive statement, especially if it had remained quiet over its interest in the outcome, one 
could have conceivably argued for the claim that Russia tried to deceive. As suggested by 
Fairclough and Fairclough, to be able to show that an argument aims to deceive, one has to 
show the deceptive intention, and this is not possible based solely on argumentation analysis.349 
Rather, this would be a tentative judgement which may be argued for and confirmed to some 
degree based on the broader context,350 hence my reliance on official documents and scholarly 
writings as well as other proposals relating to the Polar Code.  
As suggested by the above example, a great deal of interpretation was often needed when 
evaluating the documentary material. In my articles I have taken particular care to using 
extensive quotes and references to these texts in order to substantiate my interpretation and 
demonstrate the reliability of my argumentation.  
  
                                                     




5 Interpretation of major findings 
Russia in the context of Arctic shipping is an interesting case in itself, with conflicting signals 
and policies: between a rhetoric aimed at trans-Arctic international traffic and a preference for 
destinational shipping supporting its resource activities; between legislation tending towards 
alignment with international law and an emphasis on the national nature of the NSR; and 
between an interest in the highest practicable international standards for polar shipping and a 
reliance on contested unilateral rights based on Article 234 of the LOSC.351 Russia’s part in the 
negotiation of the Polar Code is the focus of this research because of Russia’s key role in Arctic 
shipping. Russia did promote its interests in the debates on the Polar Code but that is, of course, 
the case of other participants as well. In this sense, Russia is not a unique case. Russia is made 
special in the case of Arctic shipping because of its unilateral national regulations. It is, 
therefore, relevant also to compare Russia with the only other actor in a similar position: 
Canada. Thus, below I discuss Russia on its own, then widen my scope to include Canada. The 
Polar Code negotiations could not escape the question of Article 234 of the LOSC – with Russia 
and Canada on one side of the debate. By considering this issue as well as the major principles 
of the law of the sea, the discussion will be extended further to examine how actors use 
international technical organisations and how the creation and interpretation of international 
legal instruments can be understood in this light. Finally, I return to the Polar Code to give my 
account of whether the Code should be seen as a good agreement, what can be said of its future 
and new developments for regulating polar shipping as well as Russia’s place in these, and what 
direction research should turn to as a consequence of the research presented in this PhD thesis. 
5.1 Russia, the actor 
Here I will elaborate on my findings regarding Russia, both when it comes to the substance of 
the Polar Code negotiation and the mode of Russia’s utterances in these debates. The former 
speaks to Russia as an actor as regards Arctic shipping, while the latter speaks to Russia with 
regards to its deliberative performance at the IMO more generally. I bring these points together 
in a summary to discuss a couple of pertinent observations. 
5.1.1 Russia as an actor in Arctic shipping 
From Russian Proposals on the Polar Code, two things are evident as regards the issues Russia 
pursued during the negotiation process. First, there was a clear distinction in how Russia 
approached the pursuit of interests between the first half of the negotiations up to the conclusion 
of DE 56 and the second. Before the Russian-championed principle of priority was finally 
rejected at DE 56, Russia’s proposals were two-pronged – 1) dealing with distinctly technical, 
less controversial safety matters and 2) directly concerning Article 234352 – while after DE 56, 
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Russia concentrated on single issues where its interests were clearly affected by the Code.353 
This discussion speaks to how Russia dealt with the dilemma between national regulations and 
international regulations. There was clearly a preference towards the national, as first pursued 
by the principle of priority, followed by both an aim to align the Code with Russian regulations 
– as suggested by the multiple references made to the suitability of Russia’s NSR regulations354 
– and a support shown for Canadian efforts respecting savings clauses. On the side of the 
international, Russia appears to have favoured safety measures, chiming with academic 
literature on Russia and Arctic shipping.355 However, such efforts subsided after the DE 56 
meeting, with a notable exception being the (now recommendatory) regulations on icebreaker 
assistance356 and some of the arguments used against POLARIS.357 
Second, I have found that Russia’s proposals showcased a great range of issues and were 
influenced by concomitant interests – both those that could be reconciled with the contours of 
the common good and those directly conflicting with it, as suggested by Russia and the Polar 
Marine Environment. To systematise these, we can first discuss issues and interests connected 
to Russia in its coastal State capacity. Within this category, Russia pursued jurisdictional 
interests relating to Article 234 of the LOSC and upholding the primacy of its unilateral national 
regulations over the new international instrument, thus potentially overriding it and negating its 
goal and effect. Related to this were issue areas that flowed directly from the existence of 
specific national regulations, such as icebreaker assistance and ice navigators,358 contributing 
to Russia’s interest in maintaining control over the NSR waters. Further, Russia’s interests as a 
coastal State include both utilisation-oriented and environmental protection-oriented 
interests.359 As regards utilisation, I have suggested the protection of its largely unseaworthy 
Far Eastern fishing fleet as well as the many different issues connected to vessels serving 
economic projects in the Arctic as important interests – although the latter is more clearly linked 
to Russia in its flag State capacity as I will reiterate below. Meanwhile, the pursuit of 
environmental protection-oriented interests is a little more ambiguous. I stated in Russian 
Proposals on the Polar Code that Russia did not oppose the introduction of new, stringent 
regulations for the discharge of noxious liquid substances and untreated sewage and, thus, 
protected (some of) its environmental protection-oriented interests.360 Having said this, these 
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issues were not among the most contentious facing delegations with regard to environmental 
protection. Certainly, the issues of the ban on the discharge of oil and oily mixtures, the 
establishment of special areas, the regulation of grey water discharges and a ban on HFO use 
and carriage – examined at detail in Russia and the Polar Marine Environment – created more 
discord. In these areas, Russia placed greater weight on interests other than its environmental 
protection-oriented coastal State interests, even going as far as to suggest that no special 
treatment was necessary for polar waters.361 
Furthermore, I already alluded to Russia acting in its flag State capacity. This manifested itself 
first and foremost in the discussion on technical safety issues related to shipping in Arctic 
waters, in which admittedly Russia has great experience. Related to this is the interest in 
upholding its approach to limiting ship operations in ice, which has seen Russia also try to 
amend the POLARIS system. As I suggested in In the Same Boat, this is again an area where 
Russia’s interests in its flag State capacity and its coastal State capacity – this time with regards 
to jurisdiction and control – intertwine in order to gain indirect influence over ships sailing off 
its coast.362 Moreover, it is notable that Russia supported its call for the principle of priority 
from a safety perspective, suggesting a further entanglement. Another area where Russia’s 
interests in its flag and coastal State capacity – regarding resource utilisation – influenced each 
other is the discharge ban on oil and oily mixtures in the Arctic. This ban negatively impacted 
Russia in its capacity as the major flag State to ships in the NSR water area and beyond,363 thus 
having a potential knock-on effect on its activities extracting resources in its Arctic Zone. 
Russia also opposed the discharge ban with a consideration of transit-shipping along the NSR. 
In regard to this, however, Russia is a coastal State, not a flag State. Furthermore, linked to 
safety concerns, Russia as a significant State providing experienced crew for polar voyages was 
also engaged in debates on crew training.364 Finally, Russia is also a port State in the Arctic. 
Yet in its port State capacity, the one thing Russia was interested in – rather than, for example, 
certificates and ensuring compliance through port State control – was that no provision should 
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be included in the Code requiring it to establish or upgrade reception facilities in all of the ports 
facing the Polar Code application area, countering general shipping interests. 
Looking at the ways in which Russia was impacted by the new measures of the Polar Code, I 
have shown that Russia is not a distinctly coastal State or maritime user State in the Arctic.365 
Three groups of interests were influential in Russia’s positions in the negotiations. First is the 
jurisdictional coastal State interest. While pursued through the principle of priority and support 
for the Canadian savings clauses, this interest also stands somewhat apart from the other two 
which are, in turn, greatly enmeshed. These are the utilisation-oriented coastal State interests 
and shipping interests which affect Russia in its flag State capacity. Inasmuch as regulations 
affected Russian-flagged ships, or ships serving Russian resource development-related Arctic 
projects, the entanglement of these two groups of interests was not problematic. It appears that 
Russia’s concerns as regards shipping are limited to ships flying the Russian flag and ships 
otherwise related to its Arctic activities, since it argued against other issues that were in the 
more general interest of flag States, such as the requirement for reception facilities in every 
Arctic port. Moreover, while Russia appealed to universality among sea areas in its effort to 
overturn the discharge ban,366 the exemptions to the ban that it later pursued favoured Russian 
vessels very much. The complex of shipping – at least as far as ships of interest to Russia are 
concerned – and utilisation-oriented coastal State interests were furthered by trying to align the 
Polar Code’s requirements with Russian regulations and by keeping the stringency of 
environmental protection measures to a minimum. 
There appear to be several clashes between Russian interests and the common good defined for 
the Polar Code negotiations. Firstly, Russia’s jurisdictional coastal State interest clashes with 
the procedural element of the common good, uniform and universal standards. Secondly, 
Russian shipping and utilisation-oriented coastal State interests clashed in several key areas 
with the environmental protection element of the common good, resulting in Russia’s 
environmental protection-oriented coastal State interests being pushed into the background, 
only to be followed with regard to less intrusive and controversial questions such as noxious 
liquid substances. 
Thus, interestingly, if we define the coastal State jurisdiction principle of the law of the sea 
narrowly here, with reference to environmental protection due to the focus of Article 234 of the 
LOSC (although brief reference is made to its resource exploitation dimension in the 
Introduction) we could say that, on issue-specific agenda items of the Polar Code, Russia struck 
a balance between freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction that tended to lean 
towards the former. Yet, when looking at the purely jurisdictional questions stemming from 
Article 234 – i.e. the principle of priority and the savings clauses – the Russian emphasis is 
decidedly towards coastal State jurisdiction. However, the coastal State jurisdiction principle 
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can also be defined more broadly, with reference to sovereignty, security and resource 
development. In that regard, both Russia’s utilisation-oriented interests and shipping interests 
– albeit limited to its own ships – fall in line with coastal State jurisdiction. Concerning the 
higher-level principles identified behind coastal State jurisdiction in The Elephant in the 
Room,367 of primary importance for Russia are sovereignty, identity, security and resource 
development, with environmental stewardship holding less importance.  
The Soviet Union was always a special case with regard to Article 234, as it was interested both 
in a special status for Arctic waters – as was Canada – and in the specific iteration of the 
navigational freedom provided for in the transit passage regime for international straits in 
general – as was the United States. The reconciling of these objectives was relatively easy for 
the Soviet Union whilst extensive shipping in Arctic waters was not envisaged due to ice cover. 
The tension between the special status for Russia’s Arctic waters and navigation rights has 
come to the surface now. However, it is not so much due to the increasing ship traffic per se, 
but to the stringent environmental protection measures of the Polar Code which threaten to 
impede, or at least make more costly, Russia’s economic activities in the region. 
This has resulted in a mismatch of priorities in the Polar Code process, whereby Russia’s 
material interests support some orientation towards freedom of navigation, at least for Russian 
ships, while its jurisdictional interests tend towards coastal State jurisdiction supported by 
Article 234. It appears that Russia is pulled between the two competing principles in the case 
of the Polar Code. Reconciling these interests is only possible if we understand the coastal State 
jurisdiction principle in a broader sense and place environmental protection behind other 
higher-level abstractions supporting this principle for Russia. 
5.1.2 Russia’s deliberative performance at the IMO 
While there were many interests Russia pursued in its proposals to the Polar Code process as 
discussed above, there was clearly a difference between them. I start here with the two poles of 
common good and non-generalisable self-interest. On the one hand, Russian proposals for 
safety measures in the new Code can be placed at the common good end of the spectrum. While 
some of these were left out of my discussion due to their highly technical nature, they cover 
icebreaking capability, equivalency of polar classes for ships, machinery and icebreaker 
escorts.368 Even where, as in the case of icebreaker escorts, they bear a strong similarity to 
Russia’s NSR Rules, thus suggesting an attempt to align the Code with Russian regulations,369 
I argue that these efforts should be seen as furthering the safety element of the common good. 
On the other hand, at the other end of the spectrum, Russian proposals clashed on several fronts 
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with the common good, both its procedural element – in the case of the principle of priority – 
and its environmental protection element – best evidenced in the case of the debates on the ban 
on oil and oily mixture discharges.  
These issues were promoted unsuccessfully by Russia. They directly showed that Russia missed 
the point of the Polar Code: pushing both for unilateral national – as opposed to uniform and 
universal – regulations as well as for environmental protection standards that were not more 
stringent than elsewhere and thus did not take into account the special circumstances of polar 
waters already acknowledged when setting the contours of the common good.370 Besides the 
issue of the discharge ban, where Russia suggested that there was no need for more stringent 
environmental protection standards than in other sea areas, another example is Russia’s push 
for leaving the northern part of the Bering Sea out of the geographical definition of the Polar 
Code. This would have resulted in less stringent standards for these areas than those provided 
for by being included in the Polar Code application area.371  
Yet, the fact that they substantively contradicted the common good is only one – or one part of 
the – explanation why these Russian proposals failed to gain traction. Added to this are more 
procedural elements: that decisions had already been reached – as in the case of the discharge 
ban and the geographical boundaries – as well as the irrelevance of some of the justifications 
provided by Russia for its positions – such as repeated references to long Russian experience 
in Arctic shipping or where the Russian legislation draws the boundary for the NSR. These go 
against the (unwritten) rules of how debates at the IMO are conducted. At best then, these points 
suggest that Russia did not understand what is expected of, and appropriate for, member States 
when reasoning at the IMO. At worst, they indicate a Russian disregard for deliberation at the 
IMO. 
On the flip side and moving towards the middle of the scale between pure common good and 
self-interest conflicting with the common good, some Russian proposals based on self-interest 
did succeed, demonstrating that they represented generalisable interests. Notably, there was a 
growing understanding on Russia’s part that such proposals had to fit within the contours of the 
common good, for example in its proposal for a grace period from the discharge ban on oil and 
oily mixtures, which was limited in both time and scope and abandoned earlier efforts to 
overturn the ban. In addition, these proposals paid more attention procedurally: they included 
more relevant explanation, including how Russian interests would be affected, they did not try 
to overturn decisions already agreed or they introduced proposals on issues where decisions 
hadn’t yet been reached.372 What is more, in some cases other parties took similar positions in 
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these debates to Russia, for example CLIA as regards POLARIS 373  and Canada and 
environmental NGOs as regards reception facilities,374 lending a degree of support to Russia. 
These points then suggest instances of deliberative negotiation. 
Having accounted for Russia’s pursuit of the common good, generalisable self-interest and non-
generalisable self-interest, there are further factors that point to a bargaining stance employed 
by Russia in the debates on the Polar Code. These appear to be independent of the content of 
the proposals and point to more general issues. Above, I have already suggested that the 
coincidence of a substantive clash with the common good and indifference to the rules of IMO 
debates, including what counts as relevant argument, can be interpreted as a disregard for 
deliberative ideals. Such a conclusion is further supported by instances of Russian reliance on 
its unequal power relations vis-à-vis smaller actors and the employment of demands,375 as well 
as recourse to strategic uses of arguments.376 These are all squarely in the bargaining end of the 
spectrum. Coupled with – and similar to – the use of unequal power relations towards smaller 
States and industry actors in the case of reception facilities, is Russia’s disrespect towards 
environmental NGOs, exemplified by its disregard for environmental NGOs’ arguments and 
their not “well substantiated” proposals in the early debates on what the environmental part of 
the Code should cover.377 Such an approach has also been observed by the author at MEPC 68 
with regard to agenda items unrelated to the Polar Code. Although environmental NGOs are 
“only” consultative organisations, not members of the IMO, they do have the right to express 
opinion in the debates – something Russia appears to deny them, thus suggesting a refusal of 
the deliberative ideal of mutual respect and equal participation. Finally, Russia itself has been 
subject to criticism due to its cherry-picking of scientific research.378 Scientific research as 
external authority to arguments is an important element of deliberation where what counts is 
the power of the better argument, and Russia’s disregard for it further shows a tendency towards 
a bargaining stance. 
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5.1.3 Summary remarks 
One pertinent point to take away from what has been said so far concerns the procedural: the 
Russian tendency towards a more general bargaining strategy with demands, reliance on 
unequal power relations as well as disrespect for deliberative ideals. The second point is 
substantive and concerns Russia’s pursuit of self-interest – both generalisable and clashing with 
the common good – even if it is acknowledged that generalisable interests contribute to the 
common good and early Russian proposals on safety measures are more directly aligned with 
the common good. In Russia and the Polar Marine Environment, I already alluded to Russia’s 
zero-sum approach regarding environmental protection measures,379 and it is hard to escape the 
same conclusion when looking at how Russia acted in the international negotiations of polar 
shipping regulations at the IMO in general: Russia’s aim is to avoid being unduly negatively 
affected where others escape the effect of the new rules on account of their lower stake in polar 
waters. This points to Russia as an actor in the negotiation of regulations for Arctic shipping 
who is more influenced by the logic of consequences than by the logic of appropriateness, an 
actor more in the rationalist interpretation or, in Abbott and Snidal’s categorisation, more of an 
interest actor.380 This is so even if we acknowledge the instances of deliberative negotiation 
that show a developing understanding of playing by the rules on Russia’s part. Such an 
understanding of Russia at the IMO, and in the case of the Polar Code negotiations in particular, 
also appears to align well with the views of those scholars who point to tensions between Russia 
in the international arena and its national interests and who suggest a more realist Russian 
understanding of multilateralism and foreign policy in general.381  
Moreover, I noted both in Russian Proposals on the Polar Code and in In the Same Boat the 
lack of Russian leadership on the Polar Code: the reactive nature of Russia’s engagement with 
the process, its relatively small contribution as measured by the number of proposals and 
arranged workshops and draft texts, and the emphasis on its leadership on Arctic shipping only 
in its rhetoric.382 Russia’s lacklustre approach can be contrasted with the area where it had the 
potential to utilise its experience and showed early promise of leading towards the common 
good, i.e. safety measures. In this context, it has been noted that safety measures have not been 
seen by Russia as so difficult and intrusive as environmental protection measures and, thus, 
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could potentially be considered low politics, lending themselves to cooperation.383 The lack of 
contribution to multilateral processes from Russia, a State that views itself as a leader and a 
relevant power was also highlighted by Zagorski,384 while Russia’s need to be among the 
leaders in the multilateral setting and its use for the affirmation of its great power status was 
noted by Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen.385 The importance of the UN for Russia due 
to its position as a permanent member of the Security Council is of note. However, although 
the IMO is a UN specialised agency, Russia does not enjoy a similar privileged status in the 
IMO. Likewise, Russia does not have the same status at the IMO as it enjoys at the Arctic 
Council, where it is one of a small “club” of Arctic States with full membership.386 This might 
explain both its reactive stance and its perceived need to emphasise its leadership in the Polar 
Code process. In fact, Russia tried to defer decision on port reception facilities to the regional 
level, to the Arctic Council,387 perhaps in a bid to move the issue to an arena where it can better 
protect its interests.388 
Being only one of two States for whom coastal State jurisdiction is a central question and, 
therefore, unilateral national regulations need to be carefully balanced against international 
regulations, I will now turn to look at how we may characterise Canada’s contribution to the 
Polar Code process and discuss Russia in that light, answering my comparative research 
question. 
5.2 Russia and Canada in the Polar Code negotiations 
In In the Same Boat, I showed both Russia’s and Canada’s positions in the Polar Code 
negotiations – as regards the questions of national regulatory systems and environmental 
protection measures – as being affected by their particular interests. Not even Canada, 
traditionally a coastal State associated with a strong environmental protection focus,389 was 
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immune to protecting some of its other interests.390 However, as I will later show, the pursuit 
of interests that can support or reasonably fit within the contours of the common good is not 
unique to Canada and Russia. Quite the contrary.  
What sets these two States apart from the rest of the international community in the Polar Code 
process is twofold. First, being the largest coastal States facing the Arctic, they have more at 
stake in the negotiations materially. This is reflected in the wide array of topics their proposals 
covered. The issue areas covered by Russia have been accounted for both here and in Russian 
Proposals on the Polar Code. Canada’s many proposals addressed, among others, oil 
discharges, the ice class of ships, definition of different temperatures, the PWOM, 
administrative burden for ships on single voyages and ice navigators. 391  The issue areas 
represented in Canadian proposals show that Canada, like Russia, was impacted in many 
different capacities: clearly, coastal and port State capacities but also shipping interests were 
affected through Canada’s reliance on chartered ships, a circumstance Canada emphasised 
several times.392 Second, and partially concomitant to their material interests, is Russia’s and 
Canada’s jurisdictional stake due to their unilateral national regulations in pursuance of Article 
234 of the LOSC, which identifies them clearly as advocates of the principle of coastal State 
jurisdiction on this matter. This gives Russia and Canada a unique set of values and interests 
that are notoriously difficult to reconcile with the universal and uniform standards element of 
the common good in the case of the Polar Code. 
Yet Russia’s engagement with the Polar Code process was notably different from Canada’s in 
a number of ways. The first is connected specifically to the negotiations and has to do with the 
common good as defined for the Code. As suggested above, Russia’s interests and contribution 
clashed with the common good on several fronts. Not only was Russia’s drive to preserve the 
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primacy of its unilateral national regulations contradictory to the universal and uniform 
standards element of the common good, the content of many of its proposals was directly at 
variance with the environmental protection element as well. Meanwhile, for Canada, only the 
former caused a problem. As regards the environmental protection measures of the Code, 
Canada was firmly on message.393  In fact, one of the main reasons Canada opposed the 
proposed reception facility requirement was that it would have resulted in delayed 
implementation of the discharge ban.394 Furthermore, as stated, Canada’s national regulations 
have a more environmental protection focus than Russia’s – the latter, as Jan Solski points out, 
being more recently influenced by an increasing security focus,395 while also focusing on 
profitability – and Canada’s contribution to the Polar Code’s environmental measures shows a 
better consistency with its stringent national environmental protection regulations, suggesting 
that Canada is more of a value actor than Russia in Abbott and Snidal’s sense, led by the logic 
of appropriateness.396   
If we follow the suggestions above, supported by the lack of reference to environmental 
protection in the Russian Polar Code submission, which propose a principle of priority based 
on Article 234 of the LOSC,397 it appears that, for Russia, following the principle of coastal 
State jurisdiction defined narrowly in an environmental protection sense is less a value in itself, 
and more of interest in helping it maintain control over the NSR. To be sure, the coastal State 
jurisdiction principle in the broader context of other abstractions, such as sovereignty and 
security, is very much a value for Russia. Yet the lesser value of the narrowly construed coastal 
State jurisdiction partly explains Russia’s less significant engagement and commitment in the 
debates about the proposed savings clauses, which was of primary importance for Canada. In 
addition, as Zagorski notes and I also indicate in In the Same Boat, Russia is not afraid of acting 
unilaterally if it sees its interests better served that way than by working through international 
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organisations. 398  While this is not an exit-option in the sense of bargaining, 399  it has 
nevertheless been a more viable backup option for Russia than for Canada. 
The second set of differences between Canada and Russia concerns leadership. While I have 
covered this elsewhere,400 a couple of points may be added here. First, Canada is far from being 
alien to unilateral action – indeed, the introduction of its Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act (AWPPA) is a case in point.401 Yet, as Suzanne Lalonde shows, Canada has been forward 
thinking in its unilateral actions, leading international law towards important change in line 
with emerging values in environmental protection and resource conservation. 402  Further, 
Canada has always appeared preoccupied with creating international legal bases, 
acknowledging its unilateral actions as legal.403 Canadian leadership in the wider Polar Code 
process, starting in the 1990s, while not as ground-breaking as on Article 234 itself – although 
Lalonde points out that the influence of the unilateral Canadian act in the 1970 AWPPA even 
has an impact on the Polar Code404 – is indisputable.  
Second, Canada has shown more willingness to cooperate with other States and create 
sometimes unlikely alliances to support and further its positions compared to Russia. It should 
be noted, however, that Canada did not have co-sponsors when it submitted its several proposals 
on the savings clauses to regulate the relationship between the Code and the LOSC. By 
comparison, throughout the negotiations of the Polar Code, Russia remained largely a lone 
actor, at least as far as cooperating on proposals was concerned, even in the case of safety 
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and others at NAV 56, see e.g. NAV 56/20, supra note 138, 49; and IMO, “Report of the Maritime Safety 
Committee on Its Eighty-Eighth Session,” IMO Doc. MSC 88/26/Add.1, January 19, 2011, Annex 27, 1. 
404 Lalonde, “Canada’s Influence,” supra note 389, 6. 
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measures which, as stated, lend themselves more to cooperation from Russia’s perspective.405 
At the same time, surprisingly many of Canada’s proposals covered safety-related issues, 
showing its leadership not only when it comes to environmental protection. 
However, things appear to be changing, with new developments both for Russia and for Canada. 
Two issues are prominent here: a proposal for regional reception facilities in the Arctic 
submitted by all eight member States of the Arctic Council;406 and impact assessment of the 
proposed ban on HFO use and carriage for fuel, led by Canada and Russia.407 This shows a new 
direction for Russia in cooperating with other States on tabling proposals as will be further 
discussed in section 5.4.2. On the flip side, this might suggest more of a compromise approach 
by Canada, acknowledging competing interests to environmental protection, especially 
indicating less stringent standards in the case of reception facilities.408  
The last set of differences between Canada and Russia, which also touches on leadership, is the 
way in which Canada relied on the rules of the IMO’s system to a greater extent to achieve 
success – and this is particularly evident with the issue of the savings clauses. While still 
relevant in regard to the Polar Code, this is connected more to general traits of how the two 
States deal with international decision-making. While, as shown, Russia did not shy away from 
bargaining and a zero-sum approach, Canada stayed within the bounds of deliberative 
negotiation. Canadian interests were generalisable, particularly when it came to its substantive 
proposals such as that on reception facilities. As regards the jurisdictional question, there is 
more to consider. As suggested in In the Same Boat, Canada might have learnt from earlier 
debates at the IMO regarding its NORDREG system, which showed the controversial nature of 
discussing Article 234 of the LOSC directly.409 Added to that was the probability that any 
discussion of unilateral national regulations would fall foul of the universal and uniform 
element of the common good. To avoid that, Canada resorted to a creative way of reasoning, 
using second-best arguments. This approach involved providing very real arguments for 
considering the inclusion of savings clauses in the new text, while also showing respect to other 
States’ principled beliefs, both significant deliberative ideals. 410  Such considerations, 
especially respect for other States, were notably absent in Russia’s approach in general, which 
involved trying to bully its way through smaller actors, showing disrespect in the process and 
                                                     
405 Bognar, “Russian Proposals on the Polar Code,” supra note 139, 113-114; and Bognar, “In the Same Boat?” 
supra note 143. 
406 MEPC 72/16, supra note 109. 
407 Canada and the Russian Federation, “Development of Measures to Reduce Risks of Use and Carriage of Heavy 
Fuel Oil as Fuel by Ships in Arctic Waters: Report of the Informal Correspondence Group on the Determination 
of an Appropriate Impact Assessment Methodology,” IMO Doc. MEPC 73/9, August 17, 2018. 
408 Bognar, “In the Same Boat?” supra note 143. 
409 Ibid. 
410 E.g. Mansbridge, “Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations,” supra note 150, 2. Also consider Elster’s 
suggestion that the use of arguments might be justified by “fairness to avoid humiliating an opponent,” Elster, 
“Strategic Uses of Argument,” supra note 188, 248. 
 
86 
addressing Article 234 directly without any apparent awareness as to how it might be received 
by other States. 
To sum up, even though many aspects of the international regulation of Arctic shipping affect 
them in similar capacities – and through that their interests – Russia and Canada appear to 
understand their roles differently and these understandings are often contradictory. These 
differences appear to stem from their general attitude towards international decision-making, 
coupled with the content of their unilateral national regulations, notably as regards 
environmental protection. 
5.3 Implications for decision-making at the IMO 
In the following sections I discuss aspects of the IMO’s decision-making process as regards the 
Polar Code, and Arctic shipping more generally, and draw general conclusions from it. First, I 
will briefly consider how decisions are reached on lower level issues at the IMO, followed by 
the main discussion as regards the role of deep-seated principles in the decision-making of this 
largely technical organisation, as well as the law of the sea in general. 
5.3.1 Reaching decisions on lower level questions 
My starting point here is that, as suggested above, all States at the IMO are concerned with 
reaching an outcome that reflects, or at least does not significantly impede, their interests. 
Examples for State interests in the Polar Code negotiations include the proposal by flags of 
convenience to require reception facilities in every Arctic port;411 the freedom of navigation 
interest (and, as discussed in The Elephant in the Room, principle) of the United States;412 or 
the push for the expansion of the Polar Code to non-SOLAS vessels by States with SAR 
responsibilities in Antarctic waters.413 
Of course, State interests can conceivably clash with each other on particular issues even if they 
fit within the contours of the common good. In spite of that, a binding decision has to be reached 
and in a timely manner. In spite of the IMO’s insistence that it operates by consensus, I have 
already noted that in many cases decisions are reached by the chair summing up the prevailing 
mood – in effect a non-deliberative voting mechanism.414 This suggests that States do not agree 
on the same outcome, far less having the same reason for agreeing – a prerequisite for 
consensus. 
In fact, one of the weaknesses of the empirical application of deliberative theory is the notorious  
near-impossibility of knowing the reasons for the parties’ agreement to an outcome, at least 
without asking the participants.415 In the present research, I avoided this obstacle by focussing 
                                                     
411 SDC 1/3/1, supra note 275. 
412 See e.g. DE 55/22, supra note 304, 24. 
413 See e.g. New Zealand, “Ship Design and Construction: Multinational Impact of Maritime SAR Incidents in 
Antarctic Waters,” IMO Doc. MSC 98/INF.8, April 4, 2017. 
414 Mansbridge et al., “Place of Self-Interest,” supra note 172, 85-90. 
415 Even then, the issue of potential bias emerges, threatening to distort the findings. 
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on what and how the parties communicated and what this tells us about the actors and the 
process. Therefore, why States might have agreed to an outcome was not of such significance 
here. It is also in acknowledgement of the fact that consensus appears to be an ideal, especially 
in forums with over a hundred participants, as suggested by Steffek.416 
While we cannot talk about consensus on the Polar Code in the sense deliberative theory 
understands it, this does not mean that the outcome should be appraised negatively. I want to 
make two points here. Firstly, due to the lack of consensus, the often-heard charge that the 
IMO’s decisions represent the lowest common denominator may be cast into doubt. The 
clearest example of this is the fact that Russia’s efforts to overturn the ban on the discharge of 
oil and oily mixtures in the Arctic have not succeeded. What is more, the decision to ban all 
such discharges – a significant step in the Arctic – was also the more stringent of the two 
proposals put to the decision of MEPC 65.417 
Secondly, while there might not be consensus or even unanimity on all – or maybe any – 
provisions included in the text of the Polar Code, that does not appear to affect the whole of the 
instrument. In fact, when the environmental part of the Code was up for adoption at MEPC 68, 
there were no dissenting voices in spite of the fact that some of its provisions, or lack of certain 
regulations, were not in the best interests of some of the participants.418 In fact, unless there are 
objections raised against the Code – and its entry into force suggests that this was not the case 
– it is safe to say that the final text as a whole is accepted by all. Thus, the adoption of the Polar 
Code might not be dissimilar from incomplete theorisation inasmuch as the whole of the text 
was adopted and entered into force as acceptable to all even if some (or most) States disagreed 
with single provisions. 
5.3.2 Incomplete theorisation and the influence of high-level principles 
While deciding in the case of conflicting interests through a voting mechanism is possible, there 
is a different conflict that does not lend itself well to such a decision-making mechanism. Due 
to the fundamental nature of deeply held high-level principles, the resolution of a clash between 
these requires more delicacy. Technical organisations such as the IMO are not immune to high-
level, politically charged principles, such as the two main principles of the law of the sea: 
freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction. The introduction of such principles to the 
deliberation of technical organisations can be a side-effect of the topic. However, some States 
might take their chances on introducing such an issue directly, perhaps hoping for easy gains. 
In fact, one might consider Russia’s principle of priority as a deliberate act of introducing the 
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conflict of principles to the discussions. The provision Russia tried to reinstate through its 
proposal employing the principle of priority did not directly mention Article 234 of the LOSC419 
and, as I suggested in In the Same Boat, Russia could have learnt from the debates on 
NORDREG the highly-charged nature of the topic.420 In some cases where high-level principles 
are introduced, they might be discussed head-on, such as in the case of NORDREG or the 
principle of priority. However, I argue that the case of the Polar Code shows that most States 
find it preferable to circumvent the direct discussion of principles, both in order to show mutual 
respect and to provide for useful ambiguity.421 In The Elephant in the Room, I showed how the 
conflict of the two principles of the law of the sea was neutralised by avoiding a direct debate 
on it.422 Thus, I suggested that the Polar Code should be seen as an incompletely theorised 
agreement.  
By proposing to regulate issues that might affect perceived rights laid down in Article 234 of 
the LOSC, the Polar Code process perhaps inadvertently introduced the conflict between the 
two principles to the IMO. It should be borne in mind, as pointed out in chapter 3, that the IMO 
as a technical organisation has no remit and was never meant to adjudicate on the conflict of 
these two principles. As such, the avoidance of the discussion and decision on the principles 
was the correct way of proceeding. Did, then, the principles of freedom of navigation and 
coastal State jurisdiction play a role in the negotiation of the Polar Code? It might be tempting 
to answer with a straightforward no. However, that would be an incorrect answer. The two 
principles played subtle and underlying roles in three ways.  
First, the setting of the contours of the common good was affected more by the freedom of 
navigation principle than by the coastal State jurisdiction principle. Framing the need for the 
Polar Code by emphasising the pressing lack of an international legal instrument for ships 
operating in polar waters as well as the interconnected nature of environmental protection and 
maritime safety, the documents tabling the Code leaned more towards the freedom of 
navigation principle, given the IMO’s policies of universalisation and uniformity. After all, the 
issue was tabled at the IMO, which aims to regulate the global shipping industry by developing 
standards which are applied uniformly and universally. This, then, necessarily elicited response 
from those seeking to uphold and protect their rights under Article 234. Russia and Canada had 
                                                     
419 The text of the provision reads: 
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to mitigate any potential damage, and maybe it was no coincidence that of the five Arctic coastal 
States it was Denmark, Norway and the United States, not Canada and Russia, that proposed 
the development of a mandatory code for polar shipping. It is, then, no coincidence either that 
Russia and Canada were the most active among all the States with regard to the Article 234 
issue. 
Second, even though direct deliberation on Article 234 and, thus, the conflicting principles was 
avoided, the positions taken by each side to the savings clause debates, as well as the arguments 
produced, were directly affected by the principles. The second-best arguments used by Canada 
were selected to support its position. However, their use restricted what it was possible to 
achieve and in turn led to a savings clause in the new SOLAS Chapter but not in the MARPOL 
Annexes. Thus, through this chain, the two principles of the law of the sea had an indirect effect 
on the SOLAS and MARPOL amendments that make the Polar Code mandatory, and on the 
relationship between the Polar Code and Article 234 of the LOSC. 
Third, the freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction principles had an even more 
indirect effect on the Polar Code inasmuch as they influenced the substantive proposals relating 
to the Code and, thus, the Code’s content. This is well illustrated by the discussion above on 
Russia’s proposals. Two further points are worth mentioning here. First, the Russian example 
shows that one particular State might be influenced by both principles to different degrees. This 
also chimes with what I have said in the chapter on the theoretical framework, namely that the 
high value placed on one principle on the jurisdictional question of the savings clauses does not 
mean a rejection of the other principle and its underlying, even higher-level abstractions. 
Second, having said that the content of substantive proposals was influenced by the principles 
of freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction, it has to be noted that many proposals 
on the Polar Code were seemingly unaffected by any of these principles.423 However, we might 
interpret such documents as conforming to the principle of freedom of navigation by the 
endorsement of universal and uniform international regulations, not unlike the documents that 
proposed placing the Polar Code on the IMO’s agenda.  
Thus, while technical organisations might not be able to escape being influenced by high-level 
principles, the effect of these, if contained through techniques such as second-best arguments 
and incomplete theorisation, becomes limited and indirect. 
Here, one final note should be made with regard to incompletely theorised agreements, also 
foreshadowing the next section’s theme. As Steffek argues 424  and my comments in The 
                                                     
423 Consider, for example, the French proposal that the Polar Code should include a requirement regarding 
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Elephant in the Room also suggest, it appears that incompletely theorised agreements are 
ubiquitous. While Sunstein distinguishes between incompletely theorised agreements and 
incompletely specified agreements425 – being roughly the opposite of incompletely theorised 
agreements, thus containing a decision on high-level principles but not on how that translates 
into concrete or lower-level resolutions – he does not differentiate among incompletely 
theorised agreements. In following Sunstein, I have not made such a differentiation either. As 
an example, I suggested that Article 234 itself as well as the 1988 US-Canada agreement are 
incompletely theorised and, thus, similar to the Polar Code, creating a line of Arctic tradition.426 
In addition, the fact that agreement on conflicting principles and jurisdictional questions was 
avoided and (textual) ambiguity created in these cases says nothing about how this was 
achieved, treating such agreements and practices with a broad brush.  
5.3.3 Incomplete theorisation throughout 
Linked to the idea that States find incomplete theorisation and ambiguity beneficial, I suggest 
that one of the reasons for this – beyond showing respect for the deeply-held principles of the 
negotiating partners – is that incomplete theorisation and the resulting ambiguity pushes any 
resolution and decision into the future, either to a later political agreement but more likely to 
decisions on practical cases. As I have stated in The Elephant in the Room, there is ample 
precedence for key actors agreeing to disagree in the context of the Arctic.427  
However, incomplete theorisation goes even further than this. I have said that Article 234 itself 
may be interpreted as a result of incomplete theorisation.428  In fact, if we follow Martti 
Koskenniemi, the whole of the LOSC appears as an incompletely theorised agreement – or a 
series of incompletely theorised agreements – between community and autonomy. 429  He 
describes the strategy of referral as “the Convention treats conflict – by refusing to treat it,” 
seeking “in vain for a material rule,”430 where the “apparently material provisions are loaded 
with terms such as […] ‘paying due regard’ etc.”431 Thus, the Convention avoids addressing 
material conflict and makes sure that resolution to conflicts “is to be found in agreement or in 
standards external to the Convention” by competent international organisations such as the 
IMO.432 While I partly concur with Koskenniemi, my view is less pessimistic. I argue below 
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that provisions are given meaning incrementally, bit by bit by technical organisations even if 
they are trying to avoid solving the conflict of underlying principles. 
Yet, the conflicts of two sets of principles – freedom of navigation vs coastal State jurisdiction 
and community vs autonomy – are cross-cutting. If one interprets the interest of the community 
of States (and other actors in the international system) as lying in freedom of navigation, then 
the possible priority of Article 234 (or the autonomy of individual States) over the international 
regulation in the form of the Polar Code should be judged negatively. If one sees the interest of 
the community as lying in enhanced environmental protection in the fragile Arctic, giving 
increased autonomy to Arctic coastal States to prevent, control and reduce vessel-source 
pollution – even if at the expense of the Polar Code through the possible priority of Article 234 
– should then be judged more positively. This shows the impossibility of deciding one way or 
the other without making value judgements – something both the LOSC and States at the IMO 
in the debate on the savings clauses apparently avoided. 
To conclude, the strategy of using incomplete theorisation and ambiguity to avoid decisions on 
high-level principles is not necessarily unique to technical organisations. In the case of the 
LOSC, a series of diplomatic conference sessions comprising UNCLOS III also exercised this 
technique. If one accepts Koskenniemi’s arguments, it is not even unique to the law of the sea 
but pervades international law.433 The Polar Code and the IMO’s decision-making process 
utilised for the savings clause debates were, then, not as special as they might appear. 
5.4 Implications for the future 
5.4.1 Is the Polar Code a good agreement? 
In light of the discussions of my findings above, it is natural to consider whether the Polar Code 
is a good agreement, even if this is not one of the main objectives of this thesis. The Polar Code 
can be appraised in both substantive and procedural terms. As regards its substance, the Polar 
Code might be appraised as somewhat of a mixed bag, as I have already suggested in the 
introduction. The Code as a living instrument is just the start of mandatory regulations for polar 
shipping, while its recommendatory Parts I-B and II-B fit in a line of such measures already in 
place. 
What direction further developments may take is, however, not a given. In the chapter on the 
theoretical framework, I gave an account of my understanding of the common good, with the 
contours of it being set through their own deliberation prior to deliberations that are meant to 
fill those contours. However, what is in the interests of the international community, i.e. the 
common good, is continuously discussed and reinterpreted. It is reinterpreted in light of both 
the values and interests of the participants but also in light of what has been achieved in the 
previous “round” of filling the contours of the common good with content, which itself might 
have changed the values and interests of the parties. Thus, there is a chain of deliberations 
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where what is the common good is continuously deliberated, appraised, adjusted and filled with 
content, for the whole process to then start again. Such an interpretation of a chain of 
deliberations on the common good is a reinterpretation of Abbott and Snidal’s conception of 
how values and interests intertwine over time to create law in the legalisation process.434 
The Polar Code illustrates well such a process, both moving forward to future developments 
and looking back to the past. The Polar Code grew out of the reinterpretation of what is in the 
interests of the international community in light of the Arctic and Polar Guidelines. In fact, the 
documents proposing a mandatory polar code bear a title suggestive of this interpretation: 
“Mandatory Application of the Polar Guidelines.”435 The case of the second phase of the Polar 
Code, particularly the questions posed as to whether it should be mandatory, what vessel types 
should be covered and whether work on it should only commence once experience is learnt 
from implementing the Polar Code,436 also shows that the common good is discussed in light 
of how the contours of the common good set for the Polar Code were filled and where to go 
from there. Abbott and Snidal illustrate their legalisation process with a chain figure.437 In this 
thesis then, I took one element of such a chain and placed it under a microscope; and even 
within that I concentrated particularly on one actor. Further research might want to look at how 
other States, and especially non-State actors who largely escaped discussion in this thesis, have 
influenced the Code and were in turn influenced by it.  
While Abbott and Snidal illustrate the legalisation process with a chain-like figure, I would 
depict the Polar Code process as a tree. This is not in a critique of Abbott and Snidal but more 
in order to better emphasise three things. First, if we take the Polar Code as the trunk of the tree 
it can have multiple branches growing out of it, suggesting multiple contours of common good 
stemming from the Polar Code. By this I mean, for example, the second phase of the Code, the 
proposed HFO ban in the Arctic, consequential amendments for instruments affected by the 
Code as well as the issue of a regional approach to reception facilities in the Arctic – all of 
which were discussed separately. This also links with my discussion below of incremental 
changes, perhaps in different directions. Second, a tree has roots, showing the different 
processes that influenced the formulation of the contours of the common good for the Polar 
Code. This would take into account, for example, the two Guidelines already mentioned, other 
relevant guidelines for operations in polar waters and the AMSA report. While we take the two 
proposals by Denmark, Norway and the United States as the starting point of the Polar Code, it 
is also a fact that other proposals were submitted to the IMO at the same time with similar 
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content but with a different focus or background considerations.438 Third, the image of a tree 
also envisages an upwards development and, thus, evolution. This adds a normative dimension 
to this image, chiming with the need for value judgements on Arctic shipping regulation, 
highlighted above. In that light, the less stringent standards resulting from the proposed regional 
approach to reception facilities is a backwards step – both from the perspective of 
environmental protection and for the needs of the global shipping industry. Inasmuch as the 
interpretation of lowering standards is correct, the issue of a regional approach to reception 
facilities could be imagined as a “rotten” branch on the metaphoric tree.  
That the regional reception facilities were proposed and the common good discussed in that 
context shows that the direction of deliberations on the common good is not pre-given. 
Similarly, what direction the second phase of the Polar Code – and any other, related 
development – will take is very much dependent on political will and some creative solutions, 
especially as regards making any new measure mandatory while keeping near-universal 
coverage.439  
As regards procedure, in The Elephant in the Room I suggested that a positive appraisal of the 
Polar Code is in order, as the IMO’s decision-making has survived this test, both in the sense 
that it achieved an outcome without having to adjudicate on Article 234 and that the Polar Code 
process followed established IMO procedure, even if it was complicated by the fact that it is 
made mandatory through two Conventions. 440  Future research might want to further 
problematise the IMO’s decision-making procedure and systematically examine how that 
affects its outcomes. I have already questioned the IMO’s notion of consensus decision-making 
in this thesis.  
One point might alter somewhat the positive appraisal of the Code from a procedural 
perspective regarding Article 234. Although States at the IMO avoided discussing Article 234 
and appeared to leave its interpretation for the future, the Polar Code itself incrementally alters 
the status quo. The Code does not provide a single solution to the problem of the relationship 
between Article 234 and the Polar Code and of the underlying principles. However, States at 
the IMO have broken down the political problem into smaller and more technical issues, such 
as the ban on the discharge of oil and oily mixtures or the recommendatory guidance for 
icebreaker assistance or “the use of a person(s) other than the master, chief mate or officers of 
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the navigational watch” instead of directly allowing coastal States to require the use of ice 
pilots.441 Ole Kristian Fauchald argues that the Polar Code encroaches on Arctic coastal States’ 
competence in Article 234,442 while Knut Einar Skodvin suggests that coastal State regulations 
will have to be measured against the Polar Code in the future.443 Instead of such a dramatic 
interpretation of the relationship between the Code and Article 234, I contend here that the 
relationship between the two is incrementally altered through technical regulations such as 
those listed above. Thus, while acknowledging some national practices and regulating them, 
the Code might provide some legitimacy to these above others. If I have characterised the 
savings clause debates and incomplete theorisation as the avoidance of a politically charged 
issue by a technical organisation, I might say here that, through technical regulations, such an 
organisation does have an unintended effect on political issues through incremental changes 
and solutions to nitty-gritty technical details, instead of a “grand” resolution to a jurisdictional 
problem.444 Thus, rather than an ultimate solution which might risk the participation of major 
parties or the breakdown of work, the rights in Article 234 can be reinterpreted continuously 
by States through regulations of technical organisations, such as the IMO’s Polar Code and 
other developments. 
It is not just how rights granted in Article 234 should be interpreted and their relationship with 
the Polar Code that might be incrementally changed by the Polar Code. Some of the – equally 
vague – conditions placed on the exercise of these rights might be influenced by the Code. I am 
thinking in particular of the definition of ice-covered areas and how to interpret the clause “the 
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year.”445 It is now commonplace to say that 
even when “ice-free” for parts of the year, the Arctic will not literally be ice free, since different 
forms of ice will be present to a certain degree in these waters, making the interpretation of the 
above clause even blurrier. In its Introduction, the Polar Code adopts definitions of different 
forms of ice developed by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) contained in the 
WMO Sea-Ice Nomenclature, such as ice of land origin and sea ice.446  Furthermore, the 
chapters relating to pollution by sewage and garbage in Part II-A of the Code relate possible 
discharges to “areas of ice concentration exceeding 1/10.”447 Although the presence of ice in 
Article 234 is related to obstructions and hazards posed to navigation, I argue that it would be 
worthwhile to explore whether the Polar Code’s definitions and use of ice concentration could 
have a bearing on Article 234. 
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5.4.2 Russia and conclusions for future Arctic shipping regulations 
To what extent, and how, the Polar Code will be successfully implemented by Russia cannot 
be gleaned from IMO documents. Others have, however, already started to look at this based 
on largely Russian sources.448 At the same time, it is possible to discuss Russia in light of the 
most recent and future developments of Arctic shipping regulations. For this, I have to take a 
step back and briefly return to the empirical – specifically, proposals submitted to the IMO 
since the adoption of the Polar Code. Here, we need to differentiate between the second phase 
of the Polar Code, which appears to be more important to, and championed by, States with SAR 
responsibilities in Antarctic waters,449 and other, related developments. While there is no trace 
of Russia’s opinion on the former in IMO documentary material, it is important to note that 
Russia has a stake in Antarctic fisheries which might be impacted if fishing vessels are regulated 
in the second phase of the Polar Code. Thus, it would be interesting to explore to what extent 
there are similarities and differences between Russia’s contribution to the first phase of the 
Polar Code’s development and the second.  
The regulation of Arctic shipping is not only contained in the Polar Code, however. Other new 
developments relating to Arctic shipping have received more focus from Russia, especially 
those related to environmental protection. I have already mentioned the proposal for a regional 
approach to reception facilities that Russia has co-sponsored with the other members of the 
Arctic Council, as well as its cooperation with Canada on an informal correspondence group 
on the methodology for impact assessment connected to the proposed HFO ban. To what extent 
these developments strengthen environmental protection in the Arctic is questionable and will 
depend partly on concrete deliberations. However, the new direction Russia has taken towards 
increased cooperation is noticeable. It is also important to note that, according to reports,450 
Russia supported a proposal for a new IMO output to reduce the risks flowing from HFO use 
and carriage as fuel, which also included the possibility of “restricting or phasing out the use of 
particular types of fuels in all or parts of Arctic waters.”451 However, this support appears to 
come with caveats. Firstly, the significance of measures not impacting on carriage of HFO as 
cargo should be highlighted.452 Second, Russia has emphasised the negative effect the proposed 
                                                     
448 Sergunin, “Russian Approaches,” supra note 13, 23-33; and M. Skaridova and A. Skaridov, “Implementation 
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The Journal of International Maritime Law 24 (2018): 480-482. 
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96 
ban on HFO use and carriage as fuel could have on maritime trade and local communities and 
thus, third, suggested that a ban should be the last resort.453 At the same time, however, Russia 
has submitted an extensive list of measures to mitigate the risks of HFO pollution in furtherance 
of the common good in the case of this new output.454 
It should also be noted that Russia has recently in its proposals actively endorsed the Polar Code 
as demonstrating a “realistic and well-balanced approach” in its strict standards in general,455 
and its ban on the discharge of oil and oily mixtures in the Arctic in particular.456 On the one 
hand, the latter may be explained by Russia’s reluctance to move even further towards stringent 
environmental protection measures, such as a ban on HFO use and carriage, as indeed it 
emphasised the difficulties already caused by the discharge ban of the Polar Code.457 This, 
together with the emphasis placed on the effects the HFO ban would have on trade in particular 
– even evoking in the process the IMO’s Strategic Plan458 – suggests that Russia’s interests 
have not changed substantially as a result of the deliberation process on the Polar Code. On the 
other hand, that the Code overall is described in positive terms suggests that the development 
process of the Code might also have led to the internalisation of the Code by Russia and thus 
altered values attached to it to a certain degree. I have suggested that the inclusion and 
acknowledgement of legitimate interests in the debates, particularly as regards a grace period 
for the introduction of the discharge ban for certain ship types, can increase the legitimacy of 
the negotiation outcome, the Polar Code. To what degree this has happened and what influence 
that has had, and continues to have, on Russia’s attitudes to further international regulations 
and to the implementation of the Code and other regulations is an interesting area for further 
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research, with potential consequences for how to conduct negotiations so that the outcome can 
achieve legitimacy among sceptical parties.  
There appears to be a learning curve in Russia’s participation in the development process of 
Arctic shipping regulations, particularly if we also look beyond the Polar Code and include the 
negotiation of further developments. This includes not only increased cooperation with other 
States, but also perhaps a more proactive approach as evidenced by Russia’s list of mitigation 
measures against the risk of HFO pollution. Such a proactive approach is particularly visible in 
a document Russia submitted to MSC 99, pointing out an error in the text of the Code as regards 
certification of ships, which could lead to misinterpretation and additional administrative 
burden.459 This document also includes substantial argumentation to explain and convince of 
the existence and significance of the error. Another example of Russia’s increasing 
proactiveness, substantive argumentation and cooperation with other actors is its joint proposal 
with the United States for recommendatory routeing measures in the Bering Strait and the 
Bering Sea,460 which was approved and adopted by the IMO in 2018.461 These proposals show 
Russia’s potential for cooperation when it comes to less controversial and maybe more technical 
areas, as well as perhaps an improved understanding of what kind of justifications are needed 
and acceptable at the IMO. Although Russia’s argumentativeness and, at times, contempt 
towards environmental NGOs does not appear to have subsided in recent IMO meetings,462 
there is a new tendency on Russia’s part towards greater adherence to deliberative ideals, 
particularly mutual justification and respect towards State actors. 
Are the changes identified above a result of the deliberative process, demonstrating to Russia 
what it takes to achieve one’s interests while contributing to the common good and playing 
within the rules of the system? The latter links back to Russia’s role within the IMO vis-à-vis 
the Arctic, as exemplified by the Arctic Council where Russia, through cooperation and 
coalition-building, has similarly changed from an actor missing the mark to one of the 
leaders.463 I have shown that Russia miscalculated throughout large parts of the Polar Code 
negotiations, both through its weak deliberative stance and by clashing with the common good 
on multiple points. Could it be that Russia misunderstood the Polar Code process, by treating 
it as an Arctic process rather than seeing it for what it is, a global process in an organisation 
where Russia has no special status? Could it be that Russia has learnt that it is not able to exert 
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the same influence at the IMO as it does in the Arctic Council, where it is “one of the club” 
with a more elevated status as a coastal State464 and where it is increasingly listened to?465 
Could it be that Russia has learnt how to use its experience in Arctic shipping effectively to 
start to lead the IMO’s processes on polar shipping regulations as well as bring Arctic Council 
cooperation to bear on IMO developments? My tentative answer to these questions is: yes, it 
appears that Russia has learnt that a different strategy involving more cooperation, more 
argumentation and respect for others, which in turn generates more respect for Russia’s 
legitimate interests, is needed at the IMO, on account of its position as only one of 174 members 
– albeit with special knowledge and experience in Arctic shipping that, if used well, can provide 
it with significant influence over the outcome as shown by the Canadian example. However, 
one argument against drawing such a conclusion is the fact that delegations to the IMO have a 
relatively constant core that should be accustomed to the IMO’s procedures. To what extent 
Russian delegates who worked on the Polar Code were new to the process and overlapped with 
its representatives in specifically Arctic processes and institutions, for example the Arctic 
Council, should be explored as a logical continuation of this thesis; as well as whether there has 
been a change in personnel in the Russian IMO delegation. At the same time, I do not intend to 
imply that parties at the Arctic Council do not deliberate or that deliberative ideals are not 
important at the Arctic Council. However, a comparative analysis between the IMO’s and the 
Arctic Council’s processes may highlight similarities and differences between the rules of how 
deliberation in these two distinct fora, fulfilling different roles and governance tasks, 466 
commences and how that affects both the parties and the outcomes. Future research might also 
want to use the findings of this doctoral thesis as the starting point to examine the changing 
Russia’s contributions to Arctic shipping regulations in light of the two-level game theory.467 
The research in this thesis, based on deliberative theory, adds to our understanding of both 
Russia’s contribution to global international regulatory processes vis-à-vis national areas of 
interest in the field of Arctic shipping, and the workings of these international processes when 
faced with deeply rooted value principles. I have shown both Russia and the international 
community navigate between freedom of navigation and coastal State jurisdiction, between the 
international and the national, in the process also arriving at questions that show new directions 
for research. While questions relating to Article 234 of the LOSC and the conflicting principles 
of the law of the sea have been muted since the adoption of the Polar Code and will most 
probably remain so until new unilateral national acts bring them to the fore again, it will be 
interesting to see what route Russia will follow in the concrete new developments for polar 
shipping regulations that touch upon its diverse socio-economic interests. 
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The mandatory Polar Code was finally adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in
May 2015. The present article examines the role and contribution of the Russian Federation in the
decision-making process of the Polar Code through its proposals, in the form of submissions, statements,
and oral interventions. The purpose of these proposals is investigated with respect to the safety and
environmental protection goals of the IMO and Russian interests in the Arctic, by looking at the reasoning
used by Russia in its proposals. The major issue areas represented in the Russian proposals include,
among others, the role of coastal State legislation, environmental regulations, and icebreaker assistance;
however, the majority of these do not contribute to the IMO’s goals of creating globally uniform standards
for maritime safety and protecting the marine environment. The Russian proposals served State interests
through misrepresentation and reference to Russia’s experience in Arctic shipping. While the latter frames
Russia as a leading user of Arctic waters, the role that Russia played in the Polar Code negotiations
indicates that Russia has more than shipping interests to protect in the Arctic.
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1. Introduction
The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) was adopted
by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in November 2014 and May
2015,1 after years of negotiations. Once it comes into force through amendments to the
*Correspondence to: Dorottya Bognar, Department of Sociology, Political Science and Commu-
nity Planning, Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, UiT- The Arctic University
of Norway, PB 6050 Langnes, 9037 Tromsø, Norway. Email: dorottya.bognar@uit.no
Arctic Review on Law and Politics
Vol. 7, No. 2, 2016, pp. 111135
#2016 D. Bognar. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), allowing third parties to
copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any
purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license.
Citation: D. Bognar. ‘‘Russian Proposals on the Polar Code: Contributing to Common Rules or Furthering State Interests?’’
Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2016, pp. 111135. http://dx.doi.org/10.17585/arctic.v7.415 111
SOLAS2 and MARPOL3 Conventions,4 this new instrument will regulate ship safety
and pollution prevention in polar waters. While the Polar Code covers both the Arctic
and the Antarctic waters, the present article deals specifically with one Arctic State,
the Russian Federation, and its contribution to the negotiation process that resulted in
the Polar Code.
Russia is an important player in the Arctic from many perspectives. It has the longest
coastline facing the Arctic; the largest Arctic population of all the Arctic States; and a
proud reputation, history, and identity connected to the Arctic.5 Furthermore,
because of the resource wealth of its Arctic Zone,6 comprising hydrocarbons, timber,
minerals, as well as fish, Russia also has important industries located in the area,
providing a significant percentage of its GDP and export.7 With its long Arctic
coastline, Russia also has considerable experience in Arctic shipping. While shipping
activity in the Russian Arctic is mainly connected to resource extraction in the region
and supply routes to remote communities, part of the current Russian Arctic policy is
to encourage the use of the waters off Russia’s Arctic coast, the Northern Sea Route
(NSR),8 for international transit shipping.9 Much of the shipping activity in Russian
waters is supported by different services, such as icebreaker assistance and pilotage.
To make shipping through the NSR easier, new legislation was enacted with regard to
the NSR in 2012 and 2013.10
The main question this article seeks to answer is how Russia’s role and contribution
to the Polar Code may be characterised. In order to answer this question, the following
sub-questions are raised: 1) Did Russia have a prominent role in the negotiation of
the Polar Code? and 2) Looking at the content of its proposals, did Russia utilise its
experience in Arctic shipping to further the IMO’s goals or its own interests?
Section 2 of this article introduces the material on which the research has been based.
Section 3 examines the first sub-question raised above, with the hypothesis that
Russia’s size and stakes in the Arctic made it one of the most interested players in the
Polar Code negotiations. Section 4 deals with the content of selected Russian propo-
sals, statements, and interventions, in light of the second sub-question. First,
I introduce deliberative theory’s distinction between arguing and bargaining to help
the analysis, and define the IMO’s goals in the context of the Polar Code. The hypo-
thesis made is that, while Russia has furthered its own narrow self-interests in the polar
region, it has also been interested in enhancing safety and environmental protection
through the new Polar Code, especially since the waters north of Russia are expected to
open for ship traffic first. Thus, I will consider which Russian interests were promoted
through the Russian proposals and how these were furthered, in order to determine
whether the Russian proposals served the IMO’s goals or particular State interests.
Finally, building on the previous analyses, Section 5 discusses what Russia’s participa-
tion in the Polar Code negotiations can tell us about what kind of Arctic actor Russia is.
2. Research material
During the decision-making process of the IMO, its members and observers submit
proposals that are discussed in the different Committees, Sub-Committees, working
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groups, and correspondence groups. Below, analysis is made of Russia’s proposals to
the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and Marine Environment Protection
Committee (MEPC), as well as to the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and
Equipment (DE) and its successor, the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and
Construction (SDC), where the more detailed work on the Polar Code took place.11
Moreover, statements and interventions found in the reports of the Committees and
the two Sub-Committees are covered. Statements and interventions serve to
highlight States’ opinions that were deemed important enough to record in writing.
The documents analysed are those to which it is possible to gain public access
via the IMO’s database, IMODOCS.12 While a great number of decisions were made
in the setting of the Committees and Sub-Committees, many others were made in
intersessional and correspondence groups among those delegations most interested
in polar shipping. While the lack of available documents from these fora imposes
limitations on the present research, the volume of documents available  more than
250 in number  compensates for this. This material was further supplemented by
interviews conducted with selected delegates to the IMO bodies involved and audio
records of the plenary sessions of the Committees and Sub-Committees.13
3. Russia’s engagement in the Polar Code process
Altogether, there are 15 Russian submissions recorded in the IMO’s database in the
Polar Code. Moreover, there are three statements and four interventions included in
the reports of the Committees and Sub-Committees. In addition to these, a Russian
proposal or viewpoint is referenced three times in other delegations’ submissions: twice
by Norway as chair of the intersessional and working groups,14 and once by Canada.15
These numbers have to be put into perspective. Of the five Arctic coastal States,
Canada, Norway, and the United States submitted significantly more documents than
Russia: 34, 28, and 22, respectively.16 The number of Russian proposals is comparable
to those made by Finland and Denmark, with 14 and 12 proposals, respectively.
In addition to the number of submissions, there are a few other indicators that
show how engaged Russia was in the Polar Code process. Firstly, as indicated above,
there were three statements and four interventions recorded from Russia, more than
any other Arctic State. That Russia’s separate opinion was recorded indicates two
things: that Russia had a strong opinion on the matter at hand and that Russia’s
opinion differed from the other States that spoke on the issue.
Second, proposals submitted to the IMO’s Committees and Sub-Committees are
often co-sponsored, with two or more members or observers giving their name to the
same proposal. This way, multiple participants can show their support for the
proposal. In the case of the Polar Code negotiations, the other Arctic States had a
significant number of proposals co-sponsored by one another and by other, non-Arctic
States, showing an inclination to cooperate. Contrary to this, Russia did not
co-sponsor any proposals. Thus, the documents show a certain degree of isolation in
Russia’s participation in the Polar Code process. This applies to proposals before and
after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. The cooling of relations between
Russian proposals on the Polar Code
113
Russia and the West does not appear to have had an effect on this aspect of Russian
participation.
Third, as will be discussed below, many of the Russian proposals are responses to
previous submissions and decisions. In this sense, the Russian proposals are reactive
in nature, not proactive. Thus, Russia does not appear to be driving force in the
decision-making process, shaping the discussion. Rather, its submissions should be
seen as reactions to previous decisions and other members’ ideas.
Therefore, based on its submissions, statements, and interventions, Russia does
not fulfil the expectation that it would play a prominent, leading role in the Polar
Code negotiations. The factors above point to a surprising lack of prominence on
Russia’s part when compared to, first and foremost, the rest of the Arctic coastal
States. It is less surprising that Russia was more engaged than the remaining three
Arctic States that make up the so-called Arctic Eight, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden,
considering that these do not border on the marine Arctic.
4. Russian submissions in light of the IMO’s goals
4.1. Arguing and bargaining in deliberative theory
In order to provide a framework to analyse Russian submissions about the Polar Code,
I will first briefly introduce deliberative theory. Deliberative theory differentiates
between different forms of decision-making with distinct motives behind them.
As such, the theory will help determine where Russian priorities lay in the Polar Code
negotiations.
Central to deliberative theory is deliberation, or arguing, as a decision-making
mode. Deliberation is the exchange of reasoned arguments based on the communica-
tion of factual or normative assertions which claim to be valid.17 Validity here is based
on the truth and impartiality as well as the consistency of the arguments.18 However,
deliberation is not the only form of decision-making; it can be contrasted with
negotiation, or bargaining.19 As opposed to impartial arguments, bargaining involves
demands which claim credibility based on material resources that back up threats,
promises, and exit-options.20
What is more important to our discussion here is the contrast between the motives
behind arguing and bargaining. Deliberation relies on the power of the convincing
argument and, therefore, the main motive is disinterested and dispassionate reason.21
Meanwhile, the main feature of bargaining is a conflict of interests.22 The exchange of
reasoned, dispassionate arguments leads deliberation towards a common good that
can be found in consensus, whereas the outcome of bargaining should be imagined as
dividing a finite pie and, thus, can only result in a compromise.23
It has been highlighted that social norms stop States from openly reasoning in terms
of their own self-interest. This can lead to misrepresentation: presenting oneself as not
being influenced by interest, cloaking one’s message in reasoned arguments.24 Here
self-interested motives are disguised as impartial arguments; thus, arguments are used
strategically.25 One particular mode of misrepresentation is to disguise a threat as a
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warning.26 While such misrepresentation complicates the task of identifying reasoned
arguments, it is a good starting point to differentiate between what is a genuinely
impartial argument and what is an interested demand.
4.2. Arguing and bargaining in the context of polar shipping
How does the above discussion relate to Russia and the IMO’s goals with the Polar
Code? The exchange of reasoned arguments in deliberation moves the discussion
towards a common good, the aim of the deliberation.27 This can be linked to what
the IMO aimed to achieve with the Polar Code.
In general terms, the IMO, as a specialised organ of the United Nations for
international merchant shipping, works to benefit the international community at
large. The IMO is also considered the competent international organisation referred to
in various articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)
that exercises quasi-legislative functions with regard to globally uniform minimum
standards.28 Indeed, one of the functions of the IMO as laid down in the convention
that established it, the 1948 Convention on the IMO,29 is ‘the drafting of conventions,
agreements, or other suitable instruments’,30 with the goal of creating standards for
shipping that are globally uniform and are applied in a uniform manner.31
However, it has been argued that the flexibility of the Polar Code, especially its
safety part, can be problematic for the creation of a uniform set of rules.32 A further
critique often heard is that the IMO’s outcomes represent the lowest common
denominator among its global membership. Contrary to these critiques, the position
taken in this article is that even ‘watered down’ standards are better than competing
and conflicting standards that divide the international community, or no standards at
all. Furthermore, flexibility is beneficial in an area where shipping is in its infancy
and where novel approaches might be called for.
While the creation of globally uniform standards is an important element of the
IMO’s goal, such a definition would not account for the content or the issues covered
by said standards. Therefore it is proposed here that the creation of a set of globally
uniform standards should rather be seen as an umbrella encompassing other goals of
the IMO. To find out what constitutes the substance of the IMO’s goals, we can turn
again to the Convention on the IMO. Article 1 of this convention lists the purposes of
the IMO, including:
to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards
in matters concerning the maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention
and control of marine pollution from ships . . .33
These goals are repeated and thus reinforced in the IMO’s mission statement:
The mission of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a United
Nations specialized agency is to promote safe, secure, environmentally sound,
efficient and sustainable shipping through cooperation. This will be accomplished
by adopting the highest practicable standards of maritime safety and security,
efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of pollution from ships . . .34
Russian proposals on the Polar Code
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Turning specifically to polar shipping and how the IMO’s general goals translate into
the polar setting, the submissions proposing the creation of a mandatory Polar Code
emphasise the regulatory gap in the area, and highlight that
Establishing a mandatory set of requirements for ships operating in Polar Regions
will enhance the safety of life and protection of the marine environment in these
remote areas.35
This is reiterated in the Preamble and the Introduction of the Polar Code. While the
text of the Preamble can be seen more as embodying the spirit of the instrument than
a legal obligation, the Introduction is legally binding both through SOLAS and
MARPOL. Therefore, I use the latter to signify the substance of the IMO’s goals
with regard to the Polar Code. The Introduction states expressly:
The goal of this Code is to provide for safe ship operation and the protection of the
polar environment by assessing risks present in polar waters and not adequately
mitigated by other instruments of the Organization.36
Thus, in the following discussion, reference to IMO’s goals means the creation of
uniform standards to achieve the double aims of ship safety and protection of the
polar environment.37
Russia is a coastal State with an especially long and remote coastline, which makes
environmental clean-up extremely difficult. Furthermore, Russia’s activities in the
region, as well as vessels in transit, necessitate maritime safety. Therefore, the goals
of the IMO and the Polar Code can be said to serve Russia’s interest as well.
However, as the largest Arctic State, Russian interests in the region are diverse. Some
of these interests may differ from the goals the IMO aims to achieve with the Polar
Code, and can be linked to the motive of self-interest of the bargaining decision-
making mode. Therefore, the IMO’s goals, the common good towards which the
IMO has worked, can be explained in contrast to what it is not.
Much has been written about Russia’s strategic interests and policies regarding the
Arctic.38 Here, I will only introduce those interests which are important to this
discussion on Russian proposals about the Polar Code. First of all, in the domain of
international law, the legal status of some of the waters off of Russia’s northern coast,
and thus the extent of Russia’s coastal State sovereignty and jurisdiction there, is
contested. Russia relies heavily on the Arctic exception in LOSC, article 234, and its
coastal State right on that basis to adopt and enforce regulations along the NSR
without approval from the IMO.39 This right and practice have been contested by the
United States. It has been suggested that Russia would seek to gain international
legal recognition for these regulations through the Polar Code, or introduce similar
requirements to its own domestic rules, in case art. 234 becomes more controversial
in the future.40 Russia is also keen to use art. 234 and the perceived rights therein to
exert control over shipping for security reasons in an area that it sees as vulnerable
and where its strategic nuclear weapons are based.
On a more practical level, Russia has been keen to encourage international transit
shipping through the NSR, hoping for economic gains from increased activity.
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Yet, funds for necessary investments in infrastructure, including port facilities and
icebreakers, have been slow, creating delays.41 New international regulations leading
to further costs would not be helpful for Russian shipping aspirations. Beyond the
prospects of increased international shipping, domestic Russian activities in the
region include, notably, destinational shipping of natural resources and supplies to
regional settlements, as well as fishing. The fishing industry is especially important in
the Russian Far East where it provides for much needed employment, despite the
fact that it is in dire need of a new, seaworthy fleet.42 It is also worth noting that
Russia has been carrying out scientific research as well as surveying related to
hydrocarbons and its extended continental shelf. Thus, while Russia is an Arctic
coastal State, it also has significant interests related to shipping and navigation.43
In practice, Russia’s coastal State interests are often intertwined with its flag State
interests: to be able to enjoy its coastal State rights as regards fisheries and
hydrocarbon resources Russia relies on many Russian-flagged vessels, while to keep
control over transit along the NSR, Russian icebreakers are used. Russia regulates
fishing, survey vessels, and icebreakers not only in its flag State capacity, but also in
order to satisfy its interests as a coastal State.
4.3. Russian proposals
Having defined the IMO’s goal to create globally uniform minimum standards to
achieve safe ship operations in polar waters and to protect the polar environment, as
well as having established separate Russian interests in the Arctic, it is now possible
to start considering specific Russian submissions about the Polar Code. Did these
submissions contribute to the creation of uniform standards for maritime safety and
environmental protection, or did they promote other Russian interests?
The Russian proposals, statements, and interventions that are subject to this analysis
were concerned with four broad topics: 1) the role of the coastal State’s national
legislation; 2) environmental regulations, especially with a focus on discharges of oil
and oily mixtures; 3) the geographical scope of the Polar Code; and 4) systems for
determining limitations for ship operation in ice, including POLARIS.44 Furthermore,
it should be mentioned that a fifth issue espoused by Russia appears in two submissions
made by Norway, namely icebreaker assistance. In the following, each of these five
topics will be briefly introduced and analysed.
4.3.1. The role of the coastal State’s national legislation
Two Russian proposals took up the controversial issue of national regulations, with
express reference to LOSC art. 234.45 The first of these proposals, submitted to the
55th session of the DE Sub-Committee, cites the above-mentioned article
excessively, and makes reference to Russian legislation on navigation along the
NSR, professedly adopted in accordance with that article. This document leaves no
room to the imagination as to what the Russian Federation is aiming to achieve here.
The proposal endorses a principle previously included in a Canadian draft of the
Polar Code, namely ‘the principle of priority of national regulations over the Code’s
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requirements’,46 and proposes its re-introduction to the Preamble of the Polar Code
with the following text:
The Code is not intended to infringe on national systems of shipping control until a
harmonized system is in place; in addition to applicable sections of the Code, port,
Treaty and coastal States may retain local navigation rules and regulations for
certain routes and waterways under their jurisdiction taking into account local
conditions, infrastructure and procedures.47
The second proposal only contains one sentence on this topic, stating that ‘limita-
tions for navigation in ice conditions are imposed by . . . national rules adopted by
the coastal State empowered accordingly by article 234’.48 This subtle reference
is no doubt due to the concerns raised by the United States and others during
DE 55.49
While no further Russian proposals were submitted on the issue of national
regulations after DE 56’s decision to focus solely on technical matters, not
jurisdictional issues,50 one Canadian proposal includes a brief reference to Russia’s
support of Canada’s position on a savings clause, clarifying the relationship between
the Polar Code and other international agreements and international law, notably
LOSC.51
It should be relatively easy to see that these proposals were meant to further
Russia’s self-interests, rather than the IMO’s goal.52 First, on the issue of Russian
coastal State control over shipping along the NSR, it is in Russia’s interest to uphold
its regulations. Thus, when Russia gave its support to the ‘principle of priority of
national regulations over the Code’s requirements’ and suggested the inclusion of
text in the Polar Code stating that the ‘Code is not intended to infringe on national
systems of shipping control’,53 this is intended to serve as international legal
recognition of Russia’s interpretation of LOSC art. 234.
Second, giving priority to national regulations over the Polar Code is directly
opposite to what we have established as the IMO’s goal towards which the Polar Code
negotiations worked, namely uniform standards for safe ship operations and protection
of the polar environment. While uniform standards might be achieved, providing
expressed priority to national regulation over these standards undermines the intention
to apply them uniformly. Therefore, these Russian proposals are inconsistent with the
goal of uniform application.
While the above arguments are enough to categorise this topic as being motivated by
self-interest, we still need to look at what reasoning the submissions provided in
support of Russia’s proposals. DE 55/12/23, which suggests the inclusion of the
principle of priority, relies heavily on the coastal States’ rights under LOSC art. 234,
while also referring to the ‘necessary skills and knowledge on ensuring the safety of
navigation’54 possessed by the coastal States’ maritime authorities. DE 56/10/14 only
contains one sentence referring to the coastal State’s national rules, which again
highlights that these States are ‘empowered accordingly by article 234’.55 The
inclusion of this sentence in a submission otherwise denoted to ship categories related
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to ice-strengthening and ice thickness gives the impression that limitations imposed by
the national regulations of coastal States contribute to increasing ship safety.
Both of these Russian proposals include reference to the safety of ship operations.
Yet, both of them also emphasise the importance of LOSC art. 234, in which
Russia’s contested claims to jurisdiction are grounded. While the former reasoning
can be taken as pointing towards one substantive element of the IMO’s goal, the
latter casts doubt on this as the invocation of LOSC art. 234 serves to support the
acknowledgement of coastal State jurisdiction, one of Russia’s interests.
4.3.2. Environmental regulations relating to the discharge of oil and oily mixtures
While there are two Russian statements recorded in the report of DE 56 which are
more general in nature and concern many different types of vessel-source pollution,
ranging from grey water through heavy fuel oil to SOx and NOx emissions,56 the
bulk of Russian proposals related to the environment deal with the discharge of oil
and oily mixtures.
The first proposal that mentions the discharge of oil and oily mixtures was submitted
to DE 57.57 It is similarly broad in nature to the two Russian statements to DE 56.
Incidentally, this is the only proposal on this topic submitted before a decision was
made two months later at MEPC 65 to prohibit any discharge of oil and oily mixtures
from any ships in polar waters.58
Starting with the proposal made to SDC 1, Russian submissions addressing the
discharge of oil and oily mixtures from machinery spaces seem to continuously change
the scope of the Russian proposal, aiming at overturning the decision made
previously.59 This applies to both the kind of vessels exempted and the conditions
and circumstances under which discharges would be permitted. The range of vessels in
the Russian proposals narrows over time from all ships in the first submission, to ships
with structural features preventing compliance in a later submission, and finally to
ships operating in polar waters for longer periods of time. The proposed conditions
change from a general exception for these ships in the Arctic,60 to an exemption at the
Maritime Administration’s discretion, and then to a 5-year exemption period.
The discussion of environmental regulation related to the discharge of oil and oily
mixtures seems to be directly connected to the environmental protection part of
IMO’s goal. However, the Russian proposals urge less strict pollution prevention
rules than that agreed upon by MEPC. On the face of it, therefore, it seems that
these proposals are counter-productive to enhanced protection.
Furthermore, the fact that Russian proposals made after the MEPC’s decision
have continuously changed the scope suggests that these proposals were part of a
give-and-take on Russia’s part, in other words: bargaining. The line of proposals
starts with document SDC 1/3/18, a short document containing just one justifica-
tion: that the complete ban would be ‘extremely difficult to adhere to, given the
significant length of ships’ voyages’.61 The general lack of justification apparent here
is more of an indication of demand to agree with the Russian position than an
attempt at deliberation to convince the other States through reasoned arguments.
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A hidden demand can be observed in the audio records where Russia states in
relation to SDC 1/3/18:
we understand that the Sub-Committee may decide to go along with the MEPC
recommendation, but we’d like to inform you that we will actually be coming forth
with a similar proposal at the MEPC meeting.62
Another interesting feature of this submission is its espousal of conditions applicable
in MARPOL special areas and the requirement on oil filtering equipment with alarm
and automatic stopping arrangements. This is notable as Russia was previously
sceptical both of establishing such special areas in the Arctic, as well as using the
related requirements on oil filtering equipment.63 This inconsistency in Russia’s
stance can be evidential of self-interested bargaining.
Further submissions by Russia included more extensive reasoning to justify the
Russian proposals, often repeating the same justifications verbatim. Among these are
references to scientific research, highlighting that possible discharges in the region
were unlikely to pose an environmental threat, and suggesting that calls for a
complete ban were not well substantiated. The latter is not explained in further
detail, which leaves its truth-claim unverifiable and, thus, its convincing power
questionable. It is, therefore, doubtful if this reasoning can be taken as an argument
meant to be part of deliberation. Similarly, while some of the scientific research
referred to by the Russian proposals are cited, meaning their truth-claim can be
established, other passages in the submissions only mention research results in
general. The lack of verifiability and the inconsistency of citation within the same
proposals suggest the strategic use of arguments said to be based on research.
The proposals also retain the reasoning from SDC 1/3/18, and it is further specified
that the vessels likely to be negatively affected by a complete ban are ships operating in
the Arctic for months without calling at ports, such as ‘icebreakers, hydrographic
survey ships and research vessels’,64 as well as ships engaged in transit voyages. Thus,
complying with the ban would be potentially detrimental to Russian interests related to
maintaining its ability to provide icebreaker support. It could also prove discouraging
to transit shipping. Furthermore, warnings are also made in these proposals that a
complete ban would adversely affect shipping,65 and possibly lead to illegal discharges.
Finally, reference is made to Russia’s vast experience and the attention it pays to
maritime safety and environment protection. These claims can serve to provide
legitimacy to the repeated Russian demand to overturn the complete ban, and the
justifications brought forth to this end.
Related to the discharges of oil and oily mixtures in the Arctic, Russia also submitted
a proposal on reception facilities.66 This submission highlights the view that the
question of adequate reception facilities in the Arctic should not be regulated by the
Polar Code*contrary to the proposal of many flag States and shipping organisations
contained in document SDC 1/3/1.67
It is notable that in MEPC 67/9/4 Russia reasons that there is not a need for reception
facilities at each Arctic port, because of the limited nature of Arctic shipping. This
seems to be an attempt to argue with convincing, verifiable arguments. Indeed, a study
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by the reputable Det Norske Veritas (DNV) under the aegis of the Arctic Council’s
Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) is cited
in support of the Russian proposal. However, at the same time, reference is made to the
extremely burdensome nature of the requirement on reception facilities and the
considerable maintenance costs of such facilities, suggesting that including a
requirement to provide for reception facilities at each Arctic port would further add
to the costs and difficulties Russia is likely to experience in developing its Arctic
infrastructure. During debate on this issue, Russia highlighted that it was not the co-
sponsors of SDC 1/3/1 that would have to bear the costs of the proposed reception
facilities, and suggested, using non-diplomatic language, that it could agree to the
construction of such facilities if the co-sponsors were to fund it.68
On the whole, it seems that during the discussion of environmental regulations
relating to the discharge of oil and oily mixtures, Russia kept two of its interests in
mind. On the one hand, it tried to reduce the costs and difficulties for the shipping
industry by exempting some of the Russian vessels, as well as foreign vessels in
transit, from complying with the complete ban on oil and oily mixtures discharges,
thus, promoting Russian shipping activities in the Arctic, as well as transit shipping.
On the other hand, Russia sought to limit its own costs as a port State related to
infrastructure development, specifically in relation to the construction of reception
facilities in each Arctic port.
4.3.3. Icebreaker assistance
Russia briefly mentioned icebreaker escorts in a proposal to DE 54,69 and made an
intervention at DE 55, observing the lack of consideration given to the issue.70 These
early Russian proposals are limited to a discussion of the need for the inclusion of
rules on such escorts.71 Significantly, the intervention at DE 55 also warns that
safety of navigation in the Arctic regions adjoining the Russian Federation could not
be guaranteed without the aid of icebreakers, except for one or two months of the
year . . .72
Since this warning is included together with the observation that the issue of
icebreaker assistance had not previously been considered sufficiently with regard to
Russian submission DE 54/13/10, this can be taken as a hidden demand for more
discussion. Common to these documents are references to improved safety through
the use of icebreaker assistance and extended navigational seasons. It is true that
icebreaker assistance is often necessary to ensure safe passage in ice-covered waters
and, thus, the inclusion of regulation related to icebreakers can further the IMO’s
goal. However, the reference to safety can also be seen as indirectly providing
legitimacy to a Russian demand for further discussion on the issue, especially when
read together with the reference to extended navigational seasons. Again, the Russian
interest to open up the NSR to international transit shipping is noteworthy, as the
use of the NSR for extended navigational seasons was expected to generate more
income to the Russian authorities through various fees. At the time these documents
were submitted, the scope of the Russian Federation’s requirements for icebreaker
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escorts along the NSR was much wider than in the new 2013 NSR Rules. This can
be linked to the Russian statement that all ships are in need of icebreaker support.73
This brings us to a Russian proposal made to an intersessional working group on the
Polar Code, which is referred to in two Norwegian submissions, and the content of
which was included in the recommendatory part of the final version of the Polar Code.
The original submission is not publicly available and, therefore, it is not possible to
assess any reasoning given by Russia with regard to the proposal, which calls for setting
uniform procedures for icebreaker assistance for the maintenance of safety in
icebreaker operations. As such the proposal would seem to contribute to the IMO’s
safety goals. However, a noteworthy aspect of the proposal is its close similarity to
paragraphs 2630 of the Russian Rules of navigation in the water area of the Northern
Sea Route, dated 17 January 2013, a few months before the intersessional working
group which took place from 30 September to 4 October the same year. The report of
this meeting is the first document that mentions the Russian proposal on icebreakers.
Thus, the inclusion of these regulations appears to further both the IMO’s goal and
Russia’s interest to shape the Polar Code to its own needs.
4.3.4. The geographical scope of the Polar Code
While the Polar Code uses the same geographical area of application as regards
Russian waters as the 2002 and 2009 IMO Guidelines,74 the Russian Federation
attempted to modify this at later meetings. First, at SDC 1, Russia’s statement is
recorded to the effect that the geographical scope of the Polar Code should exclude
the northern part of the Bering Sea.75 This was followed by a proposal and
intervention at MSC 93.76
The reasoning used by Russia to justify changing the geographical scope of
application of the Polar Code was based on hazards specific to the polar region as
well as on the ‘available experience of shipping in polar areas’.77 The hazards include
the characteristics of the Bering Sea, which make it, in Russia’s opinion, a freezing
sea that should not be covered by the Polar Code, rather than an Arctic sea.
Furthermore, the lack of polar day and polar night, no high latitude zone and the
availability of search and rescue services were also mentioned. These reasons seem to
be unbiased and their truth-claims should be easily verifiable.
What is more interesting is that this Russian proposal was made relatively late in
the Polar Code process, considering that the geographical boundaries had been used
in the preceding discussions. With regard to the definition of Arctic waters, Russia
states that
we consider that such a straight transfer of these provisions into a mandatory IMO
instrument is not relevant, bearing in mind the importance of the future Code for
navigation in Arctic polar waters.78
This formulation seems to imply that, for Russia, what makes the difference is
whether the IMO instrument is mandatory, not whether operating in the waters in
question and the additional hazards present there require new safety or environ-
mental regulations. This is contrary to IMO’s aims with the Polar Code.
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Russia also suggests that a change in geographical scope should be justified by the
actual practice of polar shipping, which provides a clue of Russia’s interest in this
matter. Along with ships transiting the Bering Strait, to which the Polar Code would
apply anyway, Russia also mentions fishing vessels and fishing support vessels. The
submission states that these vessels typically navigate near the ice edge,
thus rendering the application of the Polar Code’s requirements in their entirety
impractical, and reducing fishing areas to a significant extent.79
The Polar Code does not concern the regulation of fishing; therefore, the suggestion
that fishing areas would be reduced seems out of place. However, the planned phase-
2 of the Polar Code will regulate fishing vessels.80 Furthermore, MARPOL currently
applies to such vessels.81 Therefore, the geographical scope of the Polar Code will
impact the largely unseaworthy fishing fleet of the Russian Far East, on which many
livelihoods depend.82
Furthermore, Russia also claims that its own regulations on the NSR treat the
northern part of the Bering Sea separately from the NSR and that this approach is
vindicated by the lack of negative effects on navigational safety in Russia’s ‘many-
year experience of shipping along the Northern Sea Route’.83 Thus, while the
Russian proposals to exclude the northern part of the Bering Sea from the Polar
Code also rely on factual claims whose content is verifiable and accordingly can be
used as arguments in deliberation, another motive for these proposals is self-interest
in the Russian fishing fleet, as well as correspondence of the Polar Code’s
geographical scope with that of Russia’s NSR regulations.
4.3.5. POLARIS and other systems for determining limitations for ship operation in ice
To determine the limitations of ship operation in ice and, thus, to make the Polar Code
more practically applicable, the International Association of Classification Societies
(IACS) developed the POLARIS system based on the contributions of Canada,
Finland, Russia and Sweden. Even though Russia did contribute to the work on
POLARIS, three of its proposals to MSC 94 served to criticise and discredit the
system.84
In its attempt to include POLARIS in a separate instrument, outside the Polar
Code, Russia highlights detailed technical problems with POLARIS, including the
combination of speed and ice thickness, lack of testing, and problems with the
Canadian system that POLARIS is mainly based on. The content of these
justifications is verifiable and, thus, may be part of deliberation to produce uniform
standards for navigational safety.
Yet, in MSC 94/3/22 Russia discusses at length its suggestion that the prescriptive
approach to limitations for ship operations, practiced by Russia, should have equal
status to methods based on risk assessment, including POLARIS and the Canadian
approach. While it serves the common interest of safety to require each system to
have sufficient experience before approval, the general proposal that
methods based on risk assessment . . . may be recommended for application after
some experience of their use is available,85
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also seems to encompass the Canadian system, and would then, in practice, not
create equal status for the two approaches.
Furthermore, Russia proposes an amendment to the POLARIS system with
Russian ice classes based on prescriptive requirements and Russian shipping
experience in the Arctic, since
this step will definitely make the modelling and approaches of POLARIS much
more profound and widely applicable especially in the Arctic region along the
Northern part of the Russian Federation.86
The separate emphasis on Russian waters, together with Russia’s insistence on equal
status for its own approach to operational limitation, seems to signal that Russia
wants to retain its influence over ships off its coast. As a flag state it could require its
vessels to use the prescriptive, Russian approach, highlighted by Russia’s insistence
on the right of the maritime administration to specifically approve the use of novel
operational restriction systems. By modifying the POLARIS system to include the
Russian approach, Russia would also have indirect influence over foreign-flagged
vessels operating in its waters under POLARIS.
Thus, while Russia can be seen to be contributing to navigational safety by
pointing out technical problems with POLARIS,87 this points in the same direction
as Russia’s wish to exclude POLARIS from the Polar Code. Both objectives are
served by Russia’s proposal to develop POLARIS further by amending it with
Russian rules, as POLARIS will not be included in the Polar Code as long as it is
under amendment.
4.4. Conclusion: self-interested bargaining or arguing to further the IMO’s goals?
The definition of the IMO’s goal as the development of uniform standards to achieve
safe ship operation and the protection of the polar environment has two elements to it:
the development of globally uniform standards and their content, the safety of ship
operations, and/or the protection of the polar environment. Of the five main themes
identified and discussed above, it is the issue of icebreaker assistance which comes
closest to fulfilling both elements of this definition. The proposal for icebreaker
assistance does serve to promote the safety of ship operation in polar waters and aims at
uniform rules. Even though it ended up in the recommendatory section of the Polar
Code, the original proposal seems to have contained mandatory language.88 Without
knowledge of the original submission, it is impossible to assess what justifications were
used by Russia. However, the correspondence of the proposed text and that of the
Russian legislation seems to indicate that, while the proposal contributed to uniform
standards for ship safety, it also furthered Russia’s self-interest.
In the case of POLARIS, Russia’s technical comments as well as its insistence on
further testing could be seen to serve maritime safety. It is, however, more
questionable whether the Russian proposals contributed to uniform standards.
First, as was pointed out, Russia promoted equal status for the two approaches to
operation limitation, thus also furthering its own interests. Second, the fact that
POLARIS was excluded from the Polar Code, an outcome Russia proposed in its
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submissions, makes it more likely that a uniform operation limitation system will not
be reached.
With regard to environmental regulations and the geographical scope of the Polar
Code, it is not clear how proposals under either of these areas would contribute to
safe ship operations or the protection of the polar environment. In both cases,
Russian interests were easily identifiable insofar as reference to them was already
included in the proposals. Furthermore, we witness an attempt at bargaining in the
series of Russian submissions on the issue of oil and oily mixtures discharges. Finally,
the Russian submissions concerning coastal State regulations neither contributed to
setting uniform standards, nor did they contribute to further navigational safety or
environment protection aims.
5. Discussion
Having explored the question in Section 3 as to how prominent a role Russia played
in the Polar Code negotiations, as well as in Section 4 as to whether Russia utilised its
experience to further the development of uniform rules on safety and environment
protection, or to serve its own self-interests, the article now turns to a more general
discussion. In the following pages, a couple of conclusions about Russia’s
participation in the Polar Code process are offered. On the basis of these
conclusions, and the findings of the previous section, I examine what can be said
about Russia as an Arctic State and about what kind of actor Russia is in the Arctic.
5.1. Reaction versus proaction
Most of the Russian topics discussed in this article can be characterised as reactive
rather than proactive. The Russian proposal to include the principle of priority of
national regulations over the Polar Code can be seen as a result of the same principle
having been omitted from documents after its initial suggestion by Canada. In the
case of the regulation of oil and oily mixture discharges, the Russian proposals were a
direct result of MEPC 65’s decision to ban all such discharges. The proposal on
reception facilities came after a provision was included in square brackets in the draft
of the Polar Code regarding the coastal State’s obligation to provide adequate
reception facilities in all ports in the Arctic.89 Discussion on the geographical scope
of the Polar Code was opened by Russia even though the definition of Arctic waters
had been used in previous sessions. Indeed, one of the reasons cited in MSC 93’s
report for rejecting the Russian proposal is that the geographical boundaries had
already been agreed upon.90 Russia’s opposition to POLARIS was brought about by
the possibility that POLARIS would be incorporated into the Polar Code.
Of these issues, Russia successfully prevented the inclusion of POLARIS and
mandatory reception facilities, both of which are areas where decisions had not been
reached previously. In the case of geographical scope and discharges, Russia even
tried to reopen the debate on issues that had already been agreed upon, thus being
counter-productive to the timely adoption of the Polar Code.
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The most proactive of the Russian submissions is its proposal for the regulation of
icebreaker assistance. Russia did achieve its inclusion in the Polar Code, albeit in the
recommendatory section.
5.2. Modes of furthering self-interests
As demonstrated above, most of the Russian proposals were not concerned with
contributing to the creation of uniform standards for ship safety and environmental
protection. Even those submissions that contained elements of this, for example
those on icebreaker assistance and POLARIS, can be linked to Russian State
interests. How did Russia go about prioritising its own self-interests?
One of the most important issues for Russia with regard to jurisdiction in the
Arctic is the question of domestic coastal State regulation based on LOSC art. 234
and international regulation through the IMO. In relation to this issue, the DE Sub-
Committee’s 56th session seems to be a watershed. At DE 56, as a response to
Canadian and Russian proposals touching upon coastal State jurisdiction, it was
decided that priority would be given to technical instead of legal issues, which could
be discussed at a later point in time.91 This decision seems to have led to an
observable change in the activity of Russia.
First, the number and composition of the documents submitted by Russia
changed. Before the decision of DE 56, Russia submitted four proposals, and five
statements and interventions were included in reports.92 After DE 56, the number of
Russian proposals was eleven, along with just one statement and one intervention.
Additionally, it was in this period that Russia submitted its proposal on icebreaker
assistance to the intersessional working group. Having taken place in early 2012, DE
56 was roughly half-way through the development process of the Polar Code,
between 2009 and 2015. Thus, the first period of the negotiations featured half as
many Russian proposals, while the number of statements and interventions recorded
in the final reports shrunk markedly in the second period of the negotiations.
Second, there was also a difference in the content of the submissions before and
after DE 56. Prior to DE 56, the Russian documents were mainly concerned with
more technical aspects such as icebreaking capability, ice classes, and icebreaker
escorting. One of the proposals discussed in relation to coastal State regulations deals
largely with such issues. However, proposals submitted after DE 56 dealt with a
larger variety of*and more interest-laden*topics.
Interestingly, while the priority of national regulations espoused by Russia does not
re-occur in documents submitted after DE 56, Canada made reference to Russia’s
support for the inclusion of a savings clause into the amendment of the MARPOL
Annexes, which made the Polar Code mandatory.93 While Canada expressed the
belief that the savings clause would make the relationship between the Polar Code and
other international agreements and international law, notably LOSC, clear,94 in effect
the savings clause also serves to safeguard the Arctic coastal States’ rights with regard
to national legislation under LOSC art. 234. Thus, it seems that, after DE 56, the
Russian delegation was more circumvent. On the one hand, its practical pro-
posals supported coastal State interests, often intertwined with flag State interests.
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These proposals included the question of oil and oily mixtures discharges from
icebreakers and survey vessels, rules of icebreaker assistance, the geographical scope of
the Code as well as operational limitations through POLARIS. On the other hand,
insofar as Russia supported the Canadian proposals on savings clauses, Russia’s
interests relating to coastal State legislation were clad in a language regarding legal
clarity, instead of directly relating to the rights enshrined in art. 234. Furthermore,
Russian support for these proposals meant support for a possibly wider application
and stronger effect for the savings clauses. This is because these savings clauses were
proposed for the chapters making the Polar Code mandatory in the parent
Conventions, SOLAS and MARPOL, and not in the Code itself as originally
envisaged. Being included in SOLAS and MARPOL would make these savings
clauses stronger, while also possibly allowing them to influence the interpretation of
other provisions of the Conventions not directly related to the Polar Code.
Thus, while the principle of priority of national regulations was dropped by Russia
after it was rejected at DE 56, this did not mean that Russia stopped trying to
prioritise its own State interests.
5.3. Russia’s experience in Arctic shipping
A running thread of justification found throughout the documents submitted by
Russia is reference to Russia’s experience in Arctic shipping. The supposed
superiority of this experience is underscored by characterising it as ‘vast’, ‘extensive’,
‘many-year’, and ‘100 year’.95 Implicit in these references to Russia’s experience is
the claim that Russia knows better, Russia’s proposal is more valid. While Russia
does have a long history of shipping off its Arctic coast, it is questionable whether
such a justification is relevant to, for example, where the boundaries of the Polar
Code’s geographical scope should be drawn. Technical areas, such as icebreaking
and ice-strengthening, lend themselves better to justification on the grounds of
extensive experience in polar shipping. Yet, the small number of Russian proposals
submitted during the Polar Code negotiations in general and the even smaller
number on the topic of navigational safety, are surprising in light of the eagerness to
highlight Russia’s vast experience in Arctic shipping apparent in Russia’s proposals.
One element of this justification based on Russian experience is reference to the
suitability of pre-existing Russian legislation on shipping along the NSR, such as
when Russia makes a case for excluding the northern part of the Bering Sea from the
geographical scope of the Polar Code. The adequacy of the Russian legislation is
again based on the Russian polar shipping experience and, thus, should serve as a
leading guide in the formulation of the Polar Code. While the justification for
Russia’s proposal on icebreaker assistance is not publicly available, the same rationale
appears to shine through this proposal, in that it mirrors Russian NSR regulations
regarding icebreaker assistance.
An interesting aspect of the emphasis on Russian polar shipping experience is that
it frames the Russian Federation not so much as a coastal State, but more as the State
with the most extensive use of the Arctic waters, a maritime Arctic State. Thus, while
Russia is undoubtedly an Arctic coastal State with interests related to that, the
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reference to its superior knowledge of polar shipping serves to point out that it also
has maritime interests inasmuch as a great deal of its Arctic activities require
shipping off its northern coast.
5.4. Russia, the Arctic actor
On the basis of the above, there seems to be a discrepancy between Russia’s
self-image and the reality of its participation in the Polar Code process. Russia’s
self-image as the main user of Arctic waters with superior knowledge of polar
shipping, as well as Russia’s extensive reference to this as justification for its
proposals, implies that Russia should take a leading position in questions of
Arctic shipping. From the stance of Russia, Russia’s proposals and views should
be given more weight in debates, as Russia has the most relevant knowledge and
understanding.
Yet, as has been shown, Russia’s partaking in the Polar Code negotiations can be
characterised by a reactive approach to the debate, a somewhat isolated position
among the Arctic States and inconspicuous activity considering Russia’s size and
importance in the Arctic and, not least, its self-image. Leadership is, of course, not
established by the numbers of proposals submitted. However, analysis of the content
of the Russian submissions shows that, rather than demonstrating leadership on a
wide array of issues, Russia pragmatically picked issue areas where it saw its own
interests affected. It becomes clear then that Russia favours national regulations over
uniform international standards and its own interests over the goals of the IMO, that
is, the wider international community.
When looking at the Russian interests put forward in its submissions, it is clear
that Russia is not just a coastal State, nor just a maritime user State of Arctic waters,
but an actor with a wide array of interests in the Arctic. Russia acted in its capacity as
a coastal State both with regard to safeguarding national regulations and over the
question of reception facilities.96 In its attempts to maintain control over shipping
along the NSR, Russia acted on its security concerns. It acted in its shipping interest
when the question of oil and oily mixture discharges from machinery spaces was
debated. Russia acted in its interest relating to fishing when wanting to change the
geographical scope of application of the Polar Code. And even though it proposed
laxer standards on oil and oily mixture discharges from machinery spaces, Russia did
not oppose strict standards on, for example, discharges of noxious liquid substances
or untreated sewage. In some cases, therefore, Russia also kept its environmental
interests in mind*after all, it has the longest Arctic coastline and clean-up could
prove impossible or very costly. Thus, Russia should not be seen as a one-sided actor
in the Arctic. Russia has many interests in the region and, in its work on the Polar
Code, Russia tried to protect all of these interests, unlike its self-image suggests.
6. Conclusion
The analysis of material from the IMO’s database shows that the Russian experience
in Arctic shipping did not translate into extensive contributions to the development
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of uniform standards for safe ship operation and environment protection in polar
areas. First, it has been shown that Russian activity in tabling proposals lagged
behind, notably, that of Canada and the United States. Moreover, the majority of the
Russian proposals were reactive rather than proactive. Second, the majority of the
issue areas and actions Russia espoused did not contribute substantially to
navigational safety or protection of the environment, while some of its proposals
effectively acted against the aim of creating globally uniform minimum standards.
Therefore, Russia’s contribution to the Polar Code in general cannot be said to have
aided the achievement of the goals which States set out at the onset of the Polar Code
negotiations.
Most of the Russian proposals seem to have an underlying motive of self-interest.97
These interests include upholding Russia’s legal, jurisdictional claims as regards the
NSR and control over vessels. Russian interests are also linked to the possibly
burdensome and negatively perceived consequences of future implementation of the
Polar Code’s regulations: financial and economic implications, such as upgrading
Russian icebreakers, survey and research vessels, and fishing fleet; discouragement of
international transit shipping through the NSR98; and the burden of providing for
adequate reception facilities in each Arctic port. Russia furthered these interests in a
pragmatic manner in its proposals, showing that it has a holistic identity in the Arctic
setting*as opposed to a distinctly coastal State identity or the maritime user identity
emphasised by the Russian proposals.
Regulation regarding fishing vessels are set to come up in the planned phase-2 of
the Polar Code, along with other non-SOLAS vessels, such as pleasure crafts and
mobile offshore drilling units. It will be interesting to see whether there will be a
noticeable change in Russia’s approach and participation in the negotiations during
phase-2, since it will touch on issues vital to the Russian fishing and offshore
hydrocarbon extraction industries. Will Russia continue to further its own interests
above the goals set out by the IMO and only pay lip-service to international
cooperation in the Arctic? Will Russia continue to be reactive and not share its
experience for the benefit of the international community? Or, will Russia live up to
its own image as a leading Arctic State with many years of experience in polar
shipping?
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S P E C I A L I S S U E A R T I C L E
Russia and the polar marine environment: The negotiation of




Email: dorottya.bognar@uit.no The International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code aims at enhancing polar mar-
ine environmental protection from vessel-source pollution. Russia, the largest Arctic
coastal State will play an important role in the Code’s implementation and further
development. This article analyses Russia’s positions and decision-making mode dur-
ing the negotiations of the Code’s environmental measures. Looking at three issue
areas – establishment of special areas, discharge ban of oil and oily mixtures, and
reception facilities – it is evident that Russia’s environmental interests took a back-
seat to economic concerns and zero-sum outlook. Further, Russia’s negotiating strat-
egy was dominated by bargaining, rather than arguing, which could have produced
better understanding among the negotiating parties. There was a disconnect
between Russia’s aims and the Code’s goals, and between Russia’s chosen strategy
and the strategy from which its proposals could benefit most. This suggests that the
Code’s implementation and future development could face further challenges from
Russia.
1 | INTRODUCTION
With the decrease of polar sea ice and the expected increase of
polar shipping, one recent step to protect the Arctic marine environ-
ment concerns a new mandatory international legal instrument, the
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),
negotiated at the International Maritime Organization (IMO).1 The
Polar Code is a set of region-specific regulations applying to both
the Arctic and Antarctic, which adds to already existing major IMO
Conventions, including the International Convention for the Preven-
tion of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).2 The Code includes manda-
tory regulations, as well as recommendations, for passenger ships,
cargo vessels and their crew, both for the protection of the fragile
polar marine environment and for navigational safety, which indir-
ectly contributes to the prevention of accidental pollution of polar
waters. The safety measures of the Code address construction,
machinery, equipment and training issues as well as voyage planning,
while the environmental measures add to the Annexes of MARPOL
in the areas of prevention of pollution by oil, noxious liquid sub-
stances, sewage and garbage. While the pollution prevention part of
the Code originally set out with a much wider coverage, the key
issue areas focused on were oil pollution, including the possibility of
a ban on the use of heavy fuel oil (HFO) and the possible need for
port reception facilities, as well as questions of certification to prove
compliance with the Code’s requirements.
One of the most affected parties in the negotiation of the Polar
Code was the Russian Federation, the largest Arctic coastal State.
It is the waters north of the Russian Arctic coast that are most
promising for commercial shipping with the predicted reduction of
sea ice, and Russia already utilizes these waters in connection with
resource extraction in the region. Russia’s participation in the Polar
Code’s negotiation and its efforts to influence the Code’s
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1‘International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)’ IMO Doc MSC.385
(94) (adopted 21 November 2014, entered into force 1 January 2017); and ‘International
Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)’ IMO Doc MEPC.264(68) (adopted
15 May 2015, entered into force 1 January 2017) (Polar Code).
2International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as Modified by the
Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto (adopted 2 November 1973 and 17 February 1978,
entered into force 2 October 1983) 1340 UNTS 62 (MARPOL), as amended.
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provisions are therefore important for understanding both the
Code’s future and Russia’s possible approach to implementing and
complying with it.
Russia’s commitment to environmental protection in the past,
both in general and in the Arctic in particular, has been chequered.
Research points to a pattern whereby Russia appears to place higher
importance on foreign policy goals and economic gains, than on
environmental protection, in both the national and international set-
tings.3 However, it is also clear for Russia that the Arctic environ-
ment is vulnerable, and environmental protection features in both
Russia’s 2008 and 2013 Arctic strategies,4 suggesting that Russia
attaches importance to such measures. But how did this translate
into the negotiation of regulations regarding ship-source pollution in
the Arctic specifically?
To answer this question, I scrutinize Russia’s participation in the
negotiations on the environmental measures of the Polar Code. First,
I ask what proposals Russia tabled during the negotiations regarding
environmental protection, and what can be said for Russia’s positions
vis-a-vis the environment-related proposals of other IMO member
States and observer organizations. Another way to answer my main
research question is by looking at what characterizes the justifica-
tions Russia used in supporting its positions, and how the decision-
making mode that Russia engaged in influenced the outcome of the
debates. For this I use deliberative theory.
Classical deliberative theory contrasts two forms of decision-
making modes, arguing (deliberation) and bargaining (negotiation).5
The former is built on the review of participants’ preferences
based on the exchange of reasoned arguments, claiming validity
concerning factual truth, normative rightness (impartiality and reli-
ance on principles) and sincerity (consistency), to achieve under-
standing based on consensus.6 During bargaining, meanwhile,
parties aim at achieving their self-interests through demands that
are based on credibility underpinned by material resources.7 If
social norms prohibit the utterance of self-interest, however,
arguments might be used by the bargaining parties in support of
their claims, to achieve such interests.8 Thus, an expression of
self-interest might be replaced by a claim to principle, or a warning
might be stated instead of a threat, replacing the need to rely on
the credibility of superior material resources to back up a position
with a claim to factual truth.9 However, the outcome of such
strategic uses of argumentation does not always coincide with
what was intended. Recently, it has been acknowledged that inter-
ests and arguing do not necessarily exclude one another. In fact,
explaining one’s interest can lead to improved understanding and
an outcome that takes into account the preferences of both
parties.10 Where can Russia’s stance in the negotiation of the
Polar Code’s environmental measures be placed between arguing
and bargaining?
This article sets out with a short presentation of secondary litera-
ture regarding Russia and environmental protection, followed by an
introduction to the research material. It then presents the environ-
mental issue areas where Russia participated in the debates, and dis-
cusses Russia’s positions and their implications, closely linked with
the justifications offered. The final sections summarize the findings
and offer a short conclusion.
2 | RUSSIA AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION IN THE LITERATURE
Previous research points at the secondary nature of environmental
considerations for Russia, compared to other drivers of its engage-
ment with environmental regulations. In his study of three cases –
Baltic Sea pollution, transboundary air pollution and nuclear power
safety – Robert Darst suggests that the Soviet Union was guided by
broader foreign and domestic policy goals when negotiating interna-
tional environmental agreements, while after the end of the Cold
War attracting money through transnational subsidization of envir-
onmental protection projects was important for economic develop-
ment.11 More recently, Anna Korppoo and colleagues find an array
of issues when analysing three international environmental regimes –
the climate regime, marine environmental protection in the Baltic
Sea and fisheries management in the Barents Sea – that influenced
Russia’s participation in these regimes over environmental concerns:
again, domestic and foreign policy goals, international image-building
and soft power, and economic gain.12 This is paralleled in the case
of the establishment of the Ross Sea Marine Protection Area in the
Antarctic where Perry Carter and colleagues suggest that Russia’s
economic concerns regarding future fishing rights in the area were
important in the negotiations, while reinforcing its soft power image
3RG Darst, Smokestack Diplomacy: Cooperation and Conflict in East–West Environmental Pol-
itics (MIT Press 2001) 3–4; A Korppoo, N Tynkkynen and G Hønneland, Russia and the Pol-
itics of International Environmental Regimes: Environmental Encounters or Foreign Policy?
(Edward Elgar 2015) 136–142; and P Carter, AM Brady and E Pavlov, ‘Russia’s “Smart
Power” Foreign Policy and Antarctica’ (2016) 6 The Polar Journal 259, 267–269.
4Russian Federation, ‘Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for
the Period till 2020 and for a Further Perspective’ (2008) para 4(c); and Russian Federation
‘Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation’ (2013) para
16. For the environment as part of Russia’s maritime policy for the Arctic Ocean, see DV
Vasilevskaya, AV Nikolaev and GI Tsoy, ‘The Environmental Component of the National
Maritime Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Ocean’ in PA Berkman and AN
Vylegzhanin (eds), Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean (Springer 2013) 93.
5J Elster, ‘Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies’ (2002) 2 University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 345, 371–372; J Mansbridge, ‘Deliberative and
Non-deliberative Negotiations’ (2009) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1380433> 3–5; and ME
Warren et al, ‘Deliberative Negotiation’ in J Mansbridge et al (eds), Negotiating Agreement in
Politics (American Political Science Association 2013) 86, 93. When the present article uses
the phrases ‘negotiation of the Polar Code’, ‘negotiating strategy’ and ‘negotiating parties’,
these are not intended to imply that the parties to the Polar Code process engaged mainly
in bargaining as a decision-making mode.
6Elster (n 5) 371–377; J Mansbridge et al, ‘The Place of Self-interest and the Role of Power
in Deliberative Democracy’ (2010) 18 The Journal of Political Philosophy 64, 66–67.
7Elster (n 5) 372, 392–393.
8J Elster, ‘Strategic Uses of Argument’ in K Arrow et al (eds), Barriers to Conflict Resolution
(W.W. Norton 1995), 237; and Elster (n 5) 405–418.
9Elster (n 8) 237–238 and 244–257; and Elster (n 5) 405–418.
10Mansbridge (n 5) 5–11; Mansbridge et al (n 6) 72–80; and Warren et al (n 5) 92–93.
11Darst (n 3) 3–4, 21–35.
12Korppoo et al (n 3) 130–142.
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was influential in bringing a solution to the issue, rather than envir-
onmental considerations.13
Turning to Arctic shipping, Russia has long experience in exten-
sive regulations of shipping on the Northern Sea Route (NSR),14
today based on the concept of an exclusive economic zone in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), where
coastal States are provided with perceived unilateral rights for the
protection of ice-covered waters from vessel-source pollution.15
However, in a region important from a national security perspective,
it has been suggested that control over ship traffic may have had
higher importance for the regulation of shipping than environmental
considerations.16 Such arguments are also supported by the poor
environmental record of the Soviet Union/Russia in the Arctic,
exemplified by the Soviet/Russian fleet’s inability to comply with
strict discharge regulations.17 Most recently, Andrei Zagorski com-
mented that concerns relating to economic impact had influenced
Russia’s thinking regarding the Polar Code.18
Despite the trends in the secondary literature, it is pertinent to ask
if their conclusions are relevant for the negotiation of the Polar Code.
As suggested above, Russia has strong, objective environmental inter-
ests in the NSR area, which is also reflected in its Arctic strategies.
3 | RESEARCH MATERIAL
The present analysis is built primarily on documents gathered from
the IMO’s document database, IMODOCS.19 These include State
submissions to the IMO Committee responsible for environmental
protection, the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC),
as well as two Sub-committees that were tasked with the technical
work on the Polar Code: the Sub-committee for Ship Design and
Equipment (DE) and its successor, on Ship Design and Construction
(SDC).20 This analysis also includes reports of these bodies where
Russia’s opinion was recorded, whether in the main text or annexed
to the report as a statement. Such inclusions of opinion serve to
show strong opinions that were different from the majority of those
States that spoke on a given issue.
Russia submitted six documents with regard to the substance of
the environmental measures to be included in the Polar Code.21
Additionally, Russian opinions regarding environmental measures
were recorded three times in reports of the Committee and Sub-
committees. In my analysis, I compare the content of these docu-
ments to other delegations’ proposals as well as legal documents
already existing at the time of the debates.
State proposals served as the basis of the discussions regarding the
content of the Polar Code and provide an insight into the justifications
used by States to support their positions, whereas reports of the Com-
mittee and Sub-committees give account of the debates. However,
expert working group debates and private conversations on the corri-
dors cannot be reproduced from these documents. Therefore, inter-
views were also conducted with delegates to the IMO in support of the
analysis. Interviewees were selected from both national delegations and
delegations of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in
consultative status at the IMO. However, interviewees were reluctant
to offer detailed information on the Polar Code negotiations for the
record, with most insight provided off-the-record which cannot be
reproduced in this article.22
4 | RUSSIA AND THE NEGOTIATION OF
THE POLAR CODE ’S ENVIRONMENTAL
PROVISIONS
In the following, I analyse Russia’s positions and the justifications behind
these, with regard to the environmental part of the Polar Code.23 These
13Carter et al (n 3) 267–269.
14The Northern Sea Route is a concept originating from Soviet domestic regulations. It is
described as an ‘historically emerged national transportation route of the Russian Feder-
ation’ that stretches from the Kara Sea to the Bering Strait; see Russian Federation, Federal
Act on Amendments to Specific Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation related to
Governmental Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of the Northern Sea
Route, adopted by the State Duma on 3 July 2012, approved by the Council of Federation
on 18 July 2012. A collection of routes, the Northern Sea Route is covered by separate
Russian regulations regarding, among others, the procedure of navigation, icebreaker assist-
ance, ice pilotage and ship design and equipment; see Russian Federation, Rules of Naviga-
tion in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route, approved by the Order of the Ministry
of Transportation No. 7, 17 January 2013, registered by the Ministry of Justice on 12 April
2013.
15United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered
into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (LOSC) art 234.
16E Franckx, ‘Nature Protection in the Arctic: Recent Soviet Legislation’ (1992) 41 Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly 366, 384–385; R Vartanov, A Roginko and V Kolos-
sov, ‘Russian Security Policy 1945–1996: The Role of the Arctic, the Environment and the
NSR’ in W Østreng (ed), National Security and International Environmental Cooperation in the
Arctic – The Case of the Northern Sea Route (Kluwer Academic 1999) 53, 63; and RD Bruba-
ker, ‘Regulation of Navigation and Vessel-Source Pollution in the Northern Sea Route: Art-
icle 234 and State Practice’ in D Vidas (ed), Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Law
and Policy for Pollution Prevention (Cambridge University Press 2000) 221, 224.
17Vartanov et al (n 16) 63 and endnote 26, 281; and Brubaker (n 16) 224–225.
18A Zagorski, ‘Perspective’ in OR Young, JD Kim and YH Kim (eds), The Arctic in World
Affairs: A North Pacific Dialogue on the Arctic in the Wider World: 2015 North Pacific Arctic
Conference Proceedings (Korea Maritime Institute and East–West Center 2015) 215, 222–
225.
19These documents are accessible to the public after registration in IMODOCS. IMODOCS
is available at <http://webaccounts.imo.org/>.
20Due to the reorganization of the IMO’s structure, the 57th meeting of DE was followed
by SDC 1.
21Russia submitted two proposals referring to Article 234 of the LOSC providing for
enhanced coastal State rights for prevention of vessel-source pollution. However, these did
not concern environmental measures, but rather focused on safety and limitations to navi-
gation. Therefore, these were left out of the analysis. For an analysis of these submissions,
see D Bognar, ‘Russian Proposals on the Polar Code: Contributing to Common Rules or Fur-
thering State Interests?’ (2016) 7 Arctic Review on Law and Politics 111, 117–119; and D
Bognar, ‘The “Elephant in the Room”: Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Convention and
the Polar Code as an Incompletely Theorised Agreement’ (2016 Arctic Circle Assembly,
Reykjavik, 9 October 2016). For the evaluation of the NSR regulations, which were in force
until 2013, four years after the beginning of the negotiation of the Polar Code, in light of
Article 234 of the LOSC, see Brubaker (n 16). For the importance of Article 234 as a justifi-
cation of Russian control of navigation in the NSR, see VV Gavrilov, ‘Legal Status of the
Northern Sea Route and Legislation of the Russian Federation: A Note’ (2015) 46 Ocean
Development & International Law 256, 260–261.
22Seven interviews were conducted in the 2015–2017 period, two of which were with
NGO representatives. Interviewees from national delegations were selected from major Arc-
tic States. While many were reluctant to be interviewed, informal discussions also took
place during MEPC 68, the final meeting to discuss the Polar Code’s environmental meas-
ures before their adoption.
23The Polar Code makes a linkage between navigational safety and environmental protec-
tion as, arguably, accidents can result in discharge of pollutants into the marine environ-
ment, see Polar Code (n 1) preamble. However, an analysis of the Russian submissions
regarding the safety part of the Code is beyond the scope of this article. For this, see Bog-
nar, ‘Russian Proposals’ (n 21) 117–119, 121–124.
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are grouped in three thematic areas in order of their first appearance in
the documentary material. In the process, I also place Russia’s proposals
and positions in the context of the views of other participants.
4.1 | Regulation of and special areas for grey water,
heavy fuel oil and emissions
Early discussions on environmental regulations had a wide scope,
including grey water discharge,24 emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx)
and nitrogen oxides (NOx) and use of HFO.
4.1.1 | Positions
Environmental NGOs submitted no less than six documents to DE
56, including proposals to prohibit the use of HFO in the Arctic,25
regulate discharges of grey water, reduce the impact of black carbon
and address SOx and NOx emissions.
26
Russian concerns were recorded twice during this meeting. The
first one appears to be a response to the environmental NGOs that
‘keep mentioning the increased vulnerability of ecological systems’,27
where Russia argued against the regulation of grey water discharges
and the proposed ban on HFO use.28 Second, Russia issued a state-
ment responding to the report of the working group responsible for
the Polar Code, in opposition to the proposed establishment of Arc-
tic special areas with regard to a number of issue areas.29
4.1.2 | Implications and interpretation
The proposal of environmental NGOs to prohibit the use of HFO
pointed to two risks that might be averted through the suggested
ban, citing scientific research to buttress this proposal. Emphasizing
the expected increase of Arctic shipping, dangers posed by naviga-
tional conditions and lack of spill response infrastructure, the pro-
posal suggested that an accidental spill of HFO would be more
detrimental to both the unique and vulnerable Arctic environment
and coastal residents, including indigenous peoples, than distillate
marine fuel.30 The second benefit of banning HFO use mentioned in
this proposal is associated with the health effects of particulate mat-
ter emissions, including black carbon, resulting from the use of
HFO.31 As regards the regulation of sewage and grey water, the
environmental NGOs pointed to the low tolerance of polar waters to
changes in nutrient levels that would result from such discharges, as
well as to cumulative effects together with global climate change
and associated warmer sea temperatures.32 This argumentation is
found in document DE 56/10/12, a paper that discussed a wide
array of issue areas, which the environmental NGOs wanted to see
included in the Polar Code. This wide scope, however, also means
that justification for many of the positions was not included due to
lack of space, including with regard to SOx and NOx emissions.
Russian counter-arguments to the proposed regulations, espe-
cially the possibility that special areas and emission control areas
could be established in the Arctic, were manifold. Russia took issue
with the legality of the proposed special areas and emission control
areas. Its statement during the plenary session singled out two
aspects of the established procedures it saw as being violated. First
of these was that proposals to create special areas must be tabled
by parties to MARPOL,33 which are nation States. This argument can
be seen as directed against both the environmental NGOs and the
working group, whose report suggested special areas as options for
inclusion in the Code.34 The second criticism was that, according to
the procedures, proposals to establish special areas have to be ‘ad-
equately substantiated’.35 It is true that the environmental NGOs’
proposals in DE 56/10/12 did not contain extensive justifications.
However, with regard to the proposed regulations against the use of
HFO in the Arctic, Russia appeared not to take note of the extensive
references provided. On the face of it, then, Russia did not oppose
the introduction of stringent regulations, including special area desig-
nations, but argued against perceived violations of the MARPOL pro-
cedures, creating an image of itself as the State upholding
international law.
Yet, reading these comments against special areas together with
an earlier Russian statement sheds more light on Russia’s concerns
and their origins. Here, Russia suggested that:
it would be imprudent to disregard the influence that
would be exerted by each Code’s requirement on the
shipping in polar waters and economic activity in adja-
cent areas of a number of States.36
Multiple self-interested justifications appear here. First, the
increase of costs that would be caused by a switch from HFO to dis-
tillate fuel would affect many of the Russian-flagged vessels as well
as vessels serving Russian projects along its northern coast. Russia
suggested that complying with some of the proposed regulations,
such as those suggested for grey water, would be ‘extremely diffi-
cult’.37 While it was not further explained what was meant by ‘eco-
nomic activity in adjacent areas’,38 it can be surmised that this
referred to the burgeoning extraction industry in the Russian Arctic.
24Grey water includes all wastewater streams from ships with the exception of sewage.
25Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) et al, ‘Development of a Mandatory Code for
Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Heavy Fuel Oil Use in Arctic Waters’ IMO Doc DE 56/
10/10 (24 December 2011).
26Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) et al, ‘Development of a Mandatory Code for
Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Environmental Protection Chapter’ IMO Doc DE 56/10/
12 (24 December 2011).




30DE 56/10/10 (n 25) 2–4.
31ibid 4–5.
32DE 56/10/12 (n 26) 3.







Finally, goods delivery to remote communities was also mentioned
as being made more difficult as a result of the proposed regula-
tions.39 As a solution, Russia suggested that regulation of structural
requirements would be sufficient, but that ships should not be sub-
ject to requirements that exceed those in MARPOL.40 This latter
statement is in direct contradiction with the stated aim of the Polar
Code that is to provide additional requirements to those already
existing in MARPOL to increase the protection of the polar environ-
ment. Thus, it appears that Russia’s interests with regard to shipping
and economic activities in its Arctic region were in contradiction
with stringent environmental regulations in this case.
While these issues are important for the protection of the polar
marine environment, they were left out of the Polar Code. This was
due mainly to the lack of prior regulations to build on as in the case
of grey water and the ongoing work of other IMO bodies on related
issues, such as the effects of black carbon emissions by international
shipping in general.41 With regard to the use of HFO, its regulation
was viewed as desired but premature.42 Thus, the focus turned
towards the regulation of other pollution sources, such as oily mix-
tures. This is the subject of the next subsection.
4.2 | Discharge of oil and oily mixtures from
machinery spaces
As one of the additional requirements to those already existing in
MARPOL, a complete prohibition of discharge of oil and oily mix-
tures was discussed during many of the IMO’s meetings. This pro-
posed prohibition extended not only to discharges from cargo tanks
but also from machinery spaces, which would affect many more ves-
sels than just oil tankers. The first meeting to discuss the potential
ban, proposed by environmental NGOs, was the 57th session of
DE.43 This resulted in MEPC 65 being asked to decide between a
complete ban and the option of subjecting discharge of oil and oily
mixtures to certain conditions, with the MEPC favouring the
former.44
4.2.1 | Positions
During these debates, there is no record of opposing opinion from
Russia. However, following the MEPC’s decision, Russia tabled a
string of proposals to overturn the complete ban and, subsequently,
to seek exemptions from it.45 These submissions included proposals
to allow discharges under certain conditions, to allow maritime
administrations to exempt ships from the ban and to provide a five-
year-long grace period for certain ship types to comply with the dis-
charge ban.
A discharge ban similar to that decided upon has been in
place both in the Canadian Arctic and in Antarctic waters, as
indicated by Canada, demonstrating that it is possible to comply
with this stringent requirement.46 Canada further suggested
that workable solutions did exist, allowing for compliance with
the ban while not causing disproportionate difficulties for
shipping.47
4.2.2 | Implications and interpretation
While the first Russian submission that aimed to overturn MEPC
65’s decision did not elaborate on the reason for this other than the
‘extremely difficult’ nature of complying with the decision,48 later
Russian documents suggested a number of justifications for the pro-
posed overturn or relaxation of the ban.
First, Russia referred to the claim that discharges of oily water
with less than 15 parts per million oil content pose smaller danger
than pollutants coming into the Arctic from outside.49 However,
Russia cited just one study throughout the submissions to support
this statement, while the lack of page numbers accompanying the
reference hinder easy verification of the research. Nevertheless, Rus-
sia suggested that the decision to impose a complete ban was not
well substantiated,50 disregarding the experience accrued from the
Canadian Arctic and Antarctica. These instances show inconsist-
encies in Russia’s argumentation, highlighting the lack of regard by
Russia for providing factually based arguments while requiring a
39ibid.
40ibid.
41‘Report to the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Com-
mittee’ IMO Doc DE 57/25 (5 April 2013) 25; and ‘Report of the Marine Environment Pro-
tection Committee on its Sixty-Fifth Session’ IMO Doc MEPC 65/22 (24 May 2013) 69–70.
42MEPC 65/22 (n 41) 70. The issue of regulating HFO use and carriage has reappeared at
the IMO since the adoption of the Polar Code, supported by major Arctic States, such as
the United States and Canada; see Canada et al, ‘Work Programme of the Committee and
Subsidiary Bodies: Measures to Reduce Risks of Use and Carriage of Heavy Fuel Oil as Fuel
by Ships in Arctic Waters’ IMO Doc MEPC 71/14/4 (21 March 2017). While risk mitigation
is supported by Russia, banning the use of HFO is not; see Russian Federation, ‘Any Other
Business: Comments on the Document on the Use of Heavy Fuel Oil in the Arctic (MEPC
71/16/4)’ IMO Doc MEPC 71/16/8 (12 May 2017) 4.
43Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Pacific
Environment, ‘Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters:
Operational Oil Pollution in Polar Waters’ IMO Doc DE 57/11/23 (25 January 2013) 2. This
document was submitted to support measures proposed by five Arctic States to mitigate
the impact of discharges from other than cargo spaces. For this submission, see Denmark
et al, ‘Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Proposals
Related to an Environmental Chapter of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters (Polar Code)’ IMO Doc DE 57/11/9 (10 January 2013) 3.
44MEPC 65/22 (n 41) 70.
45Russian Federation, ‘Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters: Comments on Chapter 1 of Part II-A’ IMO Doc SDC 1/3/18 (29 November 2013);
Russian Federation, ‘Reports of Sub-committees: Comments on the Outcome of SDC 1:
Environmental Issues Related to the Draft Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar
Code)’ IMO Doc MEPC 66/11/3 (24 January 2014); Russian Federation, ‘Mandatory Code
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Comments on the Environmental Matters in the Polar
Code (Part II-A, Chapter 1)’ IMO Doc MEPC 67/9/2 (8 August 2014); and Russian Feder-
ation, ‘Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Comments on the Report of
the Polar Code Correspondence Group (Part II-A, Chapter 1)’ IMO Doc MEPC 67/9/3 (15
August 2014).
46Canada, ‘Reports of Sub-committees: Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Oper-
ating in Polar Waters – Reception Facilities for Oil and Oily Mixtures’ IMO Doc MEPC 66/
11/8 (21 February 2014) 3.
47ibid 1–2.
48SDC 1/3/18 (n 45) 1.
49MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2; and MEPC 67/9/3 (n 45) 2. Russia used this justification in a
document submitted already to DE 57, see Russian Federation, ‘Development of a Manda-
tory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Proposals related to an Environmental
Chapter of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)’ IMO Doc
DE 57/11/12 (25 January 2013) 2.
50MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2.
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much higher standard of reasoning from other negotiating parties,
suggesting that Russia might not have aimed for genuine arguing.
On the other hand, Russia appeared to presuppose the suprem-
acy of its own Arctic experience. Multiple Russian proposals
emphasized the vast Russian experience with regard to Arctic ship-
ping, as well as the attention Russia had paid to navigational safety
and environmental protection in its Arctic waters, as legitimization of
Russia’s positions.51 Most illustrative is the document MEPC 66/11/
3 stating that Russia
drawing on its own vast experience of Arctic shipping, is
of the opinion that the Committee’s support of the
option of total banning of discharge from ships, bilge
waters especially, is not well-grounded.52
Therefore, it seems that what, in Russia’s eyes, discredited the
ban was not so much scientific research results but Russia’s experi-
ence which could hardly be reasoned against.53
One Russian argument, reiterated in three documents, stands out
as being inspired by the Polar Code’s aim to enhance environmental
protection.54 Russia pointed to the problem of illegal and uncon-
trolled discharges that could increase as a result of the prohibition
of oil and oily mixture discharges in the Arctic. Drawing a compari-
son with the Baltic Sea, which experiences illegal discharges in spite
of better infrastructure and reception facilities than are available in
the Arctic, Russia emphasized the difficulty of identifying such dis-
charges. While illegal and uncontrolled discharges are a genuine con-
cern, it is remarkable that Russia used this argument in support of
overturning the discharge ban, rather than, for example, to propose
construction of better facilities in the Arctic.
An indication of why Russia would use this argument to support
overturning the discharge ban is provided by some of the main justi-
fications Russia cited against the ban, namely the difficulties it would
cause for upgrading ships, the costs this would entail and the nega-
tive effect this would have on shipping in the Arctic.55 Russia
appeared concerned with the difficulties posed for many different
ship types that correspond to Russian activities in the region.
First, Russia mentioned ships on transit voyages across the Arc-
tic.56 Official Russian rhetoric had been vocal about the possibilities
that lie in using the NSR between Europe and Asia, trying to pro-
mote this route.57 Such opportunities would be threatened by a dis-
charge ban on oil and oily mixtures that requires ships to keep these
wastes on board during the whole length of Arctic voyages or
include port stops to offload them along the route. Second, Russia
also brought up ships that operate continuously in Arctic waters for
long periods of time without port calls, including icebreakers, survey
and research ships.58 These touch upon different activities in Russian
waters. First, icebreakers support other activities in the region, such
as resource extraction, transit voyages and resupplying local commu-
nities. They also serve to showcase Russian Arctic prowess as Russia
has the largest number of icebreakers in the world and is the only
State with nuclear icebreakers. Their presence in the Arctic is also
important in the exercise of Russian jurisdiction and control over the
NSR.59 Second, survey vessels are essential for mapping oil and gas
resources that can support continued expansion of the extraction
industry in the region. These vessels are instrumental in turning the
Arctic into Russia’s strategic resource base, providing a backbone to
the Russian economy and underpinning its great power revival.60
Third, scientific research, supported by research vessels in the Arctic,
is significant for enhancing Russia’s soft power, additionally to the
value in itself. Many of these vessels do not routinely leave Russia’s
Arctic waters, meaning that the option to discharge oil and oily mix-
tures before entering polar waters is not open to them.
Thus, many Russian interests in the Arctic would be negatively
affected by the prohibition of oil and oily mixture discharges from
machinery spaces. However, these were not protected with equal
vigour by Russia. The proposals countering the discharge ban had a
continuously changing and narrowing scope, ranging from overturn-
ing the discharge ban, through allowing maritime administrations to
exempt ships of their choosing, to introducing grace periods for
limited ship types – signifying the give-and-take characteristic of bar-
gaining. The group of vessels Russia tried to protect to the end, and
so what can be considered the most important group of vessels for
Russia, is those that spend long periods of time sailing in the Arctic
without port calls, in spite of the official rhetoric regarding transit
passages.
On this basis, it is possible to see the self-interest behind Rus-
sia’s proposals to overturn the discharge ban, or at least provide
exemptions for some of the affected vessels. Therefore, the Russian
justification regarding illegal and uncontrolled discharges might be
seen as a warning rather than a genuine environmental argument.
Warnings, as strategic appeals to truth introduce a factual element
to bargaining, thus stating not what the speaker will do, but what
will happen – something outside of the speaker’s control.61 Here,
Russia stated that illegal and uncontrolled discharges would happen
if the ban was introduced, rather than that ships over which it has
control would defy the ban. This way, Russia avoids social oppro-
brium. Russia appears to have appropriated environmental arguments
for the purpose of self-interest and to convince other States to
51ibid; MEPC 67/9/2 (n 45) 2; and MEPC 67/9/3 (n 45) 2.
52MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2.
53However, Canada’s experience of how a discharge ban, introduced 40 years prior in the
1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, works might be a match to Russia’s experi-
ence.
54MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 3; MEPC 67/9/2 (n 45) 2; and MEPC 67/9/3 (n 45) 2.
55SDC 1/3/18 (n 45) 1; MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2; and MEPC 67/9/2 (n 45) 2.
56MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2–3; and MEPC 67/9/3 (n 45) 2.
57See, e.g., V Putin, ‘Speech at the Second International Arctic Forum’ (Second International
Arctic Forum, Arkhangelsk, 23 September 2011) <http://narfu.ru/en/media/news/21110>.
58DE 57/11/12 (n 49) 2; MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2; MEPC 67/9/2 (n 45) 2; and MEPC 67/
9/3 (n 45).
59This is especially so in light of foreign objections to the status of some Arctic straits. For
an account of US challenges of the Russian claims in the 1960s, see JA Roach and RW
Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd edn (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 312–318. See also RD
Brubaker, The Russian Arctic Straits (Martinus Nijhoff 2005) 41, 146–147, 158–162.
60For a connection between resource extraction and Russia’s great power revival, see M
Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (M.E. Sharpe 2014) 159.
61Elster (n 8) 252–253.
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change their preferences. However, whether this warning was suc-
cessful is questionable since Russia’s proposals were different in the
three submissions containing this warning.
Finally, Russia remarked that the decision to ban any discharges
of oil and oily mixtures from all ships in the Arctic was
more stringent than the one for special areas, where dis-
charge into the sea of oil and oily mixtures from ships is
allowed under certain conditions, and more stringent than
those applicable to other areas of the world’s oceans.62
While it is possible to criticize the IMO for introducing quasi-
special area requirements without going through the procedures for
establishing special areas – something Russia had done in the early
debates on proposed special areas – here Russia appears instead to
denounce the stringency of the new requirements compared to
other sea areas. This is remarkable as the development of the Polar
Code itself acknowledges the fragility of the polar environment and
its need to be protected through measures more stringent than
found in the existing IMO instruments.63 This Russian approach sug-
gests that zero-sum considerations and self-interest, rather than a
common goal and concern for the state of the polar environment,
led Russia in the negotiations of this issue.
While Russia was not successful in overturning the discharge ban
or providing exemptions from it, clarifying Russia’s interest did seem
to achieve one concession to a proposal preferred by Russia: a grace
period for those vessels that spend long periods of time navigating in
ice without port calls – the group of vessels Russia most wanted to
protect.64 However, since this grace period is linked to the next survey
a given vessel must go through, this grace period will vary from ship to
ship between one and four years, less than Russia asked for.65
4.3 | Establishment of port reception facilities
As a consequence of the complete prohibition of oil and oily mixture
discharges in the Arctic, another issue needed to be considered,
namely the presence of adequate port reception facilities where
ships can offload their oily wastes. The issue of lack of adequate
reception facilities was first discussed as concerns were raised at
both DE 57 and MEPC 65 that the proposed complete discharge
ban of oil and oily mixtures in the Arctic should take into account
whether there were adequate reception facilities in the region.66
4.3.1 | Positions
Several major flag States67 and representatives of the shipping
industry submitted a paper to the next meeting, SDC 1, proposing
that every Arctic port be required by the Polar Code to have recep-
tion facilities, making it easier for ships to comply with the discharge
ban.68 On the other hand, an inclusion of such a requirement in the
Polar Code was not well received by Canada,69 Russia70 and envir-
onmental NGOs.71 While supporting the need for reception facil-
ities,72 the United States suggested that, rather than including a duty
in the Code, MARPOL should be amended, in order to avoid confu-
sion.73
4.3.2 | Implications and interpretation
Interestingly, the international shipping organizations and flag States
acknowledged that the lack of facilities was not necessarily a prob-
lem, given the existence of such facilities just outside of the Arctic
region, the short periods of operation in the Arctic and operating
practices minimizing waste generation.74 It appears then that their
proposal was primarily concerned with the needs of the shipping
industry. They also suggested that the establishment of reception
facilities was needed ‘to ensure and facilitate the effective imple-
mentation’ of the total discharge ban.75 This passage is further illu-
minated by a draft provision prepared by the United States,
suggesting that the discharge ban be delayed until the establishment
of adequate reception facilities.76
This would have meant severe implications for the protection of
the Arctic environment and drew response from environmental
NGOs and Canada. They rejected the notion that the introduction of
the discharge ban should be delayed until the lack of adequate
reception facilities was remedied, thus impairing the environmental
protection part of the Polar Code.77 Beyond repeating that oper-
ational practices and reception facilities in the vicinity of the Arctic
region suggested less need for reception facilities,78 these
62MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2.
63Polar Code (n 1) preamble.
64‘Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on its Sixty-Seventh Session’
IMO Doc MEPC 67/20 (31 October 2014) Annex 10, 6. The text regarding the grace period
reads: ‘Subject to the approval of the Administration, a category A ship constructed before
1 January 2017 that cannot comply with paragraph 1.1.1 [the discharge ban] for oil or oily
mixtures from machinery spaces and is operating continuously in Arctic waters for more
than 30 days shall comply with paragraph 1.1.1 not later than the first intermediate or
renewal survey, whichever comes first, one year after 1 January 2017. Until such date
these ships shall comply with the discharge requirements of MARPOL Annex I regulation
15.3 [regulation of discharges in special areas].’
65MEPC 67/9/3 (n 45) 3.
66DE 57/25 (n 41) 30; and MEPC 65/22 (n 41) 69–70.
67These States, including the Marshall Islands’, Panama and Liberia, operate open registries
for ships, gathering large fleets whose interests they represent at IMO. However, many of
them are developing States, some small island States.
68Kiribati et al, ‘Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters:
Reception Facilities for Oil and Oily Mixtures’ IMO Doc SDC 1/3/1 (11 October 2013).
69MEPC 66/11/8 (n 46).
70Russian Federation, ‘Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Comments on
the Report of the Polar Code Correspondence Group (Part II-A, Chapter 1)’ IMO Doc MEPC
67/9/4 (15 August 2014).
71Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Pacific
Environment, ‘Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters:
Reception Facilities for Oil and Oily Mixtures’ IMO Doc SDC 1/3/23 (29 November 2013).
72United States, ‘Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters:
Part II-A – Applicability and Goal-Based Standards’ IMO Doc SDC 1/3/19 (29 November
2013) 2.
73United States, ‘Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Legal and Technical
Comments on Polar Code, Part II and Amendments to MARPOL’ IMO Doc MEPC 67/9/5
(20 August 2014) 2.
74SDC 1/3/1 (n 68) 3.
75ibid 2.
76SDC 1/3/19 (n 72) 2–3.
77SDC 1/3/23 (n 71) 2; and MEPC 66/11/8 (n 46) 1.
78SDC 1/3/23 (n 71) 2; and MEPC 66/11/8 (n 46) 2–3.
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documents also pointed to the difficulties the proposed requirement
would pose for Arctic coastal States and their remote local commu-
nities.79 It was also questioned whether there was a lack of ad-
equate reception facilities, considering the amount and nature of
traffic in the Arctic, underlining that vessels on transit voyages do
not make use of port facilities.80
Russia appears to have first tried to connect the issue of recep-
tion facilities to its proposal to overturn the discharge ban on oil and
oily mixtures in the Arctic, suggesting that ‘special areas can only be
designated provided they have enough port reception facilities to
collect such wastes from ships’.81 The suggestion, thus, appeared to
be that accepting the Russian proposal overturning the discharge
ban would mean that the question of reception facilities could also
be discarded.
Later, in expressly suggesting the removal of the reception facil-
ity requirement from the draft Polar Code, Russia also revisited some
of the justifications used by Canada and the environmental NGOs
against the proposed requirement, including the requirement being
disproportionate to the amount of vessel traffic in the Arctic, the
improbability and impossibility of ships on transit voyages using
reception facilities and the burdensome nature of the requirement.82
It is the latter – the cost associated with the establishment of the
reception facilities – that appears to be the main reason for opposing
the requirement. It is especially so when considered together with
an earlier Russian intervention, expressed in quite undiplomatic lan-
guage, suggesting that Russia was willing to construct reception
facilities in every port if the co-sponsors of the original proposal,
mostly small island developing States, would pay for it.83 This state-
ment appears to resort to a demand, characteristic of bargaining, in
trying to rely on Russia’s power vis-a-vis the co-sponsors.
What makes Russia’s position different from that of Canada and
the environmental NGOs is the insistence by the latter two that the
requirement of reception facilities should not cause a delay to the
discharge ban. This environmental regard is lacking in the Russian
proposals. Instead, Russia attempted the opposite: to couple the
issue of reception facilities with its bid to overturn the discharge
ban.
The final version of the Polar Code does not include a require-
ment for reception facilities as it was deemed superfluous in light of
a broad requirement for adequate reception facilities already found
in MARPOL.84 Russia also highlighted this clause in its proposal,85
although the decision of MEPC to delete the requirement from the
Code appears to be based on the work of an intersessional working
group, not on Russia’s proposal.86
5 | SUBSTANCE AND FORM OF RUSSIA ’S
ENGAGEMENT
5.1 | The substance of Russian positions
As shown above, many of the Russian proposals regarding the envir-
onmental part of the Polar Code were less beneficial to environmen-
tal protection than the positions expressed by other parties. This
was especially evident in the discussions on the possible establish-
ment of special areas for HFO, grey water and air emissions and the
ban on discharges of oil and oily mixtures from machinery spaces in
the Arctic. It has been shown how compliance problems for Russian
ships and the possible impact of this on Russian Arctic activities
were visible throughout Russia’s interventions and proposals.
In the case of the debate on port reception facilities in the Arc-
tic, Russia held a similar position to environmental NGOs and
Canada. Yet, the difference between Russia and these other parties
lay, notably, in the lack of Russian concern for a delay in the imple-
mentation of the discharge ban that could have resulted from the
requirement for reception facilities, as well as Russia’s attempts to
link the issue of reception facilities with its proposal to overturn the
discharge ban. On this basis, one might consider Russia’s stance on
the issue of reception facilities to be guided less by environmental
concerns than those of the environmental NGOs and Canada.
If environmental concerns appear to have taken a low priority in
Russia’s positions, then what was guiding Russia’s participation in the
debates on the environmental measures of the Polar Code? While
considerations of shipping and economic activities in the Arctic
region appear to have been important, it would be far-fetched to say
that Russia’s proposals were aimed at positive economic gain. Rather,
the chief concern appears to be damage limitation. This included both
the costs associated with upgrading its ships to the new standards,
avoiding the need to acquire new vessels that comply with the
Code’s requirements where upgrade is not feasible and, through
these, protection of the economic viability of the diverse Russian
activities and projects in the Arctic. This appears to confirm Zagors-
ki’s submission that the environmental measures of the Code were
viewed unfavourably in Russia due to their possible negative eco-
nomic impacts.87 While it is understandable that Russia would not
want its economic activities in the Arctic to be crippled by the Code,
Russia’s positions regarding the environmental measures of the Code
do not consider the possible positive effects of the Code either as a
tool of environmental protection or as a driving force. Thus, it is argu-
able that a better balance could have been found between protection
of short-term financial–economic concerns and environmental meas-
ures necessary for the protection of the fragile environment.
The Russian aim to reduce its financial–economic costs might
also be seen in the context of foreign policy considerations. This is
due, first and foremost, to the fact that Russia’s great power revival
has been connected to resource extraction, especially in the Arctic.88
79SDC 1/3/23 (n 71) 1; and MEPC 66/11/8 (n 46) 2.
80MEPC 66/11/8 (n 46) 2–3.
81MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2. While the introduction of the discharge ban itself does not con-
stitute establishment of a special area, it may be seen as a quasi-special area measure due
to its stringency.
82MEPC 67/9/4 (n 70) 2.
83Bognar, ‘Russian Proposals’ (n 21) 121.
84MEPC 67/20 (n 64) 43–44.
85MEPC 67/9/4 (n 70) 2.
86MEPC 67/20 (n 64) 43–44.
87Zagorski (n 18) 223–224.
88Laruelle (n 60) 159.
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In this context, it is also remarkable that Russia appears to have
espoused a zero-sum outlook in its positions on the environmental
measures of the Polar Code. This is evident in Russia’s remark com-
paring the stringency of the discharge ban in the Arctic to other
seas.89 Thus, it is not simply the reduction of the impact of the new
environmental measures on its economic activities in the Arctic that
appears to be Russia’s aim in the negotiations analysed here, but
also the reduction of the relative disadvantage the Code could cause
Russia vis-a-vis other States, which do not have significant stakes
tied up and affected in the Arctic.
One final issue that deserves mention here appears to have
underpinned some of Russia’s proposals. This is the importance of
Russia’s jurisdiction and control of the NSR, emphasized by the pres-
ence of icebreakers, an important vessel type Russia tried to exempt
from the discharge requirements.
Russia’s participation in the negotiation of the Polar Code’s envir-
onmental measures is rather defensive. This manifests itself, first, in
the weak environmental protection focus of the Russian proposals
vis-a-vis their aim to minimize the effects of the proposed environ-
mental measures on Russia’s economic activity, great power revival
and jurisdictional control over the NSR. Second, Russia did not pro-
pose any environmental measures for inclusion into the Code, but
rather reacted to other actors’ proposals.
Thus, there is a disconnect between the general goal of the Polar
Code and Russia’s positions. The former aims to strengthen the envir-
onmental protection of the polar regions through stringent regula-
tions, whereas Russia focuses on mitigating the possible negative
outcomes of the new measures. Russia’s approach appears to miss
the objective of the Polar Code. Russia’s participation in this negoti-
ation then is not much different than in other international environ-
mental regimes where environmental concerns come relatively low
on its list of priorities.
5.2 | The form: arguing, bargaining or in-between?
Throughout the negotiation of the environmental part of the Code,
it is obvious that Russian interests were pursued, suggesting that the
decision-making mode Russia engaged in was bargaining, rather than
arguing. Such a conclusion is also supported by inconsistencies in
Russia’s position as well as the changing aims of the Russian pro-
posals regarding the discharge ban, trying to pursue a give-and-take
deal-making. The closest Russia came to engaging in straightforward
bargaining, relying on demands, was over the question of port recep-
tion facilities where it tried to rely on its power vis-a-vis developing
States to stop the issue progressing further.
Additionally, there is evidence of strategic use of argumentation
on Russia’s part. It could be argued that Russia’s suggestion that
ships engaged in polar shipping should not be subjected to regula-
tions that exceed MARPOL, as well as its objection to the discharge
ban that is more stringent than applicable in other sea areas around
the world, rely on the universality principle of the IMO. However, in
these cases this principle is used in order to protect Russian ships
from more stringent measures. Thus, self-interest seems to be sub-
stituted for impartiality, the basis of arguments in normative right-
ness. Further, Russia used a warning regarding possible illegal and
uncontrolled discharges of oil and oily waters if the discharge ban
was to be implemented, thereby relying on the argument’s basis in
factual truth for what will happen in case of the ban, instead of a
bargaining threat of what Russia might do. None of these seems to
have led to the desired outcome, however.
What did appear more successful when success is measured
against the proposals in the Russian documents, were Russia’s
open explanations of how its interests would be negatively
impacted. As suggested by Jane Mansbridge and colleagues,
expressions of interest can be beneficial to deliberation by creat-
ing mutual understanding between parties.90 Accordingly, being
open about the problems experienced by ships undertaking voy-
ages in polar waters for long periods of time without port calls,
with regard to the discharge ban of oil and oily mixtures from
machinery spaces, could have contributed to the MEPC agreeing
on a grace period for these. As last among the proposals that
Russia submitted on the issue of the complete ban, this had the
narrowest scope, thus providing least exemption from the strict
new environmental measures, showing also an improved Russian
understanding of the positions of the other parties to the debate,
facilitating a possible agreement.
As suggested in Section 1, it is possible that open expressions of
self-interest can constitute part of arguing, as they elucidate the
positions and motives of the parties and thus contribute to reaching
a common understanding. According to Mansbridge and colleagues,
while coercive power should be excluded, expressions of self-inter-
est are not frowned upon in this decision-making mode, deliberative
negotiation.91 Arguably, since strategic uses of argumentation serve
to hide the self-interest of parties, these might also be seen as anti-
thetical to deliberative negotiation. Deliberative negotiation should,
therefore, be placed somewhere on the spectrum between arguing
and bargaining, balancing between arguing’s common understanding
and bargaining’s self-interest. Russia’s explanation of the difficulties
it faces in complying with the discharge ban as well as the limited
scope of its proposed grace period to placate its negotiating part-
ners, thus creating an understanding, suggests an instance of deliber-
ative negotiation.
This suggests that there was a further disconnect in Russia’s par-
ticipation in the negotiations: a disconnect between the negotiating
strategy Russia used and the strategy from which its proposals bene-
fitted most. Russia achieved more success with regard to proposals
where it managed to make the other negotiating parties see the
issue from its perspective. This involved explaining how its interests
would be affected. This deliberative stance was contrasted through-
out the negotiations with Russia’s overwhelming reliance on bargain-
ing and strategic use of argumentation.
89MEPC 66/11/3 (n 45) 2.




Russia’s participation in the negotiation of the environmental part of
the Polar Code can be characterized by two disconnects: one regard-
ing the content of the Code and one regarding Russia’s negotiating
strategy. These together suggest that, despite its interest in protect-
ing the vulnerable Arctic environment and its policy documents’
emphasis on environmental protection, this concern was trumped by
other considerations in the concrete negotiation of the Polar Code.
While the fact that some of its concerns were taken into account
should be encouraging for Russia, its persistent reactive stance
against stringent environmental regulations, readiness to rely on
strategic uses of argumentation and demands based on power rela-
tions suggest that the implementation and possible further develop-
ment of the Polar Code could face resistance from the largest Arctic
coastal State.
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In the Same Boat? A Comparative Analysis of the Approaches of Russia and Canada in 
the Negotiation of the IMO’s Mandatory Polar Code 
Abstract: In the field of Arctic shipping, Canada and the Russian Federation have enacted 
extensive unilateral national regulations cognizant of Article 234, UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. On the global level, both States have been important actors in negotiating the 
International Maritime Organization’s mandatory Polar Code, a legal instrument with 
implications for regulations at the national level. This paper compares and contrasts the 
approaches, positions and arguments of Canada and Russia especially regarding national 
systems to control navigation and vessel-source pollution. The results suggest different 
emphases stemming from the two States’ political and economic realities and capacities. 
Keywords: law of the sea; Polar Code; international decision-making; Northwest Passage; 
Northern Sea Route 
I. Introduction 
With the decrease of sea ice in the Arctic, increased ship traffic is expected during this 
century in the waters of the Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), 
the sea routes north of Canada and the Russian Federation respectively. The two States with 
the longest coastlines facing the Arctic, Russia and Canada have a long history connected to 
this region which is integral to their national identity. This history and identity have 
underpinned and motivated their national policies and regulatory efforts, not least regarding 
shipping in the Arctic.  
The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code),1 negotiated at the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), is an international legally binding instrument that 
aims to raise international standards for the safety of navigation and the protection of the 
marine environment in polar regions. During its negotiation, Russia and Canada were 
expected to play an important role both on account of their experience regarding Arctic 
shipping and the potential challenges and opportunities posed by the Code for their national 
regulatory regimes. 
While the national regulatory regimes and policies of Russia and Canada have been subject to 
comparative analysis,2 this article compares and contrasts their positions and arguments 
                                                            
1 IMO, International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), Res. MSC.385(94), 21 November 
2014; and IMO, International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), Res. MEPC.264(68), 15 
May 2015 (Polar Code).  
2 See e.g. Erik Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic: Canadian and Russian Perspectives (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993); R. Douglas Brubaker, “The Arctic – Navigational Issues under International 
Law of the Sea,” The Yearbook of Polar Law Online 2, No. 1 (2010): 7-114; Aldo Chircop et al., “Course 
Convergence? Comparative Perspectives on the Governance of Navigation and Shipping in Canadian and 
Russian Arctic Waters,” Ocean Yearbook 28 (2014): 291-327; Leilei Zou, “Comparison of Arctic Navigation 
Administration between Russia and Canada,” in Challenges of the Changing Arctic: Continental Shelf, 
Navigation, and Fisheries, eds. Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Ronán Long (Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2016): 286-301; and Jacques Hartmann, “Regulating Shipping in the Arctic Ocean: An Analysis of State 
Practice,” Ocean Development & International Law 49, No. 3 (2018): 276-299. 
during the negotiation of the Polar Code.3 Did the fact that Russia and Canada have extensive 
Arctic shipping regulations, which were developed following a similar approach and face 
similar challenges on the international plane, result in comparable positions in the negotiation 
of the Polar Code? 
II. Canada, Russia and the Regulation of Arctic Shipping 
The history of regulating Arctic shipping, both in Canada and Russia/Soviet Union, goes back 
to the mid-20th Century and has been influenced by reactions to actions of foreign States, 
primarily the United States.4 It was the Soviet Union whose claimed jurisdiction was first 
challenged by the United States in the late 1960s,5 followed by the infamous voyage of the 
American tanker Manhattan through the Northwest Passage and the waters of the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago in 1969.6 The Manhattan incident led to the enactment of the Canadian 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA),7 which provides extensive regulation for 
ships in the waters of Canada’s Arctic Archipelago, ostensibly to protect against the pollution 
of these waters. As Erik Franckx highlights, the establishment of the Northern Sea Route 
Administration was the Soviet reflection of the Canadian AWPPA.8  
It was the AWPPA and the need to provide for it a solid international legal basis that led the 
Canadian delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to seek a 
provision aimed specifically at the Arctic.9 After largely trilateral negotiations between 
Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union, this was achieved in Article 234 of the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),10 which provides to Arctic coastal 
States the right to legislate for the prevention, control and reduction of vessel-source pollution 
as regards ice-covered waters without the requirement to turn to the international community, 
as represented by the IMO, for approval.11  
                                                            
3 Writing at the same time as the development of the Polar Code was still in progress, Kristin Bartenstein points 
at the use of icebreaker escorts and reliance on unilateral regulations for Arctic shipping to illustrate the lack of 
coordination among Arctic States in the negotiation of the Code. See Kristin Bartenstein, “Navigating the Arctic: 
The Canadian NORDREG, the International Polar Code and Regional Cooperation,” German Yearbook of 
International Law 54 (2011): 117-118. 
4 See e.g. Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic, supra note 2, 75-101 and 145-160. 
5 Ibid., 146-151; and J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd edition (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 312-318. 
6 Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic, supra note 2, 75-76; and John Kirton and Don Munton, “The 
Manhattan Voyages and Their Aftermath,” in Politics of the Northwest Passage, ed. Franklyn Giffiths (Kingston 
and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 67-97. 
7 Canada, Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12) (AWPPA). 
8 Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic, supra note 2, 234. 
9 For the negotiation of Article 234, see Donald M. McRae, “The Negotiation of Article 234,” in Politics of the 
Northwest Passage, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 
98-114; and James Kraska, “Governance of Ice-Covered Areas: Rule Construction in the Arctic Ocean,” Ocean 
Development & International Law 45, No. 3 (2014): 260-271. 
10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
(LOSC). 
11 Ibid., Article 234. This provision reads: 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of 
the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering 
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk speech, suggesting an opening of the NSR to foreign 
vessels, signaled a change of stance by the Soviet Union in its dying days, leading to the 
introduction of requirements for navigation along the NSR.12 Although the growth in traffic 
plummeted on the NSR with the collapse of the Soviet Union and foreign navigation did not 
materialize, efforts started to build towards the development of an international regulatory 
code for ships operating in polar waters in the 1990s. These efforts led to the designation of 
an Outside Working Group by the IMO, with the lead of Canada, to work out the technical 
details of the new mandatory code.13 This work, however, only resulted in a voluntary set of 
guidelines, the 2002 Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters,14 extended 
in 2009 to include both Arctic and Antarctic polar waters as the Guidelines for Ships 
Operating in Polar Waters.15 
Finally, while the early 2010s saw Russia reform its national regulations regarding shipping 
along the NSR, seen as the first step towards aligning its legislation more with international 
law,16 Canada introduced mandatory reporting requirements, similar to those existing for the 
NSR.17 This Canadian step to make mandatory the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services 
Zone Regulations (NORDREG) drew criticism at the IMO,18 resulting in debates also 
regarding Article 234 of the LOSC.19  
III. The Polar Code  
                                                            
the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. 
Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. 
12 Franckx, Maritime Claims in the Arctic, supra note 2, 264-268. 
13 Lawson W. Brigham, “The Developing International Maritime Organization Polar Code,” in Arctic Yearbook 
2014, eds. Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot and Joël Plouffe (Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2014): 
497. While these early efforts can be seen as forming the broadly understood process of Polar Code negotiations, 
the present article has a much narrower focus, solely concentrating on the negotiations commencing from 2009 
when an output for a mandatory code was placed on the agenda of the IMO.  
14 IMO, Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters, Doc. MSC/Circ.1056 and 
MEPC/Circ.399, 23 December 2002.  
15 IMO, Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, Res. A.1024(26), 2 December 2009. 
16 See e.g. Erik Franckx, “The Shape of Things to Come: The Russian Federation and the Northern Sea Route in 
2011,” The Yearbook of Polar Law V (2013): 268; and Jan J. Solski, “Russia,” in Governance of Arctic 
Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States, eds. Robert C. Beckman, Tore 
Henriksen, Kristine Dalaker Kraabel, Erik J. Molenaar and J. Ashley Roach (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017): 197-
215. 
17 Canada, Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (SOR/2010-127) https://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2010-127/FullText.html (accessed 1 May 2019) (NORDREG). 
18 See e.g. United States and INTERTANKO, Safety of Navigation: Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services 
Zone Regulations, IMO Doc. MSC 88/11/2, September 22, 2010; and IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety 
Committee on Its Eighty-Eighth Session, Doc. MSC 88/26/Add.1, 19 January 2011, Annex 28 Statement by the 
Delegation of Singapore. 
19 IMO, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, Doc. NAV 56/20, 31 August 2010, 49-50; and IMO, Report of 
the Maritime Safety Committee on Its Eighty-Eighth Session, Doc. MSC 88/26, 15 December 2010, 53-56. See 
also, Ted L. McDorman, “National Measures for the Safety of Navigation in Arctic Waters: NORDREG, Article 
234 and Canada,” in The Law of the Sea Convention: US Accession and Globalization, eds. Myron H. Nordquist, 
Hak-So Kim, John Norton Moore, and Alfred H. A. Soons (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 409-
424; and James Kraska, “The Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NORDREG) and the 
Law of the Sea,” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 30 (2015): 225-254. 
The Polar Code was developed by the IMO between 2009 and 2015 and entered into force 1 
January 2017.20 Its aim is to enhance the safety of ships navigating in polar waters as well as 
the protection of the polar marine environment,21 beyond the regulations that were already 
applicable through the major IMO conventions.22 The Polar Code is not a stand-alone treaty, 
but an add-on to two conventions, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS)23 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL),24 and is made mandatory through these Conventions.25 The Code has two main 
parts, corresponding to the two Conventions to which it adds new regulations: Part I for safety 
measures and Part II for pollution prevention measures.26 Both of these parts are made up of 
two sub-parts, one containing mandatory regulations (Parts I-A and II-A) and one containing 
additional recommendatory guidelines (Parts I-B and II-B). 
Due to this complexity, the Polar Code was negotiated in multiple committees of the IMO. 
The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) was responsible for the safety part of the Code, while 
the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) was in charge of the negotiation of 
the environmental part. However, in reality, the main body of the work was delegated to the 
Sub-Committee for Ship Design and Equipment (DE) and, after the 2013 reorganization of 
the IMO’s structure, its successor the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction 
(SDC).27 It was at DE/SDC where the technical details were negotiated, particularly amongst 
                                                            
20 For the proposals to place a mandatory polar code on the IMO’s agenda, see Denmark, Norway and the United 
States, Work Programme: Mandatory Application of the Polar Guidelines, IMO Doc. MSC 86/23/9, 24 February 
2009; and Denmark, Norway and the United States, Work Programme of the Committee and Subsidiary Bodies: 
Mandatory Application of the Polar Guidelines, IMO Doc. MEPC 59/20/1, 6 April 2009. The safety part of the 
Polar Code was adopted in November 2014; see IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on Its Ninety-
Fourth Session, Doc. MSC 94/21, 26 November 2014, 17. The environmental protection part of the Code was 
adopted in May 2015; see IMO, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Eighth 
Session, Doc. MEPC 68/21, 29 May 2015, 44. All document submitted to the IMO on the Polar Code were 
accessed through the IMO’s online database, IMODOCS, available at https://webaccounts.imo.org/.  
21 The definition of “polar waters” includes not only Arctic waters, which consist of all waters north of 60° N 
with the exception of the Norwegian Sea and the western part of the Barents Sea, but also Antarctic waters, i.e. 
waters south of 60° S. 
22 Polar Code, supra note 1, Introduction 1. 
23 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, 1 November 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278, as 
amended (SOLAS). 
24 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 
Relating Thereto, London, 2 November 1973 and 17 February 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 62, as amended (MARPOL). 
25 IMO, Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as Amended, Res. 
MSC.386(94), 21 November 2014; and IMO, Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973: Amendments to MARPOL Annexes I, 
II, IV and V (To Make Use of Environment-Related Provisions of the Polar Code Mandatory), Res. 
MEPC.265(68), 15 May 2015. In addition, training requirements of the Polar Code for crew on ships operating 
in polar waters are elaborated on in the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, London, 7 July 1978, 1361 U.N.T.S. 190, as amended and its Code, as amended. 
26 In addition, the Polar Code starts with an Introduction that is made mandatory through both SOLAS and 
MARPOL.  
27 For the reform of the IMO’s structure, see IMO, “IMO Sub-Committee Restructuring Agreed by MSC,” 1 July 
2013, accessed 16 April 2019, http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/26-
restructuring.aspx#.XLWiNvZuKUk. Additionally, specific issues were delegated to other Sub-Committees, 
such as those responsible for Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW, and its successor on Human 
Element, Training and Watchkeeping, HTW), Radiocommunication and Search and Rescue (COMSAR, and its 
successor on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue, NSCR), Fire Protection (FP) and Ship 
Systems and Equipment (SSE). 
a handful of experts at the working group level. The outline of the work of the Sub-
Committees was set by the two Committees which also took policy decisions when requested 
by DE/SDC on issues which were unclear. The final text of the Polar Code also had to be 
approved by both Committees. 
IV. Canadian and Russian Positions during the Negotiation of the Polar Code 
1. The Participation of Canada and Russia in the Negotiations in General, and the 
Exercise of Leadership and Experience 
The region-specific nature of the Polar Code meant that its negotiation was dominated by 
Arctic States.28 However, while both Canada and Russia were important players in the debates 
and had expertise with regard to Arctic shipping and its regulation, there were marked 
differences between their participation.  
Firstly, the number of proposals submitted shows a large disparity. Canada submitted the 
largest number of proposals of all the participants at the Polar Code negotiations – 34 
documents. Compared to this, Russia’s tally stands at 15. However, looking at the statements 
included in the reports of the Committees and Sub-Committees, the situation between the two 
States is opposite. Russia’s views are recorded in these documents nine times compared to 
Canada’s three. This suggests that Russia may have been less successful in achieving its aims 
during the negotiations than Canada. 
Secondly, Canada’s experience in previous negotiations seems to have left its stamp on some 
of its documents, as several of its submissions suggest that Canada was seeking to play a 
facilitator role, moving the discussions forward rather than expressing a specific Canadian 
position or opinion.29 Thus, Canada submitted draft texts for the Code in the early phases of 
the negotiation process30 and sample tables for the content of the new Polar Waters 
Operational Manual (PWOM).31 This facilitator role is also underscored by Canada’s 
                                                            
28 On the relative lack of engagement by the States with interests in the Antarctic, see Dorottya Bognar, “Sea-
Change in Polar Shipping: From Arctic to Antarctic Polar Code Initiatives,” The JCLOS Blog, 1 February 2017, 
http://site.uit.no/jclos/files/2017/02/Bognar-Sea-change-in-polar-shipping-from-Arctic-to-Antarctic-Polar-Code-
initiatives.pdf.  
29 While not expressing Canadian positions per se, Canada did have room to try to influence the outcome of the 
Polar Code especially through the contents of the draft texts, leading to debates regarding certain provisions. One 
example of this, as discussed further on in this article, is the principle regarding national systems of shipping 
control which was seized upon by the Russian Federation, see DE 55/12/23, infra note 42 and accompanying 
text. Canada also provided the chair of a correspondence group established by the Sub-Committee on Fire 
Protection to examine the then Chapter 8 (now Chapter 7) of the Polar Code on Fire Safety/Protection, see 
Canada, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Report of the Correspondence 
Group, IMO Doc. SDC 1/3/5, 15 November 2013. 
30 Canada, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Proposed framework for the 
Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, IMO Doc. DE 53/18/2, 20 November 2009; and Canada, 
Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Discussion Document for Progressing 
Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, IMO Doc. DE 55/INF.4, 17 December 
2010. The latter submission was accompanied by a document detailing the origin of each provision contained in 
the draft text in DE 55/INF.4, see Canada, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters: Discussion Document for Progressing Development of Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters, IMO Doc. DE 55/INF.3, 17 December 2010. 
31 Canada, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Polar Waters Operational 
Manual, IMO Doc. SDC 1/3/10, 15 November 2013; and Canada, Ship Design and Construction: Development 
participation and organization of different workshops of experts to contribute to the progress 
of the Code’s development.32 There is, however, a distinct lack of a similar facilitator role in 
Russia’s case. There are no reports of workshops organized by Russia, although Russian 
experts no doubt participated in such events organized by others. Neither did Russia submit 
any draft text of the Code. Compared to the extensive Canadian effort, Russia’s contribution 
to the development of the Polar Code seems remarkably little. 
Thirdly, while Russia’s submissions had no co-sponsors, Canada frequently co-sponsored 
proposals with other member States and consultative organizations.33 Co-sponsoring, besides 
sharing the burden of the preparatory work, serves to indicate before the debate of the 
document that the proposal is supported by multiple States and/or expert organizations. Of 
Canada’s 34 documents, nearly a third (10) was co-sponsored. This suggests that the 
Canadian proposals enjoyed a relatively wide appeal, whereas Russia’s participation in the 
negotiation may be characterized by a certain level of isolation. Furthermore, Canada co-
sponsored with a wide array of States with different interests. These included, among others, 
Arctic coastal States Norway and the United States,34 other Arctic States35 such as Finland 
and Sweden,36 as well as major flags of convenience such as Liberia and the Marshall 
Islands.37 On the one hand, this might point at a strategic choice of co-sponsors, especially 
when opposition to Canadian proposals was anticipated. On the other hand, it also implies a 
willingness to cooperate on Canada’s part. 
                                                            
of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Polar Waters Operational Manual, IMO Doc. MSC 
93/10/1, 12 February 2014. For the PWOM, see Polar Code, supra note 1, Part I-A, Chapter 2. 
32 Such workshops were notably organised regarding the PWOM, see SDC 1/3/10, supra note 31, 2 and MSC 
93/10/1, supra note 31, 2; the identification of risks faced by ships in polar waters, see Canada, Development of a 
Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Establishment of a Risk Basis for Polar Code 
Requirements, IMO Doc. DE 57/11/3, 6 December 2012; and a new system for the determination of operational 
limitations in ice, POLARIS, see Canada, Sweden, Finland and the International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS), Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Technical 
Background to POLARIS, IMO Doc. MSC 94/INF.13, 12 September 2014. 
33 There are more than 70 non-governmental organizations that enjoy consultative status with the IMO, including 
representatives from the shipping industry and environmental organizations. They provide expert input and can, 
thus, provide document to the debates. For the list of consultative organizations, see IMO, “Non-Governmental 
international Organizations which have been granted consultative status with IMO,” accessed 16 April 2019, 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/NGOsInConsultativeStatus.aspx.  
34 E.g. Canada, Denmark and Norway, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: 
Comments to Proposals Related to an Environmental Chapter of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in 
Polar Waters (Polar Code), IMO Doc. DE 57/11/18, 25 January 2013; and Canada and the United States, Ship 
Design and Construction: Applicability of Part I-A of the Polar Code in the Antarctic Area, IMO Doc. MSC 
93/10/17, 25 March 2014. 
35 It is customary to differentiate between the Arctic Five, the five Arctic coastal States – Denmark (on behalf of 
Greenland), Canada, Norway, Russia and the United States – and the Arctic Eight, States with territories beyond 
the Arctic Circle that also make up the member States of the Arctic Council, comprising of – beyond the Arctic 
Five – Finland, Iceland and Sweden. 
36 E.g. MSC 94/INF.13, supra note 32. 
37 E.g. Canada, Liberia and the Marshall Islands, Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: 
Reduction of Administrative Burden, IMO Doc. MEPC 67/9/11, 22 August 2014. 
Thus, whereas Canada’s Arctic shipping experience led to a leadership role in the 
negotiations, quite the opposite was the case for Russia. Russia’s Arctic shipping experience 
can only be found in the text of its submissions providing justification for its proposals.38 
2. Canadian and Russian Proposals 
While the above observations suggest that Canadian and Russian engagement with the Polar 
Code negotiating process was markedly different, this subsection looks at the substance of the 
two States’ proposals. Were there any similarities between the positions of Canada and Russia 
on specific issue areas, or were the general differences accompanied by opposing positions 
and arguments as well?  
It is not possible to cover the whole debate on the Polar Code.39 Therefore, the focus will be 
on i) national regulations and systems of shipping control, and ii) regulation of the discharge 
of oil and oily mixtures. The importance of the former is evident from the fact that both 
Canada and Russia have relied upon Article 234 of the LOSC to support national regulations 
for Arctic shipping which could be impacted by the new Polar Code. The examination of the 
latter cluster of issues is justified since these are matters upon which these States can invoke 
the rights provided in Article 234, namely the prevention, reduction and control of vessel-
source marine pollution.  
Clusters is an apt approach since several more or less disparate issues are connected to the 
broadly defined areas. For the first cluster one can examine how Canada and Russia tried to 
regulate the relationship of the Polar Code with the LOSC, also including the practical matter 
of operational limitation in ice conditions. The second cluster looks not only at the discharge 
ban on oil and oily mixtures but also reception facilities.  
(a) Safeguarding National Regulations 
With regard to safeguarding national regulations and systems of shipping control, it is 
possible to separate two distinct strategies. First, there is the explicit matter of the relationship 
between the Polar Code and Article 234 of the LOSC, which serves as the international legal 
basis for much of Canada’s and Russia’s national regulations as regards shipping in the 
Arctic. Besides this, efforts have been expanded to use national regulations as possible models 
for the content of the Polar Code.  
The issue of safeguarding national regulations and systems of shipping control is a distinct 
cluster of issues that was uniquely common to and supported by Canada and Russia.40 
                                                            
38 Dorottya Bognar, “Russian Proposals on the Polar Code: Contributing to Common Rules or Furthering State 
Interests?” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 7, No. 2 (2016): 127. 
39 For an overview of Canadian contribution to the Polar Code debates, see Aldo Chircop, Peter G. Pamel and 
Miriam Czarski, “Canada’s Implementation of the Polar Code,” The Journal of International Maritime Law 24, 
no. 6 (2018): 433-440. For an overview of Russian contributions to the Polar Code debates, see Bognar, 
“Russian Proposals on the Polar Code,” supra note 38. 
40 Although Bartenstein notes that Denmark’s Arctic strategy includes the possibility of introducing unilateral 
measures on the basis of Article 234 of the LOSC, see Bartenstein, supra note 3, 118, there is no evidence in my 
material from the IMO that this resulted in similar efforts to those of Canada and Russia outlined in this section. 
On the contrary, Denmark voiced a preference for maintaining freedom of navigation and for the Polar Code’s 
However, elements of the Canadian and Russian efforts did receive support from other States 
during the debates, such as the requirement to include operational capabilities and limitations 
in ice into both the new Polar Ship Certificate and the PWOM, also referring to the 
methodology of such assessment, one of which is the POLARIS system mentioned below.41 
While reference to coastal State rights and control is not included in these technical 
requirements, both the Canadian and Russian systems of control are accommodated through 
the possible methodologies mentioned.  
(i) Relationship between the Polar Code and LOSC 
Much of the debates centering on the regulation of the relationship between the Code and the 
LOSC in general, and its Article 234 in particular, has been analyzed elsewhere.42 Suffice it 
here to recount that early Russian efforts to reintroduce “the principle of priority of national 
regulations over the Code’s requirements,”43 originating in a Canadian draft text and directly 
quoting Article 234, failed in 2011 due to opposition, notably by the United States.44 
However, Canada succeeded in tabling the issue again three years later as a question of 
savings clauses.45 Through arguments relating to legal clarity and need, while at the same 
time avoiding the mention of Article 234 and national regulations, Canada achieved a partial 
victory: the inclusion of a savings clause regulating the relationship between LOSC and the 
safety part of the Code in the new SOLAS Chapter making the Code mandatory.46 
(ii) Operational and Access Limitations 
Paralleling the efforts outlined above, Canada and Russia tried to shape the Polar Code’s 
content to mirror their respective national regulations with discussions largely centering on 
operational and access limitation of ships as well as control by coastal States. Canada’s first 
submission on this issue proposed the introduction of a permit to be required of all ships 
                                                            
regulations to “supersede the countries’ national regulations,” see Denmark, Development pf a Mandatory Code 
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: HAZID Analysis of Ships Navigating in Arctic Waters, IMO Doc. DE 
53/18/5, 18 December 2009, 2. It has to be noted though that this Danish submission predates the Danish Arctic 
strategy by two years. 
41 Polar Code, supra note 1, Part I-A, Regulations 1.3, 2.2.2 and 2.3.2. See also IMO, Guidance on 
Methodologies for Assessing Operational Capabilities and Limitations in Ice, Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1519, 6 June 
2016. 
42 Dorottya Bognar, “The Elephant in the Room: Article 234 of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Polar 
Code as an Incompletely Theorised Agreement,” The Polar Journal 8, No. 1. (2018): 182-203. 
43 Russian Federation, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Procedure of 
Accounting for National Regulations, IMO Doc. DE 55/12/23, 1 February 2011, 2. Coastal State rights based on 
Article 234 were mentioned once again by Russia, referring to national rules setting limitations for navigation in 
ice. The extent of this was only a sentence, however, while the rest of the submission was devoted to the 
discussion of ice classes. See Russian Federation, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in 
Polar Waters: A Proposal to Appoint Categories Depending on the Ice Reinforcement of Ships, IMO Doc. DE 
56/10/14, 24 December 2011, 1. 
44 IMO, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, Doc. DE 55/22, 15 April 2011, 23-24. 
45 See IMO, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, Doc. SDC 1/26, 11 February 2014, 9, 11 and Annex 10, 
3. For further Canadian documents regarding savings clauses, see Canada, Reports of Sub-Committees: 
Comments on the Outcome of SDC 1: Amendments to the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating to Thereto (MARPOL), IMO Doc. MEPC 66/11/7, 21 
February 2014; and Canada, Ship Design and Construction: Amendments to the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, IMO Doc. MSC 93/10/12, 25 March 2014. 
46 SOLAS, supra note 23, Chapter XIV, Regulation 2.5. 
operating in polar waters, the “Polar Ship Permit to Operate.”47 While such a permit would 
determine areas where, and environmental conditions under which, a ship would be allowed 
to sail depending on the fulfilment of the Code’s requirements, Canada also suggested that the 
permit would “assist coastal States in regulating operations in accordance with their own 
systems of navigational control.”48 
Further, the same document also proposed the requirement that ships report regularly to the 
coastal States during their voyages “where applicable,”49 that is, where the coastal State 
already requires this, such as in the case of Canadian and Russian regulations of Arctic 
shipping. These efforts tried to establish an international legal basis for prior authorization 
and reporting requirements, notably the controversial, mandatory Canadian NORDREG 
system.  
Russia also referred to its practices of access limitation, suggesting that a document similar to 
its Ice Certificate that provides recommendations for safe navigation based on the ship’s 
parameters and performance, be required in order to increase safety in polar waters, 
explaining its use and practical experience.50 However, in the case of Russia, the discussion of 
the Ice Certificate appears to be separate from that of the national regulations. This garnered 
some support among the delegations,51 whereas Russia’s proposal regarding the principle of 
priority,52 discussed at the same meeting, together with the Canadian paper on the Permit to 
Operate and coastal State control,53 were criticized for aiming to provide international legal 
basis for national systems of shipping control.54 
Canadian efforts also focused on having in the Polar Code a system similar to Canada’s 
regulations limiting access and operation in ice-covered waters, including the Canadian 
Zone/Date system55 and the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS).56 Firstly, it was 
proposed that the Polar Ship Certificate and/or the PWOM contain such limitations.57 
However, due to the reference to presumed coastal State jurisdiction, this generated concern 
                                                            
47 Canada, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Application of 
Requirements in the Mandatory Polar Code, IMO Doc. DE 55/12/7, 14 January 2011, 2. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 3. 
50 Russian Federation, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Comments on 
Document DE 54/13/4, IMO Doc. DE 54/13/10, 31 August 2010, 4; and Russian Federation, Development of a 
Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Ice Certificate Used in the Russian Federation, IMO 
Doc. DE 55/12/22, 31 January 2011. 
51 DE 55/22, supra note 44, 24. 
52 DE 55/12/23, supra note 43. 
53 DE 55/12/7, supra note 47. 
54 DE 55/22, supra note 44, 24. 
55 Canada, Shipping Safety Control Zones Order (C.R.C., c. 356). 
56 Canada, Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System (AIRSS) Standards – TP 12259, accessed 16 April 2019, 
http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/marinesafety/tp-tp12259-menu-605.htm. See also Canada, Arctic Shipping Safety and 
Pollution Prevention Regulations (SOR/2017-286), section 8(2). 
57 Canada, Development of a Mandatory Polar Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Access Limits for 
Operation in Polar Waters, IMO Doc. DE 56/10/15, 24 December 2011. 
among the other delegations.58 Following this, Canada used more cautious language, 
emphasizing that “it is inappropriate to mandate the use of any specific methodology.”59  
Finally, Canada and Russia, along with other States and the International Association of 
Classification Societies, developed a new system to limit operations in icy conditions, 
POLARIS, discussed at the last MSC meeting before the adoption of the Code in 2014.60 
However, Canada was the only State to table a document supporting the inclusion of the new 
system in the Polar Code.61 Reference was made to Canada’s AIRSS system that partly 
provides the basis for POLARIS, highlighting, among other things, its effectiveness.62 At the 
same time, Russia submitted three papers criticizing POLARIS.63 On the one hand, the 
criticism was directed at technical issues and flaws.64 On the other hand, Russia also 
suggested that POLARIS should not replace the possible use of different approaches to 
operational limitations, proposing equal status for Russia’s prescriptive approach with 
POLARIS and AIRSS.65 Russia further suggested that POLARIS should be amended with 
“[Russian Maritime Register of Shipping] ice classes, based on over 100 years’ experience of 
Arctic-going [sic]” so as to be more applicable in the Russian Arctic.66  
(b) Regulation of the Discharge of Oil and Oily Mixtures 
The possible negative environmental effects of shipping in the Arctic served as the raison 
d’etre for the development of Canada’s domestic regulatory regime, including a discharge 
ban,67 whereas Russia’s attitude towards environmental protection has been ambivalent.68 
While the protection of the Arctic marine environment is one of the main goals of the Polar 
Code, the scope of its environmental protection part is limited to pollution prevention to 
correspond with that of MARPOL. Due to this, one of the main environmental protection 
                                                            
58 IMO, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, Doc. DE 56/25, 28 February 2012, 25. 
59 SDC 1/3/10, supra note 31, 2; and MSC 93/10/1, supra note 31, 3. 
60 MSC 94/21, supra note 20, 10-11. 
61 Canada, Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Comments on IACS 
Proposed System for Determining Operational Limitations in Ice (POLARIS), IMO Doc. MSC 94/3/19, 26 
September 2014. 
62 Ibid., 2-3. 
63 Russian Federation, Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Polar Code: 
Modes of Operation in Ice and Speed Limitations, IMO Doc. MSC 94/3/21, 26 September 2014; Russian 
Federation, Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Operational Limitations for 
Polar Navigation Ships, IMO Doc. MSC 94/3/22, 26 September 2014; and Russian Federation, Consideration 
and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments: Draft Polar Code – Proposal for Text Improvements, 
IMO Doc. MSC 94/3/23, 26 September 2014, 2-3. 
64 MSC 94/3/21, supra note 63; and MSC 94/3/23, supra note 63, 2. 
65 MSC 94/3/22, supra note 63, 2. 
66 Ibid., 3. Also see discussion in Bognar, “Russian Proposals on the Polar Code,” supra note 38, 123-124. 
67 AWPPA, supra note 7, 4(1). 
68 See e.g. R. Douglas Brubaker, “Regulation of Navigation and Vessel-Source Pollution in the Northern Sea 
Route: Article 234 and State Practice,” in Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Law and Policy for 
Pollution Prevention, ed. Davor Vidas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 221 and 224-225; and 
Anna Korppoo, Nina Tynkkynen and Geir Hønneland, Russia and the Politics of International Environmental 
Regimes: Environmental Encounters or Foreign Policy? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015). For the observation 
that Russia does not mention the environment or climate as the referent object of sustainable development in the 
case of Arctic shipping, see Kathrin Keil, “Sustainability Understandings of Arctic Shipping,” in The Politics of 
Sustainability in the Arctic: Reconfiguring Identity, Space, and Time, eds. Ulrik Pram Gad and Jeppe 
Strandsbjerg (London: Routledge, 2018), 48, endnote 9. 
achievements of the Code was the ban on any discharge of oil and oily mixtures in the Arctic, 
creating a quasi-special area.69 Due to the introduction of this discharge ban, the need for 
adequate reception facilities also arose during the debates.70 However, this issue was not 
settled in the Code. In the latest development, the eight Arctic States have tabled a paper after 
the entry-into-force of the Polar Code, proposing the application of a regional approach to 
port reception facilities in the Arctic,71 which is a long way from reception facilities in every 
Arctic port that was originally proposed by flag States and shipping organizations.72  
(i) Discharge Ban  
Canada, which already has zero oil discharge regulations for its Arctic waters under 
AWPPA,73 was not among those States that proposed the inclusion of a complete prohibition 
of oil and oily mixture discharges in the Polar Code,74 suggesting instead that there be a 
requirement of oil filtering equipment with alarm and automatic stopping mechanisms for 
certain categories of ships.75 Yet, once the total ban was agreed in 2013, Canada supported 
it.76  
This contrasts markedly with the Russian stance regarding oil pollution. Russia had already 
opposed proposed requirements regarding oil filtering equipment as, in their view, such 
requirements were applicable in special areas which Arctic waters are not designated as.77 
Russia also emphasized that special areas would require adequate port reception facilities for 
                                                            
69 Polar Code, supra note 1, Part II-A, 1.1. Compare with MARPOL, supra note 24, Annex I, Reg. 1.11, which 
defines special areas as  
a sea area where for recognizable technical reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological 
condition and to the particular character of its traffic the adoption of special mandatory methods for the 
prevention of sea pollution by oil is required. 
70 The issues of the discharge ban as well as port reception facilities introduced below are discussed in more 
detail in Dorottya Bognar, “Russia and the Polar Marine Environment: The Negotiation of the Environmental 
Protection Measures of the Mandatory Polar Code,” Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law 27 (2018): 39-42. 
71 Canada et al., Any Other Business: Regional Reception Facilities Plan (RRFP) – Outline and Planning Guide 
for the Arctic, IMO Doc. MEPC 72/16, 29 December 2017. For a more recent document proposing placing a 
new agenda item regarding a regional approach to Arctic reception facilities on the IMO’s agenda, see Canada et 
al., Work Programme of the Committee and Subsidiary Bodies: Proposal for a New Output to Amend MARPOL 
to Allow the Establishment of Regional Arrangements in the Arctic, IMO Doc. MEPC 74/14/2, 8 February 2019. 
Regional agreements and arrangements provide a possibility to satisfy the requirement for adequate port 
reception facilities in regions with unique challenges, such as areas with many small island developing States. 
72 Kiribati et al., Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Reception Facilities 
for Oil and Oily Mixtures, IMO Doc. SDC 1/3/1, 11 October 2013. 
73 AWPPA, supra note 7, 4(1). 
74 See Denmark et al., Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Proposals 
Related to an Environmental Chapter of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), 
IMO Doc. DE 57/11/9, 10 January 2013. 
75 DE 57/11/18, supra note 34, 2. The ships for which these States propose oil filtering equipment were new 
category A and B ships, defined as “ship designed for operation in polar waters in at least medium first-year ice, 
which may include old ice inclusions” and “ship not included in category A, designed for operation in polar 
waters in at least thin first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions,” respectively, see Polar Code, supra 
note 1, Introduction 2.1 and 2.2.  
76 Canada, Reports of Sub-Committees: Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 
– Reception Facilities for Oil and Oily Mixtures, IMO Doc. MEPC 66/11/8, 21 February 2014. 
77 Russian Federation, Development of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Proposals 
Related to an Environmental Chapter of a Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), 
IMO Doc. DE 57/11/12, 25 January 2013, 2. 
vessel-source wastes, “which is time consuming [sic],”78 while asserting that oily water with 
an oil concentration of 15 parts per million (ppm) or less does not pose a threat to the marine 
environment, especially when compared to the wastes entering the Arctic from outside of the 
region.79 Once the discharge ban on oil and oily mixtures was agreed, creating a quasi-special 
area, multiple Russian documents tried to overturn this as well as limit its scope.80 The 
Russian proposals added further justifications to those already highlighted, including the 
suggestion that the discharge ban would lead to increased illegal and uncontrollable 
discharges in the Arctic,81 and that compliance would be difficult for ships in the Arctic, 
especially those that conduct voyages lasting long periods of time between port calls, such as 
icebreakers and hydrographic survey and research vessels.82 Icebreakers were of particular 
importance to Russia in general as further evidenced by the emphasis it placed on icebreaker 
assistance several times during the debates,83 as well as its attempt to change the definition of 
icebreakers to reflect its understanding as meaning specialized vessels, excluding cargo ships 
with high ice class at the last MSC meeting discussing the Code.84 Russia’s extensive efforts 
to protect its regime of icebreaker assistance are of significance as Russia has a monopoly 
over providing icebreaker escorts along the NSR.85 Although a transitional period for such 
vessels was achieved, this was shorter than Russia had proposed and has reportedly been 
subject to criticism by the Russian shipping and shipbuilding industry.86 
(ii) Port Reception Facilities 
Once the discharge ban was agreed, the requirement to provide port reception facilities for the 
discharge of oily waste in every Arctic port was proposed by a number of flag of convenience 
States and shipping organizations,87 drawing opposition from both Canada and Russia.88 
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regarding the nature and amount of vessel traffic and pointed to the burden of such a 
requirement, the two States appear to be motivated by other, divergent considerations.  
Canada expressed the concern that such a stringent requirement for port reception facilities as 
a prerequisite for the introduction of the total discharge ban would delay and impede the 
discharge ban.89 Thus, Canada’s opposition to the proposed requirement seems to be based, at 
least partially, upon environmental protection considerations, especially when Canada 
suggested that there were alternative, operational and technical solutions available to achieve 
compliance with the discharge ban.90 Such a concern for a delayed or impeded discharge ban 
is lacking in the Russian position, which used the lack of port reception facilities as one 
justification to overturn the discharge ban.91 
V. Positions and the Question of Mutual Support 
As expected, both Canada and Russia tried to influence the relationship of the Polar Code 
with preexisting rights and national regulations. It was especially with regard to the 
relationship of the Polar Code and coastal State rights in the Arctic under the LOSC that the 
positions of Russia and Canada were directly aligned. One important difference between the 
two States in this regard concerned the way they tried to achieve the primacy of Article 234 of 
the LOSC over the Code. While Russia explicitly referred to and cited Article 234, Canada 
was more circumspect in its submissions, avoiding direct reference to the provision and 
talking more generally about the international law applicable to polar waters. Further, Canada 
tried multiple ways to build acknowledgement of and an international legal basis for its 
domestic regime as well as seeking to safeguard it. This was attempted through: references to 
coastal State rights to permit operations and to require reporting from ships navigating in 
Arctic waters; references to national systems of shipping control in the PWOM; and support 
for the inclusion of POLARIS in the Polar Code. Russia’s efforts were limited mainly to 
efforts to amend POLARIS to fit its system of operational limitation. In this regard, Canada 
and Russia supported their respective national systems, apparently to the detriment of each 
other. Thus, a common position did not assist the two States’ efforts to reconcile the Polar 
Code with their respective national regulations, with the exception of the general relationship 
between the Polar Code and coastal State rights under Article 234 of the LOSC. 
Was there mutual support on the latter between Canada and Russia? Russia did not appear to 
draw on or expressly support any of the Canadian proposals beyond that used for its principle 
of priority. There is a similar lack of expressed support from Canada towards Russia. One 
exception is as regards the savings clauses proposed by Canada for inclusion in the MARPOL 
Annexes making the Polar Code mandatory, which had apparently received support from 
Russia.92 However, this support did not result in any submission or statement from Russia. 
Thus, it appears that the two States only supported each other’s efforts to a limited degree. 
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While the existence of national regulations and systems of shipping control is common to 
Canada and Russia and resulted to some degree in similar, but parallel, efforts during the 
negotiations, Canada and Russia expressed directly opposite views on environmental 
protection matters. This is evident in the case of the ban on the discharge of oil and oily 
mixtures in the Arctic. Once adopted, Canada supported such a ban as it parallels its own 
regulations. However, for Russia the adoption of the ban resulted in a series of submissions 
trying to undermine it or exempt vessel types from it, such as icebreakers, survey and research 
vessels and, to a lesser degree, ships transiting Russian Arctic waters. To some extent, the 
debate on the port reception facilities mirrored these differences in spite of both Canadian and 
Russian opposition to the proposed requirements. While Canada focused on the potential 
delay in the implementation of the discharge ban, this argument was notably missing in 
Russia’s submission. Neither was there evidence of support by the two States for each other’s 
proposals regarding reception facilities. This observation, however, needs to be put in the 
context of recent developments. As already mentioned, the proposal regarding a regional 
approach to port reception facilities was co-sponsored also by Canada and Russia.93 This 
proposal was apparently developed by the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME) Working Group.94 In the proposal, the high costs of new infrastructure 
appears to take a central place.95 While there is no reference made to pollution prevention in 
the list of benefits of such a regional approach in this paper, environmental concerns posed by 
the installation of such infrastructure are listed among the challenges.96 It appears that 
Canada’s position has moved closer to that of Russia and, worryingly, concerns over cutting 
costs placed higher than environmental considerations. 
VI. Explanations 
1. Capabilities and Economic Realities 
Although both Canada and Russia have extensive national regulations for Arctic shipping that 
had faced possible challenges from the Polar Code,97 there were major differences in their 
approaches during the negotiation of the Code. These can be partly attributed to the difference 
in capabilities and economic realities between Canada and Russia.98 
Russia’s history of developing its Arctic has resulted in more Arctic infrastructure – both 
ports and vessels – than is the case for Canada. Russia is a major flag State, not only of the 
many icebreakers plying its Arctic waters, but also of cargo vessels. Much of the traffic taking 
place in the Russian Arctic also constitutes domestic voyages as opposed to international 
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voyages in the meaning provided for in SOLAS.99 This also means that such vessels would 
not necessarily need to comply with the safety provisions of the Polar Code.100 Canada is not 
among the 35 largest flag States by deadweight tonnage,101 falls far behind of Russia in terms 
of ownership of vessels102 and is reliant on chartered ships.103 
Meanwhile, causing a potential problem for Russia is that, unlike the safety measures of the 
Code, the environmental protection measures contained in Part II of the Code, notably the 
discharge ban, are not restricted to ships on domestic voyages and to passenger and cargo 
vessels over 500 gross tonnage, but apply to all ships.104 Moreover, much of the infrastructure 
in the Russian Arctic is left over from the Soviet era and in need of modernization to be able 
to help comply with the Code’s discharge requirements. Therefore, it is no surprise that 
Russia was opposed to the stringent discharge requirements of the Code, which could result in 
high bills for upgrades and replacement of ships. Similarly, the requirement for port reception 
facilities in every Arctic port was seen as a heavy burden for Russia with many, but unfit 
ports along the NSR. The costs incurred through these regulations would significantly affect 
the balance sheet of the region, hamper the development of the Russian Arctic resources and 
adversely impact the resupplying of remote communities. The need to install reception 
facilities in remote settlements along the Arctic coast would have caused similar difficulties 
and expense for Canada as for Russia, coupled with the fact that the zero-discharge 
requirement has been in effect in Canadian waters since the introduction of AWPPA without 
the need for such facilities. Thus, both Canada and Russia were influenced by concerns that 
the Polar Code would place restrictions on their activities and result in additional financial 
burden. 
These observations also highlight that although Canada and Russia are the largest coastal 
States in the region, Canada primarily emphasized its coastal State capacity and interests 
during the negotiations of the Polar Code. For Russia, the picture was more complex. While it 
is in Russia’s interest as a coastal State to exploit the resources and opportunities of its waters, 
Russia also is a major flag State. In some respects, its resource development-related interests 
also serve its flag State interests when the aim is to reduce the costs to the ships serving its 
Arctic activities. Yet, its flag State interests were countered in the debates on port reception 
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facilities, although Russia tried to connect the reversal of the discharge ban with its opposition 
to the port reception facilities requirement. 
2. (Geo)Political Positions 
While both Canada and Russia have adopted regulations for their Arctic waters, Canada 
appears to be more concerned than Russia with establishing and reinforcing the international 
legal bases of these actions.105 This can be explained in part by the respective positions of 
Canada and Russia vis-à-vis international organizations and international law. Russia’s 
general wariness towards multilateral organizations, especially where it does not enjoy the 
special status as one of a small group of leaders has been well documented.106 Beyond this, 
Russia’s tendency towards unilateralism when that serves its interests has been noted,107 while 
Russia’s recent actions regarding Crimea and Eastern Ukraine suggest that Russia feels it can 
disregard or manipulate certain norms of international law. At the same time, even when 
Canada has acted unilaterally and not in conformity with international law, as in the case of 
the 1970 AWPPA’s adoption, it has expended considerable efforts to accumulate international 
support and establish a legal basis for the action.  
Moreover, influencing Canadian actions in the Arctic is its concern of not provoking or being 
challenged by its neighbor and close ally, the United States.108 This happened at the IMO with 
regard to the Canadian NORDREG regulations in 2010, with the United States questioning 
the unilateral action of Canada making NORDREG mandatory and criticizing Canada’s 
disregard for freedom of navigation.109 The resulting debate centered heavily on Canada’s 
understanding of Article 234 of the LOSC. This would have provided ample weariness for the 
Polar Code debates, especially regarding the relationship between the Code and Article 234. 
While Russian proposals regarding the Polar Code directly mention Article 234, Canada 
adopted a more cautious approach. Russia’s history as a superpower and ambitions for the 
revival of its great power status mean that it is more likely to and capable of disregarding 
challenges to its actions and regulations.110 Thus, the difference in the way Russia and Canada 
approached the issue of the relationship between the Code and Article 234 can be attributed to 
their political relationships with the United States.  
Furthermore, Canada’s notion of Arctic sovereignty is very much connected to environmental 
protection, suggesting that the issue of sovereignty also motivated Canada towards a more 
environment-friendly approach. The way the question of navigating along the NWP has been 
framed with reference to pollution prevention since the introduction of the AWPPA,111 thus, 
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influenced Canada’s positions on the Polar Code.112 Besides, genuine concern for the health 
of the polar marine environment, this necessitated a balancing of Canada’s economic interests 
with environmental concerns. At the same time, Russia’s sovereignty in the Arctic is 
connected more to strategic-military considerations and control over the water areas of the 
NSR, which is officially defined as a “national transportation route.”113 As Jan Solski has 
observed, recently the role of security-oriented bodies, such as the Ministry of Defense and 
the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB), has been increasing in the management of the 
NSR.114 While strategic-military interests are not threatened by the Polar Code as it does not 
apply to warships,115 control over the waters might be affected by the new regulations that 
also apply to icebreakers, hence also Russia’s efforts to protect these. 
6 Conclusion 
The positions of Canada and Russia during the negotiation of the Polar Code were marked by 
one major similarity that stems from their unique status as the only States relying on the 
extensive coastal State rights granted by Article 234 of the LOSC. The two States tried to 
protect their national regulatory regimes and using the Polar Code to buttress the international 
legal basis for these. However, beyond this, differences dominated their positions. 
Looking beyond the negotiation of the Code, with regard to implementation, Russia appears 
to face a larger bill than Canada, while the requirements of the Code appear to be less 
controversial for Canada than for Russia.116 As regards the further development of regulations 
for ships operating in polar waters, the issue of a regional approach to reception facilities 
suggests that Canada is perhaps moving closer to Russia’s position on where to place the 
balance between environmental protection and economic considerations now that the 
discharge ban is in force.117 Further, neither Russia nor Canada have shown unconditional 
support for a future ban on the use and carriage as fuel of heavy fuel oil,118 with the former 
treating such a ban as a last resort119 and the latter suggesting that the impact of such a ban on 
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Arctic communities and economies be taken into consideration.120 The two States also worked 
together to table the report of an informal correspondence group on the methodology of 
impact assessment for the future ban.121 In spite of the shelving of the question of 
acknowledging coastal State rights, which was the main source of correspondence between 
the two States’ positions, more similarities appear to surface between Canada and Russia, 
potentially affecting ongoing negotiations on the regulation of polar shipping and their future 
outcomes. 
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